Information Theoretic Models of Social Interaction by Salge, Christoph
Information-Theoretic Models of Social Interaction
Christoph Salge
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of the University of Hertfordshire
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The programme of research was carried out in the School of Computer Science,
University of Hertfordshire.
That’s why it’s always worth having a few philosophers around the place.
One minute it’s all Is Truth Beauty and Is Beauty Truth, and Does A Falling
Tree in the Forest Make A Sound if There’s No one There to Hear It, and then
just when you think they’re going to start dribbling one of ’em says, Inciden-
tally, putting a thirty-foot parabolic reflector on a high place to shoot the rays
of the sun at an enemy’s ships would be a very interesting demonstration of
optical principles.
Terry Pratchett, Small Gods
i
Abstract
This dissertation demonstrates, in a non-semantic information-theoretic framework,
how the principles of “maximisation of relevant information” and “information parsi-
mony” can guide the adaptation of an agent towards agent-agent interaction. Central
to this thesis is the concept of digested information; I argue that an agent is intrinsically
motivated to a.) process the relevant information in its environment and b.) display this
information in its own actions. From the perspective of similar agents, who require similar
information, this differentiates other agents from the rest of the environment, by virtue of
the information they provide. This provides an informational incentive to observe other
agents and integrate their information into one’s own decision making process.
This process is formalized in the framework of information theory, which allows for a
quantitative treatment of the resulting effects, specifically how the digested information
of an agent is influenced by several factors, such as the agent’s performance and the
integrated information of other agents.
Two specific phenomena based on information maximisation arise in this thesis. One is
flocking behaviour similar to boids that results when agents are searching for a location in a
girdworld and integrated the information in other agent’s actions via Bayes’ Theorem. The
other is an effect where integrating information from too many agents becomes detrimental
to an agent’s performance, for which several explanations are provided.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In nature there are numerous organisms that interact with others of their own kind,
displaying a list of behaviours and abilities to specifically facilitate this interaction. This
list includes diverse phenomena, such as imitation, learning, cooperation and coordination.
Humans are no exception; arguably having the most complex and best developed forms
of social interaction, including language, writing, mass media, etc.
The development of those phenomena has evidently been a long process of gradual
change (Darwin 1859). In this dissertation I want to investigate if the perspective of
information theory can offer new insights into how this development was motivated, i.e.,
what gradient may have guided the evolution of social interaction?
For several of the aforementioned abilities the benefits for an organism seem obvious.
Social learning and imitation lead to faster acquisition of skills, writing allows us to transfer
information through time and space, and coordination allows joint efforts that achieve
what a single organism could not. But most of these “high level” concepts also include a
number of “lesser” interaction abilities, such as
• the ability to differentiate other agents from the environment,
• directed attention towards other agents,
• understanding of one’s own actions and consequences,
• understanding of other agents’ actions and consequences.
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This makes an evolutionary argumentation for the abilities that we observe at the
end of this gradual adaptation process susceptible to the counter argument of irreducible
complexity. The argument being that these complex abilities, those necessary to enable
high level social interaction, could not have been the result of a single mutation, which
then spread based on its fitness. To counter this argument it would be ideal if one could
not only demonstrate the benefits of the final social interaction abilities, but also identify
a gradient of step-wise development leading there, where each of the developmental steps
is shown to be beneficial by itself. Therefore, this thesis focuses on early stages of social
interaction and asks how the earlier steps towards the development of social interaction
can be motivated?
In this thesis I want to look at this question from the information theoretic perspective,
taking the stance that one of the fundamental properties of life is information processing.
In itself, this is more a change of perspective than an insight into what a living system
is. If we were to consider information processing as a process that causes two different
random variables to be correlated, for example the sensor input of an animal and its
actions, then the idea that life processes information is true, but trivially so. Numerous
non-living processes could make this claim, and so the criterion would fail to exclude any
non-living systems.
It is possible, though, to further refine the hypothesis of life as information processing.
For this purpose, I adopt a hypothesis that has been brought forward already in early cy-
bernetics and has been revived due to new evidence (Barlow 1959, Barlow 2001, Touchette
and Lloyd 2000, Touchette and Lloyd 2004, Attneave 1954, Laughlin 2001, Bialek, Ne-
menman and Tishby 2001, Polani 2009) namely that organisms attempt to optimize their
information processing; more precisely, organisms attempt to maximize the information
attained relevant to their goals under the constraints of their particular sensorimotor (and
neural) equipment. Regarding the evolutionary perspective, this includes the idea that
organism do not necessarily adapt to solve a specific problem, but are optimized regard-
ing relatively generic information theoretic principles, which then in turn enable them to
perform well in different, concrete situations. The resulting organism then would not be
“hard wired” with strategies to deal with concrete situations, but rather be able to “in-
telligently” adapt to different problems by acting or adapting according to more general
principles. This should also make organisms more adaptable in general, as the informa-
tional efficiency of the organism provides an immediate (rather than delayed) gradient for
the effectiveness of the organism’s behaviour, prior to any evolutionary feedback from an
external long-term pay-off.
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In this dissertation I will focus on two candidate principles, which are discussed in more
detail in (Polani 2009), namely, maximisation of relevant information and information
parsimony. Both principles are taken as pragmatic assumptions in this thesis, and the
focus will be to investigate where theses principles lead. While there is some evidence,
which will be discussed in the related work section, that those principles are reasonable
assumptions for the development or real biological organism, proving or disproving these
claims is beyond the scope of this thesis. The only aim related to those claims is to
demonstrate that some of the behaviour that results from these principles is similar to
behaviour observed in biological organism, thereby supporting the idea that such ideas
can indeed lead to more complex, life-like behaviour.
Information Parsimony Information acquisition and processing are found to be very
expensive in terms of metabolic costs. Therefore it is sensible from an evolutionary
standpoint to process the needed information with the least amount of effort, using
only the resources necessary. As a corollary, it is evolutionary sensible to assume that
a given organism would process as much relevant information (information needed
to achieve certain life goals) as possible given a specific organismic sensorimotor
equipment. If the organism could do with less relevant information, its information
processing equipment can be expected to be selected against during evolution.
This is related to, but not the same concept as information limitation, where due to
some physical constraint it is impossible to obtain or process more information. Of
course, all agents are also subject to a form of information limitation, and this
might lead to specific behaviours to cope with the limitation. But information
parsimony is slightly stronger, suggesting that even within the bounds of limited
information, obtaining information is costly; if the same pay-off can be achieved
with less information, then the agent will adapt to use even less information.
Maximisation of Relevant Information In general, a specific amount of information
about the environment is necessary for an organism to select the best available action.
Therefore, it is generally a good strategy to develop the ability to a.) determine
where the relevant information is located and b.) to process this information so it can
positively influence an agent’s actions. Note here, that his principle uses the notion of
“Relevant Information” as defined in Chap. 3. The definition of relevant information
as the minimal mutual information over all optimal strategies implies that there
is indeed an upper bound for the amount of relevant information. If all relevant
information has been obtained, then all additional information is either redundant
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or not relevant for choosing an action. So maximisation of relevant information is
different from just maximising information intake for an agent.
There are indications that immediate sensorimotor efficiency already provides powerful
local gradients for adaptation and evolution (Klyubin, Polani and Nehaniv 2005b, Klyubin,
Polani and Nehaniv 2007, Der, Steinmetz and Pasemann 1999, Ay, Bertschinger, Der,
Gu¨ttler and Olbrich 2008, Sporns and Lungarella 2006, Prokopenko, Gerasimov and Tanev
2006), where those simple, information theoretic principles already generate behaviour
similar to those in simple, biological agents. In (Polani 2009) this is further developed
into a hypothesis that these, and some other principles described in the paper, are not
just descriptive of the properties that organism have acquired through the process of
evolution, but that some organisms have adapted as to actively improve their information
processing in line with these principles. This way, information theoretic principles could
act as a stepping stone in the evolutionary process. Rather than adapting to solve a very
specific goal agents could adapt to deal “better” with information, and thereby become
more proficient at dealing with and adapting to the world in general.
In this context, and to further support this hypothesis, this dissertation investigates
whether and how the previously mentioned principles of information parsimony and max-
imisation of relevant information can lead to agent-agent interaction. Furthermore, I want
to inquire what social phenomena similar to those of biological agents can possible arise
from said principles?
To address this, I will assume a slightly more specific criterion, namely that the agents
are interested in maximizing the relevant information about a life goal (e.g. the location
of food). For this, the agents will have the possibility to detect the food directly or to
observe the behaviour of other agents. Our study will investigate whether and how, under
these circumstances, social interaction can emerge simply from the immediate drive to
maximize relevant information.
To implement a quantitative and consistently informational model, I will use an ap-
proach based on Shannon’s Information Theory, Bayesian Modelling and Causal Bayesian
Networks. Within this information theoretic framework, our agents will build their be-
haviours from the starting point of quite restricted assumptions; in particular, no a priori
social dynamics will be assumed. Based on the information theoretic framework and using
a few assumptions about the world the agents live in I will then introduce the concept of
Digested Information; this will serve as an argument for why the actions produced by one
agent might be of particular interest for another similar agent, even if those actions have
no direct consequences for the other agent, meaning there are no joint pay-off matrices
and the agent’s actions do not affect other agents’ performance.
4
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I will support these conceptual arguments by presenting simulations that support the
plausibility of the previous argument by providing quantitative data in line with the argu-
ment’s predictions. In addition, this will also demonstrate that the information-theoretic
framework allows us to quantify the concrete benefit of observing another agent.
1.2 Research Questions
The general direction of this dissertation can be summarized by the following two research
questions:
1. Does the optimization of information processing lead to agent-agent interaction?
2. What insights can the analytical framework of information theory provide into agent-
agent interaction?
While both questions are closely linked they demarcate nicely what one can take away
from this dissertation depending on one’s own research interests. The first question is
more relevant to the artificial life community, which tries to understand life-like systems,
and ideally wants to replicate them. A major focus in this field is the creation of complex
behaviours or structures from simple principles or rules. So, while a lot of social behaviours
can much easier be produced by some dedicated development towards this behaviour, there
is an interest to create a whole range of such behaviours from the same simple principles,
building agents from the “bottom up”.
The second question is more related to the natural sciences, where actual social be-
haviour is studied. This thesis includes the development of several analytical tools, which
can also be applied to real world biological systems, and could therefore be helpful to
understand actual biological life better.
1.3 Overview
The dissertation will be organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the notation used in the dissertation and specifies the information
theoretic model this thesis operates in. It also contains a review of the literature
related to this work, specifically in the areas of “Information and Cognition”, “Social
Bayesian Learning” and “Game Theory”.
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Chapter 3 introduces Polani et.al.’s concept of Relevant Information(RI). In this chapter
I derive and discuss some of the essential properties of RI and demonstrate how the
RI trade-off curve of a specific scenario can be obtained by an adaptive process.
Furthermore, I introduce a distinction between general relevant information, and
the relevant information in an agent’s sensors. This leads to the introduction of
unique relevant information, which is a formalism that allows us to quantitatively
measure how much relevant information is contained in a specific part of the sensor
input.
Chapter 4 contains the Digested Information argument, where I explain why any agent
that has to process information from the environment in order to perform well also
has to display this information in its actions. I also introduce measurements to
quantify different kinds of digested information, and discuss several factors that in-
fluence how much relevant information is encoded in an agent’s action. This chapter
also contains the analysis of two different simulations that demonstrate the digested
information’s effects, such as how the performance of an agent increases the relevant
information in an agent’s actions.
Chapter 5 contains several different quantitative analyses that study what happens when
an agent incorporates the digested information of other agents into its own internal
model by using Bayes’ Theorem. Even if only one agent uses the information of
others, it is possible that this agent’s selective observation of other agents close to
it introduces a conditional dependence between different observed actions, which in
turn violates one of the basic assumptions of the employed Naive Bayesian Update.
Furthermore, too much information can destroy the information gradient used by
the infotaxis search. The simulations where all agents observe each other also show
evidence of an information cascade, where possibly misleading information is prop-
agated through the agent population. Finally this chapter also demonstrates how
incorporating the relevant information of others is another factor that changes the
relevant information an agent provides itself.
Chapter 6 demonstrates how boids-like flocking behaviour can result from the princi-
ple of information maximisation. Infotaxis search, combined with incorporating the
digested information of other agents leads to agent flocking in the previously dis-
cussed grid-world scenario. This illustrates how a different agent-agent interaction
phenomenon that is also present in nature can arise from the same information-
theoretic principles as used in the previous chapter.
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Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation, and connects the conclusions of the different chap-
ters into an overall argument, outlining why the basic principles of information
maximisation and information parsimony can indeed create a gradient for gradual
adaptation towards social interaction.
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis
• The development of an approximation strategy for the relevant information func-
tion for the dual constraint (relevant information / information parsimony) optimiz-
ing agent based on a genetic algorithm and a neural network which allows us to
approximate relevant information in more complex scenarios. Application of said
approximation to different complex scenarios, including an analysis relating the rel-
evant information trade-off graph to some essential properties of the scenario it was
derived from.
• Extension of the relevant information framework with a formalism for unique relevant
information. This makes it possible for the agent to determine how much relevant
information is contained in a subset of said agent’s sensor input. Compared to the
overall bandwidth it also provides a notion of “information density” which is helpful
to guide adaptation based on information parsimony.
• Development of the Digested Information Concept, an argument why agents that
need to obtain information from the environment in order to perform well have to
display that information in their actions. This includes the development of mea-
sures necessary to quantify this effect, and an analysis of different factors, such as
performance, that influence the provision of digested information. In general, this
provides an argument why agents can act as pre-processors of relevant information
for other agent with similar goals, which in turn provides an argument for the ex-
istence of an informational gradient for the adaptation of basic social interaction,
such as attention to other agents.
• Implementation and analysis of two multi-agent models to evaluate the Digested
Information Concept. This includes the adaptation of the continuous infotaxis for-
malism to a discrete grid world, and an extension of infotaxis to incorporate different
temporal horizons for expected information gain.
• Application of the single-symbol information gain formalism to Social Bayesian learn-
ing in a grid world search task. Includes the detection of an effect where the incorpo-
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ration of two different sources of information (other agents and environment) changes
the internal prior systematically, so that one source make the agent less certain on
average.
• Analysis of information cascade behaviour in regard to how it affects the provided
digested information. Specifically, I demonstrate how the transition of the agent
population into an information cascade moves their strategies away from the trade-
off curve between performance and efficient information processing.
• Generation of boids-like flocking behaviour based on the principle of maximising
relevant information, demonstrating how the optimization of information processing
can lead to coordinated behaviour.
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Background and Related Work
The following chapter will provide the necessary background for the later chapters, and it
will also give a general overview of the related work. This chapter includes definitions for
the key terms used in this thesis, outlining what I understand by information, information
theoretic model and social interaction. Furthermore, while reviewing the existing related
work, I will argue why it is advantageous to employ the information theoretic perspective,
presenting the key benefits of this approach.
2.1 Information
The central concept of this thesis is information, which will be formally defined as some
variant of mutual information in classical information theory. I will give a short historical
overview of the development of information theory to illuminate some of the implicit
assumptions in regard to sender and receiver. I will then introduce the formal basis for
information theory, including the notation used in this thesis. Based on the information
theoretic formalism I will then define the term information as used in this thesis.
There are several common concepts using the term “Information”; a hierarchical
overview based on their different properties can be found in an overview by Floridi (2011).
To avoid confusing the reader I will differentiate the definition of information used in this
thesis against other definitions by discussing some of its basic properties, namely observer
independence and being non-semantic in nature. This will also help to argue against the
notion that the absence of sender and receiver poses a problem in applying information
theory to natural systems, which was raised by Gibson (1986).
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2.1.1 Development of Information Theory
Information Theory has undergone several stages of development in which its scope and
applications have changed considerably. The core elements of Information Theory were
developed by Claude Shannon to deal with the limitations of transatlantic communication
(Shannon 1948). His initial work, and the context it is applied to is well characterized by
the title “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” (MTC).
“Information theory answers two fundamental questions in communication
theory: What is the ultimate data compression? (answer: the entropy H),
and what is the ultimate transmission rate of communication? (answer: the
channel capacity C)”(Cover and Thomas 1991)
But Thomas and Cover, and others, go on to argue that MTC has applications beyond
the standard problems of communication theory.
The mathematical theory of communication formalises the fundamental limitations
of any kind of communication channel. If the minimal encoding of a message has more
bits than the available amount of transmission bandwidth, or the amount of storage (as
storing information is transmitting a message through time), then perfect communication
is not possible. But the general mathematical formulation of information theory based on
random variables allows the application of those upper and lower bound considerations
to more than just humans sending messages to each other. Shannon already argued that
other natural processes, such as music or speech (Shannon 1951), have a certain irreducible
complexity, a property he named entropy, or later, self-information.
Once the basic parameters of a given system are formalized in random variables, MTC
can be used to illustrate the fundamental limitations of a diversity of systems. A common
application is an argument that something is impossible to do, because the amount of
necessary information that would need to be transferred to achieve a specific objective
exceeds the channel capacity of the channel used for this transfer. This general idea leads
to a wider application of MTC, where the information theoretic limitations of different
systems were studied (Touchette and Lloyd 2000). One motivation was to evaluate how
well a technical solution would approximate the theoretically achievable optimum. But it
became clear that the same idea could also be applied to the study of natural systems,
such as the replication process of genetic code (Prokopenko, Polani and Chadwick 2009),
or the efficiency of animal communication (McCowan, Hanser, Doyle et al. 2004).
10
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1.2 Formalism
Information theory (Shannon 1948, Cover and Thomas 1991) in a formal sense can be
applied to any set of random variables. I denote random variables with capital letters,
and the states they can assume with lower case letters. Let X be a random variable that
can assume the states x, where each state x is an member of the alphabet X . Then P (X)
is the probability distribution of X, and P (X = x) is the probability that X assumes the
value x. This will also be denoted as p(x).
With this notation information theory defines the entropy of a random variable X as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
P (X = x) logP (X = x). (2.1)
This is often described as the uncertainty about the outcome of X, the average expected
surprise, or else the average information gained if one was to observe the state ofX, without
having prior knowledge about X. The entropy has a number of important properties.
Among others, the a priori uncertainty (i.e. entropy) is larger if the outcomes are more
evenly distributed than if the outcomes are more concentrated on a particular value - in
other words - concentrated values are easier to predict than uniformly spread ones.
Consider two jointly distributed random variables, X and Y ; then we can calculate
the conditional entropy of X given a particular outcome Y = y as
H(X|Y = y) = −
∑
x∈X
P (X = x|Y = y) logP (X = x|Y = y). (2.2)
This can be averaged over all states of Y , resulting in the conditional entropy of X given
Y ,
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
P (Y = y)
∑
x∈X
P (X = x|Y = y) log(P (X = x|Y = y)). (2.3)
This is the entropy of X that remains, on average, if Y is known. So H(X) and H(X|Y )
are the entropy of X before and after we learn the state of Y . Thus, their difference is
the amount of information we can learn, on average, about X by knowing Y . Subtracting
one from the other, we get a value called mutual information,
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(XY ). (2.4)
The mutual information is symmetrical (Cover and Thomas 1991) and measures the
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amount of information one random variable contains about another (and vice versa, by
symmetry). Also, note that I use the binary logarithm for all log(.) operations, so all
information measurements are in bits.
2.1.3 Definition of Information
Based on the formalism introduced in the last section, Information will be defined as the
mutual information between two random variables. If I say that one variable contains in-
formation about another, I mean that the mutual information between those two variables
is larger than zero. Furthermore, if one variable X is said to contain a certain amount of
information, this then refers to the mutual information with itself, I(X;X). This is also
often called self-information, and is numerically identical to the entropy of X, since
I(X;X) = H(X)−H(X|X) = H(X)− 0 = H(X). (2.5)
Properties of Information
Some confusion regarding the properties of information, as defined in this thesis, results
from the communication model presented in the original paper, and the implicit assump-
tions it introduced. Shannon defined a communication system as essentially consisting of
the following five parts:
1. Information Source
2. Transmitter
3. Channel
4. Receiver
5. Destination
Communication is considered successful if the destination can reconstruct the state of the
information source. The channel is defined by a distribution of the output states for every
possible input state, a conditional distribution. The transmitter and receiver are also
conditional distributions that map the information source to the channel input, and the
channel output to the destination variable. It is assumed here that those mappings can
be changed in order to optimize the use of the channel.
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Observer Independence
In the classical interpretation this usually carries an implicit assumption about involved
agents. Either a sender and receiver who both know the channel, and agreed on an
encoding and decoding scheme to use the channel efficiently, or in the case of a more
technical application, an external agent who knows the channel distribution and engineers
a transmitter and receiver to optimally use the channel. These assumptions limit the
generalized application of the mathematical theory of communication. Gibson (1986)
for example is sceptical, and argues that there are in general no intentional senders and
receivers in nature. But the formalism of information as mutual information does not
necessarily need these assumptions, as a simple example illustrates.
It is generally assumed that the number of tree rings correspond to the age of a tree.
While there might sometimes be deviations from this rule, I think it is safe to say that
there is a high correlation between the number of tree rings and the age of a tree. It follows
that there is mutual information between the number of tree rings, and the age of the tree,
hence one contains information about the other. For an agent to use this information, i.e.
to determine the age of a tree, the agent would have to know about this relationship. The
agent would have to understand the conditional distribution of the channel. But, even if
no agent would know, even if there were no humans, the tree rings would still contain this
information.
So we see that the term information defined as mutual information is observer inde-
pendent, meaning that the value of information is not dependent on a specific observer,
nor is it measured from the perspective of a specific observer. The idea of measurable
information does imply that there is some model or other way to conceptualize the world,
and I will assume for my arguments that such a model exists, even if it is not necessarily
accessible to the agent.
To clarify this it might be helpful to use the terminology used for signs, where each
sign has a signifier, an object and an interpretant. For a proper sign a signifier has to be
about an object, and refer to it, and an interpretant that understands the relation between
the last two. Information, as used here, differs from this as it is fully determined by the
relation of the two variables, but does not require an interpretant.
Information could in theory also be defined for an observer. It would be possible to
assume that an agent knows only to a certain degree how two variables are related. In
this case one would ask how much information does one variable give the agent about
another variable. This will be studied in more detail later in this thesis, but it is not
what is quantified by mutual information, and therefore is not included in the concept
of information as used in this thesis. In this definition variables can contain information
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about another regardless whether someone can access it or not. Therefore, the definition
of information presented here should be applicable even if there are no intentional senders
or receivers.
Non Semantic
Information, as used in this thesis, is considered to be non-semantic. There have been
attempts to extend information theory, or build upon it, in order to attach some semantics
to Shannon information (Dretske 1981), but mutual information in itself does not have a
semantic interpretation, nor does it requires any semantics to evaluate.
Without going fully into what exactly is meant by semantics, and meaning, (a more
extensive account can be found in (Floridi 2011), some simple examples already demon-
strate that mutual information lacks already the basic properties for semantics. For one
thing, it is, as Dretske calls it, “an argument by amount”. Mutual information only an-
swers the question of “how much” information is present, but does not address what this
information means, or what this information is. All that mutual information returns is a
numerical value.
Furthermore, all basic properties of information theory (entropy, mutual information,
channel capacity) only depend on the probability distributions of the random variables
involved, and not on any of their actually assumed values. So, even if there was some
meaning attached to the specific state one of those variables could assume, then informa-
tion theory would not treat this state any differently because of it.
While the formalism of information theory is unable to deal with any form of semantics,
it should also be noted, that it might still be possible to gain insights into those fields, by
using the tools provided by information theory. This thesis deliberately does not venture
into the rich field of philosophical discussion surrounding the concept of representation, but
there is a certain proximity to the idea of biosemantics (Millikan 1989) in the later chapters
of this work. One central question regarding representations is how they gain the property
of “intentionality” or “aboutness” regarding the thing they represent. Millikan argues that
representations are the result of functions that adapted through an evolutionary process.
In this process certain producers developed functions that would produce representations
which would both contain a fact about the world but also an implicit directive to action,
while consumer mechanism adapted to use these representations to their benefit. The
meaning of those representations then is identical to the functions they fulfil.
In the later parts of this thesis I will make a slightly different argument, namely that
agent’s actions contain information because the agent adapted to act according to its en-
vironment, and thereby also adapted to encode specific valuable information about that
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environment; not because it was interested in passing this information on, but because it
has to display this information in its actions in order to act correctly. The adaptation of
observers on the other hand invokes similar arguments to those used to argue for the adap-
tation of consumer mechanism, but does not require a co-evolution, as the development
of the information display in the actions is self motivated.
In any case, the concept of information does not contain any semantics by itself.
2.2 Information Theoretic Model
2.2.1 Causal Bayesian Models
To model the causal structure connecting the random variables Causal Bayesian Networks
(CBN) are used (Pearl 2000). A CBN is a directed, acyclic graph, in which the nodes
represent random variables. The directed edges represent conditional probability distri-
butions.
A CBN has the following property. Let G = (V,E) be a directed, acyclic graph, and
X is a set of random variables indexed by V , and xpa(v) are defined as the states of the
parent nodes of xv. Then the probability for the overall system to assume the state x is
p(x) =
∏
v∈V
p(xv|xpa(v)). (2.6)
From this follows the so called “causal Markov property”, formalized as
Xv ⊥⊥ XV \de(v)|Xpa(v), (2.7)
where de(v) indexes all those nodes that are descendants of Xv, and V \de(v) are all those
nodes that are not descendants of Xv. This means any variable in a CBN is statistically
independent of all its non-descendants if conditioned on its parents. Or, more informally,
knowing the states of a variable’s parents tells us all there is to know about that node;
there is nothing else influencing it in the graph. All the descendants can be considered to
assume their state “later” than XV , and therefore have no influence at all.
Pearl describes how a CBN can be constructed for a set of random variables, given
either a joint probability distribution, or sufficient statistics to construct such a distribu-
tion. The resulting CBN might not be unique, though. But if it is possible to intervene
at any random variable at will, then a unique CBN can be constructed; one that, as Pearl
argues, models the causal structure of the variables.
For specific computer simulations it is rarely necessary to reconstruct the CBN from
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data, since looking at the implementation usually reveals which parameters influence what
other parameters. On the other hand, if one wants to apply a CBN model to a real-world
scenario, then it is necessary to reconstruct from statistics. Intervention can still be
avoided in many cases if additional context can be used, such as the fact that a later event
cannot causally influence an earlier event.
For the arguments in this thesis it is also secondary how the CBN is determined, it
only matters that the system in question can be modelled by a CBN. Keeping in mind
that even this, in general, is contested (Spohn 2000), I want to make clear that for the
models we are looking at it is assumed that their relevant properties can be modelled with
a CBN.
2.2.2 Perception Action Loop
A possible way to model an agent’s interaction with the world is the perception action
loop (PAL). The PAL has been used as a model in various previous work, and all the
models in this thesis can be formalized as PALs.
A simple PAL is a CBN consisting of three random variables, or sets of random vari-
ables, which will be labelled as A (actuators), S (sensors) and R (rest of the world).
Fig 2.1(a) shows this loop unrolled in time. The arrows make it clear that the sensors get
influenced by the rest of the world, which in turn then influence the agent’s actions. The
next step of the environment then depends on the previous environment and the action
of the agent. This clearly separates how information can get in and out of the agents.
Influence from the agent on the environment has to go through A, and information from
the environment to the agent has to go through S.
The agent’s strategy, or decision making, is represented by the ability of the agent to
change the conditional probability P (A|S). If there is some dependence between A and
S, i.e. I(A;S) > 0, then I will call the agent reactive. The agent in this case processes
information from its sensors and acts accordingly.
Fig. 2.1(b) shows a modification of this model by adding another random variable,
called M , for memory. M influences the agent’s actions and is in turn influenced by
previous states of the memory and by the sensors. This allows the agent to react to
information from an earlier point in time or to aggregate information. An agent without
such a variable is called memoryless, and can only react to the current sensor input.
In case the agent has an internal memory, the agent’s control over its behaviour then
extends to how its internal state is influenced by its sensors, and in turns influences the
agent’s actuators. The agent, in general, has no control over how its actions affect the
rest of the world, or how the world affects its sensors, i.e. the agent cannot change the
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Figure 2.1: Causal Bayesian network of the perception-action loop, unrolled in time, showing (a) a
memoryless model, (b) a model including agent memmory, and (c) a model containing two agents.
conditional probabilities P (R|A) and P (S|R).
Similar models have been used in a variety of other scientific work (Capdepuy 2010,
Klyubin et al. 2007, van Dijk, Polani and Nehaniv 2010). Most of the further related
work either explicitly or implicitly assumes this model. The general arguments made in
this thesis pertain to this model, and should therefore apply to those cases which can be
captured by a PAL. The actual simulation models are more specific, but can be expressed
in terms of a PAL with memory.
The perception action loop is closely related to the concept of Umwelt by von Uexku¨ll
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(1909). The Umwelt of an agent is all that the agent can interact with and perceive,
those things that the agent causally interacts with. Through actions the agent shapes
and changes its own Umwelt. Specifically, von Uexku¨ll also introduces the idea of circular
interaction with the Umwelt, where an agent effector would influence the Umwelt, which
in turn would lead to different experiences for the agents receptor. More modern work
(Capdepuy, Polani and Nehaniv 2007a) also relates the concept of Umwelt to information-
theoretic studies of the perception action loop.
2.2.3 Agent Interaction
To deal with several agents in a perception action loop framework I will assume that the
variable R can be further decomposed into another agent and the remaining environment.
The CBN seen in Fig. 2.1(c) captures this more closely. In general, this is still an agent
interacting with the world, but the world now also contains another agent. This works
well with our initial question of how to distinguish an agent from the world, because it sets
up the random variables pertaining to an agent as just being part of the environment of
another agent. So, initially, there is nothing special about the random variables belonging
to another agent, compared to those belonging to the remaining environment.
Coming back to another major part of this dissertation, I need to formalize social
interaction. Because of the non-semantic nature of the underlying information concept it
is difficult to formalize social interaction as more than one agent reacting to the actions
of other agents. Therefore, Social Interaction will be defined as statistical dependence
between one agent’s actions and another agent’s actions. Or, more formally, as a non-zero
mutual information between two agent’s action variables. While this is not very helpful to
differentiate between them, it at least captures most basic forms of social interaction, such
as learning, coordination, cooperation and imitation. It does have the problem that it
would also capture common-cause reasons for mutual information, where both agents act
similarly because of similar observations in the past. It might be undesirable to classify
this as social interaction, but in this case one could utilize some measure of information
flow (Ay and Polani 2008) to differentiate further.
To summarize: the above described framework, consisting of random variables which
form a perception-loop with the environment, constitutes the information-theoretic model
in which I am going to ask how agent-agent interaction can be motivated through infor-
mation theoretic constraints and optimization of specific information theoretic measures.
The next section will review the related work regarding information and cognition, and
discuss some of the existing formalisms for information theoretic behaviour generation.
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2.3 Related Work
2.3.1 Information and Cognition
Information processing is a necessary requirement for life; an organism that wants to react
to its environment has to first acquire this information. The law of “requisite variety”
(Ashby 1956, Touchette and Lloyd 2000, Touchette and Lloyd 2004) formalizes this, and
shows that the control of an organism is limited by the amount of information it has
obtained. Already at that time is has also been suggested that information plays an
important role in understanding cybernetic systems, and that information theory is a
suitable way to gain quantitative insights (Barlow 1959, Attneave 1954).
In this context Polani’s “Currency of Life” (Polani 2009) offered the hypothesis that the
adaptive process that enables organisms to deal with the environment might not only be
driven directly by the optimization of performance, but includes as an intermediate step
the optimization of the agent and the agent’s behaviour in regard to some information
theoretic principles. This would increase the adaptability of the agent immensely, as it
would not just rely on external reward functions, but could be supported by some agent-
internal information gradient. The general idea here is that an agent would adapt to
optimize its information processing, and this in turn would allow the agent to deal with
a wide variety of problems. A good example here is Lizier’s work (Lizier, Prokopenko
and Zomaya 2008a, Lizier, Prokopenko, Tanev and Zomaya 2008b), where he analysed
the control of a snakebot. Applying a genetic algorithm to optimize the snakebot in
regard to its achieved forward momentum also increases the information transfer between
the different actuators of the agent. The second value could be measured by the agent
internally, and could then be optimized, which in turn might cause the snake bot to move
faster.
To support the hypothesis that the adaptation of life is driven by informational prin-
ciples it would be useful to demonstrate how real world biological phenomena can be re-
produced from some of those principles. This artificial life approach (Adami 1998) would
increase the plausibility of such principles. The two principles I want to focus on here
specifically, are the maximisation of relevant information and information parsimony.
Information Maximisation
Following from the law of “requisite variety” (Ashby 1956) it becomes clear that a certain
amount of information is necessary to perform a specific task. This leads to the question
of how much information is necessary to perform optimally for an agent? This has been
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formalized in the concept of Relevant Information (Polani, Martinetz and Kim 2001,
Polani, Nehaniv, Martinetz and Kim 2006), which will be introduced in more detail later.
In short, relevant information is the amount of information an agent needs to perform
optimally, which is also the mutual information between the actions of an agent A and
the environment R.
Since it is necessary for an agent to obtain and process relevant information, this
general idea motivates several optimizations regarding the agents information processing.
For example, Linsker’s “Infomax” (Linsker 1988) optimizes a multi-layer neural network
so it preserves the maximum amount of mutual information between the layers. Other
strategies include the maximisation of information intake. A biologically relevant example,
which will be discussed in more detail later, is “infotaxis” (Vergassola, Villermaux and
Shraiman 2007), where an agent chooses its actions to maximise the expected gain in
entropy reduction in regard to some relevancy variable. Vergassola demonstrates that this
leads to the reproduction of the idiosyncratic flight patterns used by moths trying to find
mating partners.
Information Parsimony
The second principle is based on the physically motivated idea that processing information
is work in itself and requires energy and resources expenditure (Polani 2009, Laughlin
2001). An organism therefore should only process information that is necessary and should
optimize its information processing so that the necessary processing gets done with a
minimum of informational cost. One exemplary biological inspiration for this idea is the
sensor degradation observed in the eyes of animals that have no, or very little, exposure
to light within their lifetime (Jeffery 2005).
A formalism which combines both principles is the information bottleneck approach
(Tishby, Pereira and Bialek 1999) where a random variable X is mapped to another
variable Y , maximising the mutual information I(Y ;Z) to a relevancy variable Z, while
at the same time minimizing the mutual information I(X;Y ). This both maximizes the
relevant information Y contains about Z, but at the same time it keeps the information
processing from X to Y to a minimum.
2.3.2 Embodied and Situated Cognition
A major paradigm shift in artificial intelligence and studies of cognition has been brought
about by the idea of embodiment and situated cognition (Varela, Thompson and Rosch
1992, Almeida e Costa and Rocha 2005). Capdepuy (2010) argues that the information
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theoretic framework in general, and the perception action loop in particular, are well suited
to model this paradigm. The CBN offers a natural decomposition where it is clear:
• which parts of the simulation are controlled by the agent’s strategy (the mappings
between the sensors and the actuators, and all mappings involving the memory)
• which mappings represent the embodiment of the agent and define how it interacts
with the world (the mapping from the world to the sensors, and the mapping from
the actuators to the world)
Also, since all information about the world has to pass through the sensor variable, it is
easy to ensure that the agent can only act on information it obtained itself. One of the
challenges associated with this shift is to figure out how an agent can make sense of its
environment and act intelligently, when nothing is initially known about the world. A
good example to illustrate this problem is the scenario by Bongard, Zykov and Lipson
(2006), where an AI is placed inside an unknown robot body, and has to figure out how
to control the body, and derive its basic configuration.
Recent research demonstrated that the information theoretic framework is well equipped
to deal with this, especially in the area of sensor evolution and adaptation. Philipona,
O’Regan and Nadal (2003) describes a scenario, where initially all the agent gets in terms
of sensor input is a sequence of binary data. They demonstrate that it is possible to derive
the dimensionality of the world the agent is situated in. Furthermore, Olsson demonstrates
that, if separate sensor inputs can be identified, then it is possible to use the information
distance between them to determine the configuration of a visual field (Olsson, Nehaniv
and Polani 2004), or to derive the relationship between different actuators and sensors
on a robot (Olsson, Nehaniv and Polani 2006). Furthermore, Salge and Polani (2009)
demonstrated that hierarchical clustering based on the information distance, and subse-
quent bottleneck-like mapping of the clustered variables is able to extract salient features
of the environment, such as dominant line structure, and regions of increased activity. All
those applications can be done from the agent’s internal perspective, and do not require
meaning associated with the sensor input.
In terms of behaviour generation information theory has been successfully applied to
an area called guided self-organization (Prokopenko 2009). The general idea here is to
find generic, agent-internal principles that can be used to generate behaviour independent
of specific agent goals. The information theoretic measure of empowerment (Klyubin et
al. 2005b) for example measures the channel capacity between an agent’s actions and its
sensors. This is interpreted as a measure of how much reliable control an agent has over
the world it can perceive. By choosing actions that increase empowerment an agent strives
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to get to a position in the world where it has the largest effect on and most control of it.
Unempowered states, such as death, are to be avoided. Even without a goal, this gives
an agent an internally measurable utility function to guide is behaviour. Interestingly,
the behaviour resulting from this one generic formalism corresponds to behaviour that
seems reasonable in a lot of different scenarios. It causes agent to go to central points in
a maze (Klyubin, Polani and Nehaniv 2005a), balances pendulums (Salge, Glackin and
Polani 2012, Jung, Polani and Stone 2011) and even generates some form of collective
behaviour (Capdepuy, Polani and Nehaniv 2007b) and coordination (Capdepuy, Polani
and Nehaniv 2011). Similar successes have been achieved with “Predictive Information”
(Ay et al. 2008) and “Homeokinesis” (Der et al. 1999), where other information-based
measures were used to generate agent behaviour.
In summary, the idea that basic cognition can be understood in terms of information
processing, and that basic adaptation can be guided by informational principles is well
established. In this dissertation I want to build on this work, and explore whether the
principles applied here are sufficient to generate agent-agent interaction.
2.3.3 Information and Social Interaction in Nature
The idea that the interaction between biological agents is related to the processing of
information (the term information being used in a more general, commons sense way),
has been well established. A classical example is the work of Ward and Zahavi (1973),
which details for birds how communal roosting is beneficial, as other birds or aggregation
of birds can provide important information regarding food, predators, etc. Even more
closely related is Danchin’s idea of inadvertent social information (Danchin, Giraldeau,
Valone and Wagner 2004), in which he stipulates that agents are encoding information
into their actions without a specific intend to communicate. This is then later supported
by empirical studies of the effects of inadvertent social information in different animals
(Parejo, Danchin, Silva, White, Dreiss and Avile´s 2008, Baude, Dajoz and Danchin 2008).
There is in fact, as pointed out by Call and Carpenter (2002), a long list of research
that uses information or related ideas to study social learning in animals. This research,
and the terminology used there is varied, so that Call and Carpenter (2002) argue that
the question of what information can be gained from social learning should be ordered in
three categories: actions, results and goals. The work in this thesis focusses mainly on the
information in actions.
Another problem, pointed out by Stephens (1993), is that a lot of models have agents
that act as if they know where the relevant information is located in the actions of another
agent. In this thesis, I also aim do demonstrate how an agent could determine this.
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2.3.4 Game Theory
Another theory that is both well developed and often applied to the formal analysis of
social interaction is game theory. In general, the theory deals with the question of how a
rational economic agent should act (make a decision between a set of mutually exclusive
options) to maximise its own pay-off in an interaction with other agents who are also
assumed to act in a way to maximise their own pay-off. Interestingly, this can lead to
outcomes that are neither preferred, nor intended by any of the agents (Ross 2011).
Economic Rationality
Rationality, or economic rationality in this context is understood as:
1. knowing which actions (probabilistically) lead to which outcomes,
2. having a consistent preference with regard to all outcomes, which defines a pay-off
or utility for each outcome,
3. acting accordingly as to maximise the expectation of ones own outcome.
Formally, this can be easily applied to the information theoretic model we outlined
earlier. The action variable A’s alphabet is exactly the set the agent has to chose an
action from, and the underlying Causal Bayesian Network is exactly what the agent needs
to know to understand how its actions potentially lead to different outcomes. Given a
utility function for all outcomes, the agent would be faced with a simple decision making
problem, where each action could be associated with a corresponding expected utility. The
problem in an agent-agent interaction, and the defining problem for game theory, is how
to make this decision if your decision also depends on another agent who rationally tries
to maximise its own pay-off itself taking into account you decisions, etc.
To illustrate, imagine you and a friend, who both like cake, are offered three different
cakes. Each of you has to separately pick one, and if you both choose different cakes then
you get the cake you have chosen, respectively. If you both chose the same cake, then
there will be no cake for either of you. Now, the cakes are of slightly different size, and
both of you would prefer the biggest cake. Which cake should you pick? You might want
to take the biggest cake, but then your friend could use the same reasoning, and then
there would be no cake. Similarly, if you decide to settle for the medium cake to avoid a
collision, your friend could do the same. Even if you go for the smallest cake, the one least
likely to be picked by your friend, you could not exclude that your friend might reason
the exact same way, again creating a situation with no cake.
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It should be obvious that this self-referential and circular reasoning has the potential
to create all kinds of problematic and paradoxical situations. Game theory now offers a
framework to understand how an agent would determine its own optimal decision.
Classical Game Theory
The field originated with the Minimax Theorem from von Neumann’s paper “Zur Theorie
der Gesellschaftspiele” (von Neumann 1928) which dealt with two player games with the
properties of:
• full-information: All player know everything there is to know about the game up till
now, its complete current state, and the rules of the game.
• zero-sum: For each outcome state the associated outcomes for all players sum to
zero. So, if one player get a positive outcome of V , then the outcome of the other
player is -V . In general, one player’s gain is another player’s loss.
Chess or Checkers are examples of such a games, as they have two players, both players
know all there is to know about the rules and the state of the game (position of pieces on
the board), and a better outcome for one player equates to a worse outcome for the other
player.
For all two player, zero-sum, full-information games von Neumann proved the existence
of a mixed strategy that will guarantee the two players a pay-off of at least V or −V ,
respectively. If both players know these strategies, this essentially solves the game, and
the outcome is predetermined. Deviating from the optimal minimax strategy allows for
the deviating player to be exploited by its opponent. The resulting strategies are therefore
called stable, or strategic equilibria.
Prisoners Dilemma
Building upon this, game theory has also been extended for multiple player games (Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern 1944), and to games with a more general pay-off distribution than
zero-sum games. A prominent example here is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)(Rapoport
and Chammah 1965). The story to illustrate this dilemma is that of two criminals who
are caught by the police and interrogated separately. Both are offered the same options:
they can either confess to the crime (Defecting, in regard to their fellow prisoner), or be
silent (Cooperating with their fellow prisoner).
If both stay silent the police can only incarcerate them for minor charges (1 year),
but if one confesses he will go free, while the other will be put away for 15 years. If both
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P2 cooperates P2 defects
P1 cooperates -1 / -1 -15 / 0
P1 defects 0 / -15 -10 / -10
Table 2.1: This table shows the different pay-offs for a two-player Prisoner Dilemma. Depending
on the actions of both players, Player One (P1) will receive the first pay-off in a cell, and Player
Two (P2) the second. The pay-offs are negative, so 0 is the largest and therefore the most desirable
pay-off.
confess, then neither of them will receive mercy, and both will go to jail for 10 years.
This can be visualized as a joint pay-off matrix seen in Table 2.1. Each player’s pay-off
depending on its own actions, and the actions of the other player(s).
PD is a particularly interesting example because a.) it has been related to a number of
real world scenarios such as “Mutual Assured Destruction” (Darwen and Yao 2002) and
b.) it is at first glance unclear why a rational agent would ever cooperate. If one looks
at the pay-off matrix it becomes clear that no matter how the other player acts, defecting
is always preferable. This of course leaves both player worse of than if they would both
cooperate, but the are effectively stuck in the mutual defection position, since neither can
change its own strategy unilaterally and receive a better pay-off. This state is then called
a Nash-Equilibrium (Nash et al. 1950).
One possible solution has been proposed by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) in “The
Evolution of Cooperation”. The key insight here is the idea of an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. It would still be irrational for an agent to cooperate for a single encounter, but
if the agent’s would know that there was a possibility for future encounters then they
would have to act with taking into account that their current actions could influence the
willingness to cooperate of the other player.
Without going into much more detail, it should be mentioned that this kind of analysis
has been applied to a number of real world social situations and phenomena, specifically
when dealing with rational agents that are motivated by their own gain in a somewhat
antagonistic scenario. To contrast the work in this thesis with the vast body of game
theoretic analysis I would like to point out again that classical game theory not only
presupposed the agent’s own ability to make rational decision, but also the ability to
determine the rational decisions of all other players. This require the agent to
• know that there is another agent,
• know the other agents preferences in outcome,
• know the available action options of the other agent,
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• and know what the other agent’s action would result in.
While this is already a problematic assumption in human agents, these aggressive assump-
tions go far beyond the intention of this thesis to look at the first steps towards agent-agent
interaction, since these abilities would place a high cognitive burden on the agent.
Evolutionary Approaches to Game Theory
A possible approach to shift the cognitive burden and make the models more biological
plausible is the introduction of evolutionary processes. One classic example is the previ-
ously mentioned example of Axelrod’s ”Evolution of Cooperation”. In (Axelrod 1997) he
used and evolutionary algorithm, proposed by (Holland 1992) to search for good strategies
to play iterated prisoners dilemma.
A genetic algorithm is, in essence, a heuristic to find a good solution to a high-
dimensional optimization problem. The most simple version consists of the following
steps:
1. Initialization: A random population of genomes is creates, each representing a
solution for the problem. They are expressed in a language that is able to model all
possible solutions or parameter combinations.
2. Selection: Based on a fitness function each genome gets a fitness value. A certain
number of genomes is then selected to reproduce, while the selection favours the
genomes with higher fitness values.
3. Reproduction: A new population is created, based on the selected genomes. Those
new genomes are usually either mutated (changed slightly), or combinations of the
selected genomes, or both.
4. Termination: The simulation then jumps back to the selection step, unless a ter-
mination criterion is reached. This is usually a certain number of time steps, a
threshold fitness value, or the lack of fitness increase.
Several modifications and refinements have been introduced to make this process more
efficient, but most versions still contain those four steps. All that is usually needed to
apply a genetic algorithm is an appropriate representation of all possible solutions to form
the genome, and some way to assign a fitness value. This makes it possible to apply this
heuristic to find a good strategy for agents in a competitive scenario. For example, in
(Salge and Mahlmann 2010), genetic algorithms were used to evolve several strategies to
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play a turn-based strategy game. The fitness value then simply becomes the percentage
of won games. Similarly, strategies for game theoretic scenarios can be evolved. For
example, when Axelrod applied the optimization algorithm to a population of strategies
that would play iterated prisoners dilemma against each other the population would over
time evolve to contain only strategies that played ”tit-for-tat”, a strategy where you
mirror the last move of your opponent, and start by cooperating. This led to mutual
cooperation all around. But this result has to be treated with caution, since (Ashlock,
Kim and Leahy 2006) demonstrated that the resulting population depends heavily on
the representation chosen for the genome. He showed that it is possible to have stable
populations full of defecting agents, or oscillating populations, depending on how the
strategies are represented as genomes.
A very similar approach is the mathematical field of ”Evolutionary Game Theory”,
which is based on the notion of differential reproduction. For a stable environment there
are certain species with heritable features. If those features are beneficial, meaning they
increase the expected number of offspring, then the next generation should have more
agents with those heritable features.
Based on this it is also possible to define a game theoretic scenario, where the optimal
strategy or feature set depends on other agents. A classical example is a world that
contains two competing species, which fill the same niche, apart from the ability to digest
two specific plants. If those two nutritious plants exist in the same quantity, then we
can see that they only stable solution is a population where animals that can digest
the first, and those that can digest the second, have the same number of specimens. If
one species’ population is larger, then the other species could always find slightly more
food per specimen, and could reproduce faster. If both species have the same number,
then switching from one strategy to the other would offer no benefit. This is called an
evolutionarily stable strategy, a population consisting of different strategies or solutions in
a relation so that any change away from this distribution would be harmful to an agent.
Without going into more detail, we can see that in those models the cognitive work
of finding a solution if moved out of the agent, into the evolutionary process. Finding
the right strategy becomes evolving the right strategy. Still, the models retain the basic
property that stable solution are situations where it would be irrational for a single agent,
or species to switch away from its current strategy.
Difference between Game Theory and the Presented Work
While game theory offers a lot of insight into several social interaction phenomena, and
can in theory be applied to similar agent-agent models (if a utility function is assumed),
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it also differs in scope and in some underlying assumptions to the work presented in this
thesis.
First of all, the classical game theoretic approach assumes not only rational behaviour
in the agent itself, but also the ability to predict the rational behaviour of others. This
requires the assumption of extensive cognitive abilities, including theory of mind-like abil-
ities in regard to the other agents.
Even if we assume that the cognitive work of finding equilibrium strategies is not done
by an individual agent in its own lifetime, but as an adaptive, evolutionary process in a
population of agents, then game theory still requires a joint pay-off matrix to create any
kind of social interaction. The basic assumption in all of game theory is that the decision
of another agent can directly influence one’s pay-off, and therefore has to be taken into
account when deciding one’s own action. If the joint pay-off matrix would show the same
values regardless of what the other agent does, then game theory would not need to be
applied at all. In this thesis, I want to focus on possible motivations for interaction in
scenarios where an agent’s action does not influence another agent’s pay-off, which is not
covered by game theory as such.
What will find application later on, however, is the basic idea that strategies can
be subject to evolution, and the idea that a stable strategy has to be the result of an
individuals agent’s optimization. An overall stable population requires an equilibrium
where no individual agent can change its own strategy without losing utility.
2.3.5 Social Bayesian Learning
Another related area of research is “Social Bayesian Learning”, a field that deals with
the integration of other agent’s information via Bayes’ Theorem. In the coming chapters
I will demonstrate why it is reasonable to assume that another agent’s actions contain
information, and why it is likely that this information is relevant for other agents. As-
suming that this is the case, an obvious incentive for social interaction is the acquisition
of this information via learning. But if all agents acquire information from others it is
possible that the influence of this information on their behaviour becomes stronger than
the influence of their own private information. This can lead to a case where an agent
acts based on the information from its observation of others, rather than based on its own
observation of the world.
Consider the example by Easley and Kleinberg (2010), where one agent wants to choose
between restaurant A and B, which are next door to each other. His own research suggests
that restaurant A is better, but once he gets there, no one is eating in restaurant A, while
restaurant B is filled with customers. Based on this information it is reasonable to infer
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that several other agents have private information that caused them to choose B instead
of A. By inferring this additional information it becomes rational to choose B instead of
A, even if your own private information suggests otherwise.
The problem here is that others might make similar conclusions, and create a chain
reaction of inferred private information that is based on no private information whatsoever.
The first guest could just have been uninformed, had no preference for either A or B, and
then has picked B at random. The second guest might have also been uninformed, and
picked B because the observation of the first guest acted as a symmetry breaker. The
third guest then already saw two guests, and this might have caused him to overrule is
own private information for A. All following guest could have preferred A prior to arriving,
and then all made the same rational inference to choose B. In the end nearly everyone
had private information to go to A, but all ended up going to B, via a process of rational
decisions.
This phenomenon has been called herding or an information cascade by Banerjee
(1992). Similar concepts can be found in (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992),
including examples of information cascades in the real world, and conceptual examples
on how those can occur. Easley summarizes the general requirements for an information
cascade as:
• There is a decision to be made from several choices
• Agents make decisions sequentially, and each agent can observe the choices of the
other agents.
• Each agent has some private information to help it with its decision
• Agents can only observe the actions of their fellow agents, but not their private
information
This phenomenon has been formalized in the framework of Social Bayesian Learning,
where Bayes Theorem is used to integrate the information of others into an agent’s own
probabilistic model. Similar methods will be used in a later chapters, and will be intro-
duced there in more detail. The work in (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Banerjee 1992) shows
that information cascades can be produced in the formal framework of Social Bayesian
Learning as well. In those models several properties of information cascades became clear:
Cascades can be wrong. As seen in the previous restaurant example, it is possible
for the population of agents to make choices that would not be rational given the
overview of all private information available to the agents.
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Cascades can be based on very little information. Similarly, it is possible, espe-
cially if little information is present, that some small initial preference for one choice
gets amplified and then influences the whole system.
Cascades can be fragile. In the Bayesian Model it is quite possible to stop a cascade
with a slight change of parameters. For example, if the prior for one restaurant was
zero, then no Bayesian update could change that to anything else, and the agent
would just make a choice not including this option.
This is somewhat in contrast to the argument presented in “The Wisdom of Crowds”,
where Surowiecki (2005) argues that agents that aggregate their information can produce
very accurate results. But, as Easley and Kleinberg (2010) point out, this only applies if
they are guessing independently. If they are influencing each other, then it is possible for
the crowd to be rational and wrong at the same time.
This work has also been generalized to deal with different networks describing the
agent observations. The previous examples all assume that all agents can observe each
other. More recent work now asks what happens if agents are limited to observe only their
neighbours in some form of network. Gale and Kariv (2003) show that the connectivity
of the network plays an important role. Given similar parameters that would allow an
information cascade in a full network they shows that synchronicity becomes likely ones
the network connectivity reaches a certain percolation threshold.
This relates to the work in later chapters of this dissertation. Once the information
maximising agents start using Social Bayesian Learning to use the information from others
they become susceptible to information cascades. Assuming the agent could influence
whether they observe others or not, they could actively influence the network structure of
observations. From an information maximisation perspective this then raises the question
if observing less information might actually lead to better information?
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Relevant Information
3.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the relevant information formalism by Polani
et al. (2001), and illustrate some of its properties. This is not directly relevant in regard
to my research question; the main aim here is rather to familiarize the reader with this
specific relevant information definition. This is crucial for the remaining thesis, because
when I talk about optimization of information processing I mean maximisation of relevant
information intake, with the technical meaning of relevant information as defined in this
chapter.
First, I will state the general idea of relevant information, and reproduce Polani’s formal
definition. Some simple examples will be presented to both illustrate the formalism, and
demonstrate some of its basic properties. Several of the derived properties are used in
later chapters, or are helpful to understand the later chapters.
I will also define relevant information for sub-optimal strategies. This definition differs
from Polani’s existing one as it defines how much information is need for a given per-
formance level, and not what performance level can be reached with a given amount of
information.
Furthermore, I will then present an experiment to demonstrate:
• How a genetic algorithm can be used to approximate the relevant information of a
given environment from an agent-centric perspective.
• That we can distinguish between three different world types, depending on how
relevant information is related to agent performance.
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These experiments have two purposes in this thesis. First, I want to illustrate how an
adaptive process optimized in regard to performance and information parsimony will end
up on the trade-off curve between performance and necessary information. This is un-
surprising, but will be a helpful reminder for the later argument about how increased
performance requires more relevant information. The second purpose is to introduce my
idea that worlds can be classified by the shape of their relevant information trade-off curve,
and demonstrate how agents can detect which kind of world they are in. In this context I
will also argue why all the “interesting” cases that we will lock at in the remainder of the
thesis are of a specific type, or should be assumed to be of a specific type.
Additionally, I will introduce the new concept of partial relevant information, both as
a general idea and as a formal definition. Partial relevant information extends the relevant
information formalism; instead of only measuring how much relevant information is present
in the overall environment or sensor input, it also measures where that information resides.
3.2 Concept of Relevant Information
Relevant information is a concept introduced to tackle an often discussed limitation of
information theory, its lack of semantics. While the general rejection of semantics in
classical information theory offers the benefits of mathematical versatility, it also leads to
problems when information theoretic methods are used by an agent to act intelligently in
the world.
If we analyse a given signal it is possible to ask how much irreducible self-information,
or entropy, is contained within the signal. This would also measure the maximum amount
of information this message could contain about the world. The same principle applies to
sensor input, and if an agent were to maximise its information about the world, it might
be reasonable for the agent to adapt its sensors in a way that maximises the informa-
tion intake. But the problem with this approach is that some of the information gained
might be more relevant or useful than other information, and some information about the
world might be completely useless for the agent. If we make the additional assumption
that information processing requires some work that in itself incurs a cost to the agent,
then taking in additional “useless” information might indeed be harmful to the agent’s
performance.
To address this problem Polani et al. (2001) suggest that the relevance of information
could be determined by examining the actions resulting from information in regard to a
utility function. In essence, information is relevant if it is necessary to increase the agent’s
performance. Relevant information is defined in (Polani et al. 2001) as the minimal amount
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of information needed to choose an optimal strategy. In the next section I will give a formal
definition close to and based on Polani’s work.
3.3 Definition of Relevant Information
3.3.1 Relevant Information for Optimal Strategies
Assume that there is an agent that interacts with the environment by choosing an action
in reaction to some form of sensor input. The environment R is in the state r, and the
agent chooses an action a from a set of actions A. For simplicity, we assume for now that
the agent can perceive the whole environment, so the sensor state is equal to the state
of the environment. Furthermore, assume that the actions of the agent are connected
to some unspecified form of utility function U(a, r) (for example, survival probability, or
fitness) which determines different pay-offs, depending on the agent’s action A = a and
the state of the environment R = r. We also assume that the states of the world R are
distributed according to the probability distribution p(r). In this case, for every state of
the environment r, there exists a set Aoptr of actions which result in the highest expected
utility:
Aoptr = arg max
a
(U(a, r)) (3.1)
A strategy is defined as a conditional probability distribution p(a|r), which defines for
every state r the probability of choosing the different actions a. We shall define an optimal
strategy for the state r as a distribution p(a|r) which has the property such that:
∀a : p(a|r) > 0⇒ a ∈ Aoptr (3.2)
Meaning, that if an action a has a non-zero probability of being chosen in reaction to state
r, then this action must be one of the of optimal actions in Aoptr . This also allows us to
define the set of all optimal strategies:
piopt = {p(a|r)|∀a, r : p(A = a|R = r) > 0⇒ a ∈ Aoptr} (3.3)
Since we assumed an existing probability distribution for p(r), we can calculate for every
optimal strategy p(a|r) ∈ piopt the resulting probability for a as p(a):
p(a) =
∑
r
p(a|r) · p(r) (3.4)
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This makes it possible to compute, for every optimal strategy, the mutual information
I(A;R) between A and R.
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) (3.5)
Relevant Information (RI) is defined (Polani et al. 2001) as the minimal mutual information
between the action random variable A and the environment random variable R, over all
possible optimal strategies.
RI = min
p(a|r)∈piopt
I(A;R) (3.6)
This can also be understood as:
• the minimal amount of information an agent has to acquire about the environment,
in order to act optimally.
• the minimal amount of information an agent’s actions have to contain about the
environment, if the agent acts optimally.
The first interpretation is the standard interpretation present in Polani’s work. The second
interpretation is new, and follows from the symmetry principle of mutual information. It
is the key insight that leads to the digested information argument in the later chapters.
This new interpretation will be used later to argue why an agent’s actions have to contain
useful information for other agents. This different interpretation also leads to the different
definition for sub-optimal relevant information, since I want to be able to measure how
much relevant information is present in an agent’s action at a specific performance level.
Examples for Optimal Relevant Information
To illustrate the principle of relevant information, I will present a few simple examples.
They are presented in the form of pay-off matrices where the columns denote the different
states of the environment, and the rows denote the different actions of the agent. The
values represent a positive pay-off for the agent for a specific state-action pair. They are
the value of U(a, r), the utility function, that result from the agent choosing action a if
the world is in the state r.
World 1 in Table 3.1 shows a scenario were each state of the environment has a different,
corresponding optimal action. To choose the optimal action, the agent has to know the
exact state of the world. Since the world has four possible states, this means the agent
needs to acquire two bits of information, i.e., the agent would need at least two yes-no
questions to determine the state of the world.
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World 1
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 1 0 0 0
Action 2 0 1 0 0
Action 3 0 0 1 0
Action 4 0 0 0 1
Table 3.1: A pay-off matrix where each state of the environment has one, different corresponding
optimal action (coloured in red)
World 2
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 1 1 0 0
Action 2 1 1 0 0
Action 3 0 0 1 1
Action 4 0 0 1 1
Table 3.2: A pay-off matrix where two groups of states have the same optimal actions (coloured
in red)
Those two bits correspond to the amount of relevant information determined by the
previously introduce formalism. If we assume that the states of the world are equally likely
to occur, we can calculate the mutual information for the one possible optimal strategy as
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) = 2− 0 = 2. (3.7)
Here, the conditional entropy H(A|R) of the actions given the state of the environment is
zero, because the actions are fully determined by the environment, since there is only one
optimal reaction to each state of the environment R. The entropy H(A) of the actions
itself is equal to the entropy of H(R), and is therefore two bits.
The second example in Table 3.2 shows World 2, where the agent only needs to know
if the world is either in the first two, or in the last two states. So the agent only needs
to acquire one bit of information to act optimally. In this case several optimal strategies
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World 3
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 0 0 0 0
Action 2 0 0 0 0
Action 3 0 0 0 0
Action 4 0 0 0 0
Table 3.3: A pay-off matrix where each action leads to the same pay-off regardless of the action
the agent chooses
exist. For example, when the world is in State 1 the agent could always take Action 1, or
always take Action 2, or any mixture of those two actions.
To determine one of the strategy with the minimal amount of mutual information,
Polani et.al. suggest creating a strategy were every optimal reaction to a state of the
environment is equally likely to occur:
p(a|r) =
{
1/(|Aoptr |) if a ∈ Aoptr
0 if a /∈ Aoptr
(3.8)
The conditional entropy of H(A|R) can then be calculated as:
H(A|R) =
∑
r
p(r) ·H(A|R = r) = 4 · 1
4
· 1 = 1 (3.9)
The entropy of A is still two bits, because all reactions are still equally likely to occur,
if they are summed over all states of the environment. All states of R have equal prob-
abilities, and also have the same resulting action state entropy, since every state of the
environment has exactly two optimal actions, which results in one bit of entropy.
It follows that the mutual information for this specific optimal strategy is:
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) = 2− 1 = 1, (3.10)
which is also the minimal mutual information for any optimal strategy. For both cases we
see that the formalism concurs with our intuition about how much information the agent
needs to have about the environment.
In Table 3.3 we now see World 3, an example of a world with no relevant information.
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World 4
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 0 1 0 1
Action 2 0 1 0 1
Action 3 0 1 0 1
Action 4 0 1 0 1
Table 3.4: A pay-off matrix that has different pay-off values but they only depend on the state of
the environment, not on the action of the agent.
World 5
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 0 0 0 0
Action 2 1 1 1 1
Action 3 0 0 0 0
Action 4 0 0 0 0
Table 3.5: A pay-off matrix where the optimal action is always Action 2, no matter what the state
of the environment is.
Every action in every state leads to the same result. Obviously, there is no information
that could make the agent perform any better. Since all actions have the same utility
we can minimize the mutual information by giving all states r an equal probability for
p(a) = 1/4. In this case the conditional entropy is equal to the unconditional entropy of
A. This means the mutual information is zero,
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) = 2− 2 = 0. (3.11)
The next example, World 4 in Table 3.4, also contains no relevant information. There is
the possibility that different pay-offs occur, but this only depends on the state of the en-
vironment, not on the action the agent chooses. Therefore, every strategy the agent could
choose is equally good (or bad). The agent could in this case choose the random strategy,
which has, as established in the the last example in Table 3.3, no relevant information.
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World 6
Pay-Off State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Action 1 2 1 0 0
Action 2 1 2 0 0
Action 3 0 0 2 1
Action 4 0 0 1 2
Table 3.6: A pay-off matrix with one, different optimal action for each state of the environment
(coloured in red), and another suboptimal state for each action, that offer half the pay-off of the
optimal state (coloured in yellow)
World 5 in Table 3.5 is different from World 3 or 4, but also contains no mutual
information. Every state of R results in the same optimal action a. So it seems the agent
has to actually make a decision, rather than to act random, but it still has to acquire no
information from the environment. An optimal strategy here would be to always chose
the same action, thereby the entropy of A is zero, H(A) = 0. Similarly, since the state of
R has no influence on the action, H(A|R) is also zero. As a result:
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) = 0− 0 = 0 (3.12)
This can be generalized, since every strategy that does not depend on the state of the
environment should have no mutual information between R and A. If the distribution of
A does not depend on the state of R, then it follows that p(a) = p(a|r) for all a, which leads
to H(A) = H(A|R). Since mutual information can be calculated as the difference of those
two values, every strategy where p(a) is equal to p(a|r) for all a has no mutual information.
As a result, there are always several strategies (basically every possible distribution for A
independent of R) that have no mutual information. If any of those strategies that do not
depend on the input states are optimal, then the relevant information is zero.
3.3.2 Relevant Information for Suboptimal Strategies
In the next example in Table 3.6 we are looking at different pay-off values. This illustrates
a limitation of the original relevant information formalism (Polani et al. 2001), where
only optimal actions were considered. The scenario seen here looks very similar the one
in Table 3.1. The optimal strategy requires two bits of information, and there is an
optimal action for every state of the environment. But if one were to settle for an average
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pay-off of 1.5 then it would be possible to play a strategy that requires only one bit of
information, as seen in Table 3.2. This makes this example a different scenario from World
1, but the original formalism does not account for this difference. This becomes even more
problematic if we exaggerate the pay-off values. If the best pay-off was 1000, and the
second best pay-off was 999, then the difference between the two strategies would be only
0.5, compared to the overall pay-off of 1000. But this marginal improvement would have
to be bought by an increase of 100% in the required amount of information. If information
processing has an associated cost this might be undesirable for the agent.
To account for this problem (Polani et al. 2006) extended the formalism to be able
to answer the question,: “How much performance can the agent get for a given bit of
information?” To formalise this, we first define the set piu as the set of all strategies that
have the average pay-off level, or performance, of at least u as
piu =
{
p(a|r)
∣∣∣∣∣∑
a
∑
r
U(a, r)p(a|r)p(r) ≥ u
}
. (3.13)
Note that this raises the requirements for the pay-off function U(a, r), which now has
to return values that can be averaged. For the optimal relevant information an ordinal
preference function that would have simply sorted all the possible outcomes according to
the agent’s preference would have been sufficient.
With this set of strategies it is now possible to define the relevant information for a
certain performance level of u as the minimal mutual information over all strategies that
have at least the average pay-off of u as
RI(u) = min
p(a|r)∈piu
I(A;R). (3.14)
This definition now allows us to formally address two conjugate questions:
• How much average pay-off can the agent achieve with a given amount of mutual
information?
• How much information does the agent need to reach a certain performance level?
While Polani et al. (2006) focus mostly on the first question, I will put the focus on the
second. This will become important later in the thesis, when it is crucial for the arguments
to demonstrate how much information an agent actually has to process when it is acting
on a certain performance level.
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3.3.3 Properties of Relevant Information
So far this chapter has mostly restated the relevant information formalism, though with
slight alterations to make it more applicable to the argument in this thesis. Before I will
continue to expand upon this formalism, I will demonstrate some properties of relevant
information. This will not only help to deepen our understanding for later arguments, but
it will also illustrate how well the formalism is in line with our intuitions.
Upper Bounds
Property 1. Relevant information is bound from above by the entropy of the environment
H(R):
RI ≤ H(R). (3.15)
This follows directly from the definition of mutual information as a difference between
the entropy and the conditional entropy:
I(A;R) = H(R)−H(R|A). (3.16)
The value of H(R|A), as a conditional entropy, is non-negative (H(R|A) ≥ 0), which leads
to the following inequality:
I(A;R) ≤ H(R). (3.17)
Since the mutual information of any strategy is smaller than H(R), the minimal mutual
information also is smaller than H(R). The same argument also holds for any suboptimal
relevant information. This agrees with the interpretation that relevant information is the
amount of information the agent has to acquire from the environment to act optimally.
Since the entropy ofR is all there is to know about the environment in terms of information,
the agent cannot possibly acquire more information than H(R). This also shows how
relevant information is dependent on p(r), our a priori assumption about the distribution
of the states of R. H(R) provides an upper bound for the mutual information of any
possible strategy, and therefore is also an upper bound for the overall relevant information.
Property 2. The relevant information is bound from above by the maximum entropy of
A:
RI ≤ max
p(a)
H(A) = log(|A|). (3.18)
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In analogy to the last property, mutual information can also be expressed as:
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(AR). (3.19)
With the non-negativity of H(A|R) we can again follow that:
I(A;R) ≤ H(A). (3.20)
Since the distribution p(a) is not fixed, but dependent on the strategy p(a|r), the relevant
information is not bound by any actual entropy H(A) for a specific p(a|r), but is bound
by the maximal entropy that H(A) could achieve, which is the logarithm of the number
of states of A:
RI ≤ max
p(a)
H(A) = log |A|. (3.21)
This also agrees with the interpretation that RI is the information needed to act optimally.
When an agent has only two options to choose from, then the agent might acquire a lot of
information, but ultimately at most one bit of information is relevant, the one that tells
it which of the two options to chose.
Relevant Information as Function
The formalism for sub-optimal relevant information RI(u) in Eq. 3.14 defines a function
that returns the amount of relevant information for every performance level that can
be achieved by the agent. This can be used to construct a graph that illustrates the
relationship between relevant information and performance in a specific scenario, similar
to those graphs produced by Polani et al. (2006). I will use a scatter plot similar to these
graphs to present the results of the next experiment. But before we do so, I would like to
outline a few additional properties of the actual function approximated by these graphs.
Property 3. The relevant information function is monotonically non-decreasing in regard
to the performance level u. A higher performance u always requires a larger, or equal,
amount of relevant information than a lower performance u′.
This follows directly from the definition. Compare two performance levels u and u′,
assuming that u ≥ u′. We define the associated level-set of strategies that achieve at least
the performance level of u as:
piu =
{
p(a|r)
∣∣∣∣∣
(∑
a
∑
r
U(a, r) · p(a|r) · p(r)
)
≥ u
}
. (3.22)
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We can see that all the strategies in piu are also in piu
′
since everything that is larger than
u is also larger than u′. It follows that:
piu
′ ⊇ piu (3.23)
If we then calculate a minimum over two sets, where one set is a subset of another, it is
clear that the subset has a higher or equal minimum.
RI(u) = min
p(a|r)∈piu
I(A;R) ≥ min
p(a|r)∈piu′
I(A;R) = RI(u′) (3.24)
In short we can state that for two performance levels u and u′:
u ≥ u′ ⇒ RI(u) ≥ RI(u′) (3.25)
This again is consistent with our intuition about how relevant information should behave.
If an agent wants to do better it cannot do so with less information.
Property 4. There is always a strategy and a performance level with no relevant infor-
mation.
As outlined before, if the agent chooses a strategy where p(a) = p(a|r) for all r,
then the conditional entropy of H(A|R) and the entropy H(A) become identical, and the
mutual information becomes zero. The random strategy, defined as p(a) = 1/|A|, is one
example for such a strategy. Since the mutual information cannot be less than zero it
is certain that random is on the actual trade-off curve defined by RI(u). And since its
mutual information is zero, this means that there is at least one point on the trade-off
curve where there is no relevant information.
Once should keep in mind that “random” is not the only strategy with zero mutual
information. Any strategy, i.e. conditional distribution p(a|r), where A is independent of
R, also leads to no mutual information, as discussed in the example of world 5.
Property 5. The relevant information function is a property of the world and the agent’s
possible actions, it does not depend on any particular strategy.
Relevant information depends on several variables. It is limited by the entropy of
variable R, and by the logarithm of the number of actions states. It also depends on
the utility function U(a, r). But it is computed over all possible strategies, which should
illustrate that no particular strategy can influence the function RI(u) per se.
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If we would calculate, for all possible strategies, both the mutual information and the
performance, we could then put a data point in a graph for each strategy. Those data
points would all be on, or above RI(u). This means that for every strategy the amount of
mutual information is larger, or equal, to the amount of relevant information needed for
that performance level. The actual function runs along those data points that represent
the minimal amount of mutual information for each performance level. Even if an agent
does not utilize a certain strategy, this strategy would still define the relevant information.
So, while an agent can chose how to act, the agent cannot influence the trade-off curve
between performance and mutual information defined by RI(u).
3.4 Relevant Sensor Information
The next section contains another new extension of the original relevant information for-
malism. It highlights the difference between an agent’s sensors and the environment, and
asked what happens when the world is no fully accessible to the agent. I also proof that a
limitation in sensor input can only lead to an increase in relevant information for a given
performance level.
So far we assumed that the state of the environment r ∈ R is identical to the sensor
input S of the agent, meaning that the world was fully accessible to the agent. In general,
this cannot be assumed to be true, and we also have to deal with cases where the informa-
tion about the world, and the subsequent choice of actions is limited by the sensor input.
This is especially true if we want to maintain an agent-centric perspective regarding our
sensor intake.
The Bayesian graph in Fig. 3.1 illustrates this extension to the model. The agent now
only has access to the random variable S, instead of perceiving R directly. S is the output
of a probabilistic function of R, which can be defined by the conditional probability p(s|r).
This limits the agent’s possible choice of strategies. With full access to the environment
an agent could choose any strategy p(a|r). We will call the set of all those strategies
P = {p(a|r)}. The sensor-limited agent can only react to what it perceives in its sensor
input S, which is created with a fixed p(s|r), thereby all available strategies for that agent
are in the set Pp(s|r), defined as
Pp(s|r) := {p(a|r) : p(a|r) =
∑
s
p(a|s) · p(s|r)}. (3.26)
Since Pp(s|r) has additional constraints, it is obviously a subset of P.
This now allows the definition of Relevant Sensor Information, the minimal mutual
43
CHAPTER 3. RELEVANT INFORMATION
Rt−1
At−1
Rt
At
Rt+1
(a) Fully Accessible World
Rt−1
St−1 At−1
Rt
St At
Rt+1
(b) Sensor Model
Figure 3.1: Causal Bayesian network of the perception-action loop, unrolled in time, showing (a) a
fully accessible world model and (b) the case when the world access is limited through the sensor
input.
information between the sensors and the actuators of an agent, over all optimal strategies
available to the agent as:
RSIp(s|r) = min
p(a|s)optimal
I(A;S). (3.27)
Just as with the relevant information RI, it is also possible to define this for any suboptimal
performance level u as RSIp(s|r)(u), if there is actually a strategy that reaches performance
level u.
RSIp(s|r) = min
p(a|s)∈piu
I(A;S). (3.28)
In contrast, the previous definition for RI measures the relevant information, not for
a specific sensor set-up, but for all possible sensor configurations, including full world
access. This distinction becomes clearer by looking at which variables are involved in the
calculation of mutual information.
Relevant information looks at the mutual information between actions A and envi-
ronment R, while relevant sensor information replaces R with the sensor input S. As
a result relevant sensor information is not making a statement about the world and all
possible strategies. It has the advantage, though, that it can be determined from the
agents perspective, and it captures the limitations of the specific sensor configuration of
the agent.
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The question I now want to address concerns the relationship between RI(u) and
RSI(u). Since the random variables Rt, St, At form a Markov Chain,
Rt → St → At (3.29)
it might appear that limiting the access to the world via S might limit the mutual infor-
mation between R and A, and thereby reduce the relevant information, but the opposite
is the case.
Property 6. Let u be a performance level, and p(s|r) a given sensor configuration of the
agent. If the agent, with that sensor configuration, can select a strategy p(a|s) which on
average achieves at least a performance level of u, then the Relevant Sensor Information
for that level is larger than or equal to the Relevant Information for that level.
RSIp(s|r)(u) ≥ RI(u) (3.30)
Proof. This is a proof by contradiction. Assume that
RSIp(s|r)(u) < RI(u), (3.31)
with the actual amount of relevant information RI(u) = k. Since RSIp(s|r)(u) < k, this
would imply that there is a strategy p(a|s) that would result in a mutual information
between S and A that is smaller than k, i.e., I(S;A) < k. But this strategy, which would
still achieve the pay-off level u, could then be used construct a conditional probability
between A and R as:
p(a|r) =
∑
s
p(a|s) · p(s|r). (3.32)
This conditional probability, which would be in P the set containing all conditional prob-
abilities between R and A, would also reach the performance level u. Following from the
Markov Chain property in Eq. 3.29, we also know that the mutual information I(A;R),
based on this conditional probability would be less or equal to the mutual information of
I(S;A). So there would be a strategy with the following mutual information,
I(A;R) ≤ I(S;A) < k. (3.33)
As a result this means that there is a strategy that achieves u and has less mutual infor-
mation than k, so it cannot be that k = RI(u). This contradicts out original assumption,
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so the opposite must be true.
While this result may appear counter-intuitive at first, it can be explained. When the
agent’s sensor input becomes limited, there are basically three options:
1. The agent cannot achieve the given performance level any more.
2. The agent can continue to use the same strategy p(a|r), even though its sensor is
now limited.
3. The agent has to use a different strategy that has a higher mutual information.
The third option always results in a strategy that is more “expensive”, meaning that it has
higher mutual information, since if there is a cheaper strategy, it would have been there
before the sensor limitation, and that strategy would have been the one used to define the
relevant information.
3.5 Experiment: Agent based Approximation of Relevant
Information
3.5.1 Motivation
Now that I have defined relevant information and relevant sensor information and outlined
some of its basic properties I want to introduce an experiment that will demonstrate how
relevant information and relevant sensor information can be approximated with a genetic
algorithm.
This is particularly relevant for my second research question, as it demonstrates how
the relevant information function can be approximated for a wide range of scenarios.
Previous work (Polani et al. 2001, Polani et al. 2006) showed how the trade-off function
can be explicitly computed, and how a dynamic programming approach can be used to
iteratively improve the strategies towards a convergence point. The approach presented
here has the advantage that it can treat complex simulations as a black-box, as long as they
provide some form of utility. This includes scenarios where the agent has to repeatedly
make decision over an extended period, and only then acquires a result. This will be
demonstrated, exemplary, with an agent playing a simple computer game.
Furthermore, I will then also demonstrate how scenarios can be differentiated based
on their respective trade-off functions, and what properties this assigns to the world. This
allows an agent or observer, who was able to determine the trade-off function, to derive
certain properties about the world.
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Furthermore, this experiment also addresses an important step towards answering the
first research question, as it demonstrates where on the trade-off function an “actual”
agent should be located. Assuming the agent is motivated to a.) improve its performance
and b.) to achieve this with the lowest cost in information processing, then the agent would
try to find a good trade-off between information parsimony and performance. Regardless
of how information cost is weighted against performance, any optimal trade-off lies on
the Pareto front that is defined by the RI function. Meaning, agents should only employ
strategies that have the property that there is no other strategy that has a.) less mutual
information but the same performance, or b.)more performance, but the same mutual
information. So, no actual used strategy should be dominated by another existing strategy.
Therefore, optimized strategies should be on the actual RI function, rather than above
it. This would, in conjunction with Property 3 (the RI function being monotonically non-
decreasing), indicate that an increase in performance would also likely lead to an increase
in relevant information. This will later be used to argue that agent’s act as an information
preprocessor to other agents.
Of course, there would still be the possibility that the agent lives in a world where
a performance increase is not accompanied by an increased level of relevant information
(such as in Table 3.5). But the following experiment will also demonstrate that an approx-
imation of the relevant information is the right tool to determine which of those different
worlds an agent exists in.
3.5.2 Overview
Originally, the following experiment was designed to illustrate how relevant information
corresponds to enjoyment-related factors in game design, and how information theory
could offer a measurable, and quantifiable game play evaluation method. This work was
done together with Tobias Mahlmann and published as Salge and Mahlmann (2010)1.
The original paper has a more in depth discussion on how information theoretic prop-
erties relate to certain essential game play flaws, but the presentation here will focus on
the approximation method, and the three main types of scenarios an agent can encounter.
In relation to this thesis, it is interesting to note that the same game flaws that prevent
fun, are also flaws that will make a game less likely to resemble a real life scenario. If
1T.Mahlmann’s contribution was the implementation of the game simulation, the genetic algorithm
and the discussion of the relation between game design and fun. I contributed the implementation of the
information theoretic tools, designed the game rules and developed the theory of how to apply relevant in-
formation to games. The work presented in the following section is my own, apart from the implementation
of the game itself, and the implementation of the genetic adaptation.
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games are understood as practice for real life challenges, then this might also explain why
such flaws make games less interesting, since they do not prepare the player for the kind
of scenario the real world offers. This is briefly discussed in (Salge and Mahlmann 2010),
but in this thesis I will present the argument in reverse. I will briefly introduce some of
those flaws, which also hinder enjoyment, and then demonstrate why they are unlikely to
be present in the actual challenges a biological agent has to face.
The three flaws I will talk about here (Inferior Choices, Dominant Strategies, Irrelevant
Actions) are of special interest, because they do not only describe an undesirable scenario
in a game, but their existence, in general, changes the overall nature of how the agent can
interact with the world. They will be the later cornerstones to define the three different
categories of worlds an agent can encounter, in terms of relevant information.
In short, I will argue that the scenarios which are most interesting for the player of a
game are those with increasing relevant information, which, in turn, are also those most
challenging to solve, and those where gaining information from other agents helps most.
3.5.3 Relevant Information and Player Satisfaction
This section describes how relevant information (RI) corresponds with game mechanical
properties that foster or hinder enjoyment. Since it is questionable whether fun can be
measured by some mathematical formalism, I am focusing on measurable factors that
prevent or reduce fun in games and should therefore be avoided. Those factors are mainly
taken from literature, such as (Koster 2005, Juul 2003), or are criteria which are self-
evident. While some of them might be debatable, this is beyond the scope of the present
exposition, as is a psychological or sociological evaluation of those factors and their relation
to game play fun.
What I want to demonstrate instead is that RI offers some measurable values that
relates to properties in game mechanics that should be avoided. The first data point I
want to discuss in this context is the actual RI, the minimal amount of mutual information
over the set of optimal strategies.
Inferior Choices
One possible game world design flaw is to offer the player a choice of actions where one
action is an inferior choice, independent of the circumstances, since there is always another,
better option. Game theory would call this a dominated option. As a result this action
would never be played by an optimal strategy. According to Property 2, the relevant
information has an upper bound of log(|A|). If we now eliminate one option for A, the
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maximum entropy is reduced to log(|A|−1). So, for every inferior choice in A the maximum
of RI is reduced. Therefore, an increasing presence of inferior choices should be detectable
by a decrease in the value of RI.
Dominant Strategies
Even more limiting in terms of the reduction of possible actions is the existence of a
dominant strategy. By dominant strategy I mean a strategy or action that is always
better than all other options, independent of the circumstances (such as the actions of
other players or changes in the environment). In those scenarios, an optimal agent’s
strategy will always choose the same action, regardless of the agent’s sensor input. Such
a scenario is also undesirable for a game, because once the player finds this strategy he is
forced to play it continuously.
An example of this scenario is the world in Table 3.5. Here the player would always play
Action 2. The amount of information one would need to acquire about the environment
is 0, so the RI is also 0. If we only look at single actions this also follows mathematically
from the argument in the last section. If the player only chooses the same action, no
matter what the environment, then H(A), the entropy of A is 0, resulting in zero mutual
information.
If the dominant strategy is a specific sequence of actions, its existence would not
be immediately clear, but the same argument as for single actions can be applied. If the
optimal strategy consists of some combination of actions that is played regardless of sensor
input, then the conditional entropy of H(A|S) and the marginal entropy H(A) become
identical, and the resulting mutual information is zero. So, in any case, the existence of a
dominant strategy would result in a vanishing RI value.
But for the agent to detect this flaw, and differentiate it from the flaw described in the
next section, we need to take an additional data point into account, the performance level
of the random strategy. This strategy chooses its actions at random, with an equal chance
for every action to be picked, disregarding any sensor input. This strategy’s actions have
obviously no mutual information with the environment, as outlined in Property 4. The
performance level of this strategy indicates how much utility a player can get “for free”,
by acting without any thought or regard of the environment.
If there is a dominant strategy in the game, then the player can find this strategy, and
we can observe a strategy that has the same amount of relevant information as random
(none), but has a higher performance level than random. If this is not the case, then we
are dealing with the next flaw.
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Irrelevant Actions
Another flaw is to design a game mechanic where the agent’s effort has no impact on the
outcome of the game. Apart from the question if this should be considered a game at
all (Juul 2003), we postulate that this is not desirable. While it is unlikely that such a
scenario would be designed by a human designer by choice, it is possible in a complex
game world that such a pathological case arises.
The world in Table 3.3 describes the pay-off matrix of a scenario where neither the
agent’s action nor the states of the environment matter. All strategies have the same pay-
off, and therefore, the RI is 0, because the strategy that plays randomly is also optimal.
To differentiate between this case and a dominant strategy we just have to consider
whether there is an actual difference in the performance levels of the different strategies
that is not explained by random noise, but due to different action choices. If the random
strategy plays as well as all other strategies, than there seems to be nothing to do for the
player, its actions are irrelevant. If there is actually a visible difference between bad and
good strategies, but they both have zero mutual information then we are dealing with a
dominant strategy.
Desired Case
The desirable case in this context is a world where the previously discussed flaws are
absent. Such a game would be designed such that:
• The player uses all possible options, in similar frequency
• The decision of the player have an impact on the world and on the utility of the
player.
• The optimal decision depends on the different states of the environment
This would lead to a high degree of RI for the best strategy. Furthermore, the performance
for the fully random strategy should be low, and the increase in performance should lead
to an increase in RI.
In summary, this means there should be three distinct kind of scenarios. One where
the agent has no influence on the world, where its action are irrelevant. Here all strategies
should have roughly the same performance. The second kind of scenarios are those where
there are strategies that do better, but they do not require any kind of sensor input. Here
the RI should be zero for a wide range of different performances. Finally, the third kind of
scenario should have an increase in necessary relevant information for higher performing
strategies.
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3.5.4 Experimental Model
To demonstrate the new approximation method we2 implemented a simple, turn based
tactics game where the player controls several groups of units and has to make the decision
what actions those groups are taking. We will demonstrate how neural network-based AIs,
adapted to the game via Genetic Algorithm (Holland 1992), were used to approximate the
actual relation between RI and performance.
In the experiment we will approximate the relevant information function for three
different scenarios (different rule sets for the world).
The hypothesis here is that a genetic algorithm can approximated the relevant infor-
mation trade-off function, and that the shape of this function can be used to differentiate
between different cases. Specifically, it should be possible to differentiate between a world
with no player effect, a world where dominant strategies exist that are optimal, regardless
of the sensor input, and the “desired” case, where the agent is forced to use the sensor
input to achieve different performance levels.
I will now first introduce the general game mechanics, and describe how the approxi-
mation via genetic algorithm was performed. I will then separately describe each scenario,
explain how an agent would play this scenario, what the actual RI function should look
like and then discuss the scatter plot data for that scenario. At the end I will show a
comparison between the different approximations.
Game Mechanics
The game used to demonstrate the approximation algorithm is a turn based, two player
tactics game; a very simplified version of the battles in the “Heroes of Might & Magic”
series. Both players start with three stacks containing three creatures each. The goal for
both is to kill the opponent’s stacks by attacking them with their own stacks. If only one
player has remaining creatures, then that player wins.
The game is played in consecutive rounds, until one player wins. Each round lets the
player act with their three stacks in alternating order. The player opposed to the one we
study always gets to act first. One of its three stacks is chosen, and the player gets to
decide what action to take. The four options are to either attack one of the three opposing
stacks or to wait. The effect of that action is carried out. Then the other player gets to
act with one of its stacks, also chosen at random. This is alternated, until both players
have chosen an action for all their remaining stacks. Then the next round starts.
2the actual implementation of the software described here was a joint project between me and Tobias
Mahlmann for (Salge and Mahlmann 2010).
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Figure 3.2: A diagram representing the player’s options. Each pip represents a group of units.
Whenever it is a groups turn to move it becomes active (here blue), and the owning player can
decide to either attack one of the enemy groups (here red) or wait.
All creatures start with the same attributes for attack damage(1.5 to 4.0 points of
damage per hit point) and hit points(3 per creature). To simplify, we removed the spatial
component so stacks can attack each stack of the enemy, regardless of position. Every
stack gets to act once per round, but the order is random. So, every round all six stacks,
both those of the player and the opponent (or less if one of the armies is already destroyed)
are able to take one action.
The players decision has to be made when one of their armies can make a move. The
actions and consequences of previous armies have been fully resolved at that point.
When a stack attacks another, the damage dealt is calculated by multiplying the
hit points of all remaining creatures in the stack with their attack damage. There is a
random element in the attack damage, so while each creature has a certain damage range;
the actual damage done varies. The damage is then subtracted from the hit points of
the first enemy creature. If the hit points of that creature drop to zero the number of
creatures in the stack is decreased by one, and the remaining damage is subtracted from
the next creature. If the number of creatures in a stack reaches zero, the stack dies and
is removed/ignored until the game ends. The game ends when one player has lost all its
stacks.
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Figure 3.3: A neural network with one hidden layer is used to compute for each game state as
input a resulting probability distribution of actions.
The only special ability given to some stacks is the ability to retaliate. If a stack is
able to retaliate then it can make a counter attack on the stack that just attacked it and
deal damage to the attacker after it has been damaged itself.
Agent Control
The agent we implemented to test the game has the following functionality. When it is its
turn to choose an action for one of its stacks it has to take in the current sensor state of
the world and select an action from a list of choices. We deliberately designed the game in
a way that it was not necessary to record or use any memory about the past of the game.
All there is to know is currently visible, and so the agent controller only has to take in the
current world state.
A further requirement for the agent controller was that it could model different strate-
gies, meaning that different agent controllers should return different action distributions
for the same sensor input. Furthermore, we also needed the agent to be able to express
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probabilistic strategies and it should be possible to serialize the agent controller, so it
could be subjected to a genetic algorithm.
We chose a simple, feed forward neural network with one hidden layer to realize the
agent controller.
Agent Sensor Input
The agent’s input S is a set of binary variables containing the following values:
• For each of the agent’s own stacks:
– two bits are used to encode the stack’s topmost creature’s health
– two bits are used to encode the actual number of creatures in the stack
– one bit to indicate if the stack can retaliate
• For each of the opponent’s stacks:
– two bits are used to encode the stack’s topmost creature’s health
– two bits are used to encode the actual number of creatures in the stack
– one bit to indicate if the stack can retaliate
Note that only the health of the top creature was given, as all remaining creatures
have full health, since their health can only be reduced when they are the first creature in
the stack. So, overall five bits were used to encode each stack’s current state. Thus, the
sensor input state for each stack has 25 = 32 states.
Two players with three stacks each make six stacks in the game which makes the
signature of each game state an array of thirty bits. So the overall number of different
sensor states for S is 230 = 1, 073, 741, 824.
Neural Network
The neural network, as seen in Fig. 3.3 has thirty input nodes, each input node receives
one bit of the sensor data as a real value of either 1.0 or 0.0. The network has four output
nodes, each associated with a different action the AI can take. In those scenarios where
the wait action is not available the output of the wait node is ignored. There is also a
hidden layer of 3 neurons.
Each of the 30 input neurons is now connected to each of the hidden neurons. Likewise,
each of the hidden neurons is connected to each of the output neurons. Each of these
54
CHAPTER 3. RELEVANT INFORMATION
connections has an associated weight. The state of the input neurons is determined by the
input they are receiving. The state of the hidden neurons results from a weighted linear
combination of the connected input neurons which are used as the input of a sigmoid
function, which returns a value between 0 and 1. This value is the resulting state of the
neuron. Likewise, the output neurons state dependent on a weighted combination of the
states of the connected hidden neurons.
Which action the AI decides to use is then determined at random, where the proportion
of the value of a certain node would correspond to the probability of that action being
chosen. For example, if node one had the value 1.0 and the three other nodes had the
value of 0.5, then action one would be chosen with a probability of 40% and the other
actions would be chosen with a probability of 20% each.
This probabilistic interpretation of the output was chosen deliberately over a “winner
takes it all” interpretation, so it is possible for the neural network, which is by itself
deterministic, to represent probabilistic mappings from input states to chosen actions.
This allows the network to express a wider range of possibly strategies p(a|s), including
actual probability distributions, and not just those strategies that have a specific resulting
action for each state.
3.5.5 Approximation via Genetic Algorithm
Calculating the actual RI for each performance level would make it necessary to look at
all possible strategies, but this approach becomes quickly infeasible once the complexity of
a game grows. An alternative option is to use a genetic algorithm to select a subsection of
all strategies, those adapted to be of high performance and low mutual information. We
then record the mutual information and performance of those strategies, and use those to
approximate the actual RI.
Note that, since the computation of mutual information requires the joint probability
of both variables, it is not sufficient to only look at a strategy p(a|s) to compute I(A;S);
it is also necessary to get data about the distribution p(s) of S. But this is not a problem
in a game scenario, where the AI playing the game can be used to create an actual real
distribution of S. The starting state of the game is defined as part of the game rules, and
each subsequent game step is a result of the players’ actions.
To adapt the controllers with any genetic algorithm we first have to define how a
genome encodes the different controllers. In our case the genome is a list of all the weights
associated with each connection in the neural network.
The next requirement is the definition of an objective or fitness function, a function
that formalizes what should be optimized with the genetic algorithm. In our case we want
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to evaluate the genomes with a fitness function that favours high performance and low
mutual information, weighted with a variable weighting factor λ. Both values, performance
and mutual information, are normalized to values between 1.0 and 0. For the performance
we divide the number of victorious games gw by the number of played games ga. For the
mutual information we divide the results by the maximum entropy of the actions, in our
case log(4) = 2. The mutual information is then subtracted from 1.0, since we want to
minimize it. The resulting fitness U(p(a|s)) function looks like this:
U(p(a|s)) = λ
(
1− I(A;S)
log |A|
)
+ (1− λ)gw
ga
(3.34)
We use the values of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 for λ, where λ = 1.0 means that only
mutual information matters, and λ = 0.0 means that only performance is taken into
account.
To determine the performance of a specific genome we created the associated neural
networks that plays the game for 1000 games against an opponent that picks random
actions. For each strategy, we measure both the performance, as the fraction of games
won, and the mutual information for the recorded joint distribution of sensor states and
actions. Note that each game consists of several pairs of sensor inputs and selected actions.
We then need to select a specific genetic algorithm to perform the optimization. In
this experiment we used an particle swarm optimizer (Kennedy and Eberhart 1995, Shi
and Eberhart 1998) as provided by the Computational Intelligence Library (Engelbrecht,
Peer and Pampara 2010). For each scenario we ran a population of 20 genomes for 200
generations for varying through all 5 values of λ.
Note that this approach is not aiming to find the optimal solution, but aims to intelli-
gently sample the overall search space to look mostly at those strategies that are close to
the relevant information function.
Scatter Plot
We measured the relation between performance and mutual information for all genomes
in all generations and the result is a scatter plot as seen in Fig. 3.4. This means the points
seen in the graph are not just the endpoints of evolutions, or the best results, but all
strategies that have been tried during the evolutionary run. Every data point in the plot
is a strategy; the values indicate its performance and its mutual information.
We combined all these values into one graph, because any additional data point can
only improve the approximation. The actual function RI(u) would be a line that all data
points are either on or above, since it is possible for a strategy to have higher mutual
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information than the relevant information, but not lower. We also combined strategies
for different values of λ in the same graph, since they also are all subject to the same RI
function, regardless of what fitness function was used to produce them. This relies on fact
that the relevant information function is defined by the way how actions and states map
to performance, and is independent of the actual approximation. So different values of λ
still approximate the same function.
Note, the two factors in our fitness function are used to evolve the strategies towards
higher performance, and lower mutual information, thereby moving the resulting strategies
closer to this actual function. Note that the function RI(u) we want to determine is not
an average of the strategies we are looking at, but a lower bound. Therefore, it is possible
to take the results of several evolutionary runs and combine them all into the same graph.
This can only improve the approximation. Also, since the mutual information is a function
defined by the game mechanics, it is possible to vary λ and evolve strategies that are more
optimized towards performance or mutual information reduction, and still combine them
in the same plot. Indeed, our experience suggests that this is advised to get a good
selection of strategies that populate the whole Pareto front.
Approximated Lower Bound
In a comparison plot I will show graphs that approximate the actual RI function. To
produce these I first select all strategies that are not dominated in terms of mutual in-
formation cost or performance. Meaning, I select all strategies for which there are no
strategies that a.) have a higher performance and the same or less mutual information, or
b.)have the same performance, but lower mutual information. I then draw a line through
all these strategies; this line lies below all tested strategies. This line is our approximation
of the relevant information function.
3.5.6 Problems
Deterministic Strategy
One problem in approximating the actual RI of a game is the use of deterministic strategies.
A classical neural network usually picks one action based on its inputs, and normally it
would always choose the same action for the same input. This automatically limits the
strategies p(a|r) to those where H(A|R) = 0 , since the action is determined by the sensor
inputs. This leads to the mutual information being calculated as:
I(A;R) = H(A)−H(A|R) = H(A)− 0 (3.35)
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Since we are looking for the strategy with the least amount of mutual information, limiting
us to deterministic strategies seems to hinder a good approximation. Strategies that take a
random decision in those circumstances where it does not matter are a good candidate for
a strategy that uses only the actual relevant information. Only searching in the subspace
of deterministic strategies might result in the algorithm overlooking a good approximation
candidate, and thereby will worsen our approximation. In any case, deterministic strate-
gies are only a comparatively small subset of the overall available strategies, so excluding
all other strategies would reduce the amount of available strategies that could offer a good
solution significantly.
One solution to this problem is to modify the way the neural network chooses the
actions. Instead of picking the actions whose nodes got the highest values, the algorithm
associates the values of the end nodes with the probability for that action to be picked.
This allows the neural network to realize random strategies; strategies that should be
favoured if they have the same performance, but lower mutual information.
Large Input State Space
Treating the sensor input as one random variable quickly increases the state space. Every
additional bit of information doubles the amount of theoretically possible sensor states. In
our case, 30 bits of information already lead to 1,073,741,824 different states. Calculating
properties such as the entropy H(R), or the mutual information by summing up over all
those possible states was already infeasible for the large number of computations we had to
perform. This also stretches the plausibility of similar mechanism being used in biological
systems. Even if we only argue that natural adaptation leads to a solution that has low
relevant information and high performance, without actually computing it, it still raises
the question how this is archived?
Fortunately, both in our example, and arguably in the real world as well, not all
combination of inputs actually happen, so not all states of the overall input state space
have to be considered. So, instead of using a data structure were the amount of occurrences
for each state of the joint probability p(a; s) is recorded, we used a data structure that
records:
For every state s = S that occurs at least once:
• Number of occurrences of s
• Number of occurrences of each state of a ∈ A, if the sensor has the state s
Combined with the overall number of state-action pairings it is possible to calculate the
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mutual information with an alternative formula:
I(A;S) =
∑
a∈A
∑
s∈S
p(a, s) · log
(
p(a, s)
p(a)p(s)
)
(3.36)
Since p(a, s) is zero for all s that never occur we can neglect all terms that sum over a state
s that is not in our data structure. This reduces the calculation of I(A;S) to summing
over all existing states of S, thereby greatly decreasing the needed processing power.
3.5.7 Evaluation of Different Scenarios
In this sections i will now show the resulting scatter plots from three different scenarios.
I will first outline the scenario, and explain how the relevant information function should
look like. I will then show the scatter plot and discuss it. In the end of this section I will
present a comparison plot that should illustrate how the different kind of scenarios can be
differentiated by looking at the RI approximation.
Case 1, No Player Effect
The first case we look at is a scenario that is deliberately constructed so that the player’s
decision has no influence on the outcome of the game.
In this initial scenario both sides have the same creatures and there is no ability to
retaliate. The player has the option to attack the stacks in position one, two or three, but
does not have the option to wait. If the player tries to attack a stack that is dead, the
game would redirect his attack to the next stack alive. In the case that an attack deals
more damage than the current stack could take, the remaining damage is redirected to
the next stack. The opponent here always chooses at random which stack to attack. As
said before, the opponent always goes first.
In this case, the player’s action has not real influence on the outcome of the game.
When the player chooses what stack to attack we can see that all possible choices are
equally good, as they have the same expected effect. Regardless of where the damage
would be applied it would remove the same amount of hit points from the opposing team,
thereby reducing the opposing teams ability to deal damage in the same way. All options
to take bad decision are taken away. The player cannot wait, and if attacking an army
where some of the damage would be wasted, this damage would then be redirected. This
also meant that the opponent, which acted random, was not really doing anything wrong,
and therefore, the ability to start each round should be a huge advantage.
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The only way how a player could actually make a meaningful difference would be to
attack those stacks that had not yet acted this round, so the dealt damage would reduce
the hit points, and thereby the damage of creatures who have yet to attack. But this
information was not available in the current sensor input, so there was no change for the
AI to devise a strategy to use this information.
The scatter plot resulting from this should show little change in performance, since
the player has no real influence on the outcome. All variations in outcome are due to the
random elements of the game. Furthermore, I would expect that those strategies evolved
to minimize their mutual information should end up using 0 mutual information, since a
completely random strategy should be just as good as any other.
Case 1, Results
Several evolution runs with different value for λ of our adaptive AI yielded the results seen
in Fig. 3.4.
Two effects can be observed here. Firstly, there is no real difference in performance
levels between the different strategies, they all seem to be very close to zero. So this
seems to confirm that the players actions have no real impact on the outcome of the game.
The small variation in performance values is likely due to the random element in damage
calculation that allows the player to win in rare cases. Note that the graphs performance
axis is scaled to reach only from 0.0 to 0.025, otherwise, if the scale would go up to 1.0,
the variations would be nearly invisible on the graph.
One property of the simulation that was only revealed through the analysis was the
fact that the AI player nearly never wins, so the advantage of being able to go first seems
to be very strong.
The second thing to observe here is that the RI for all the performance levels up to
≈ 0.011 is zero, since there is always at least one strategy that does not use any information.
Also, for the other strategies that go above that value the increase in RI is quite low.
Comparing that to our earlier theories we seem to be dealing with a case where the
player’s actions are irrelevant and a closer look at our current game mechanics supports
this analysis. All actions are attacks, deal similar damage, always hit a valuable target,
and even reduce the opponent’s ability to deal damage in a similar way. So no matter
what the player decides, the resulting action will have the same effect (a similar amount of
damage to some enemy unit). Therefore, the strategic choices of the player do not change
its game performance.
In summary, the resulting scatter plot supports out hypothesis, and the lack of player
effect is visible in the lack of spread in performance levels.
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Figure 3.4: A scatter plot showing the relation between performance and mutual information for
all evolved strategies for case 1. The plot includes the statistics for all genomes in every generation;
the actual relevant information is a lower bound on all these data points. The different colours
show how the strategies where optimized, corresponding to the different weighting factors between
performance and low mutual information. Note that the scale for performance, as fraction of won
games, only reaches from 0.0 to 0.025, otherwise all data points would appear in a line above 0.
Case 2, dominant strategy
In this scenario the world is modified, so the player could do better, but in a way that
required no sensor input. The game mechanics were modified so the player’s actions have
an impact on the game. We introduce the retaliation mechanics, and now each stack can
retaliate once per game round. So, when a stack is attacked for the first time in a round it
will retaliate, executing an attack on the attacking stack, after the damage of the original
attack had been resolved. If the same unit would be attacked in the same round it would
be unable to retaliate again. We also introduce the option for a stack to wait and do
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nothing for one round.
Now the player has an impact on the game. A good strategy will have to avoid choosing
to wait, as this actions deals no damage and is therefore a bad choice. Furthermore, it
would also be good to attack an enemy stack that has already retaliated in order to
minimize the damage received in return. The opponents still chooses actions uniformly
random, but now this also means that the opponent can chose suboptimal actions such as
wait.
While this might look like the agent would now be required to use its sensor input,
there is also a simple strategy that is arguably optimal, which does not require any input
regarding the current state of the environment. An example of such a strategy is to always
attack the stack in position 1. This strategy avoids using wait, and it focuses all attacks
on the same target to avoid retaliation (after the first attack). In case the first stack is
dead, the attack will be forwarded to the next stack (still the same mechanics as in Case
1).
This is what we earlier identified as a dominant strategy, something that should be
avoided in game design but cannot necessarily be seen as easily as here. As the player does
not actually need to look at the game world to make a decision, the resulting RI function
should have mutual information of zero for most of its performance levels. In contrast to
case one there should now be strategies that improve well above the performance level of
the random strategies but still keep a mutual information of zero.
Case 2, Results
Looking at Fig. 3.5 we can see that there are several strategies with better performances
than random, and we see several strategies that are able to win the game more than 60% of
the time even though the game still lets the opponent start first. Even for those relatively
high performance levels the amount of RI is zero, indicating that these strategies do not
react to the agent’s sensor input.
The graph in Fig. 3.5 also shows how the different weights in the fitness function push
the different controllers along different paths in the two-dimensional projection (to low
mutual information and high performance) of the solution space. The adaptation towards
minimal mutual information (λ = 0.0) moves quickly towards the random strategies and
then ends up in a cluster around zero performance and zero mutual information. The
strategies that maximize performance (λ = 1.0) don’t move towards the lower mutual
information, but their cluster pushes to the right to explore strategies with higher per-
formance. Finally, the strategies that balance both constraints (λ = 0.5) develop good
strategies with a performance around 0.55 but also use no mutual information.
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Figure 3.5: A scatter plot showing the relation between performance and mutual information
for all evolved strategies for case 2. The plot includes the statistics for all genomes in every
generation; the actual relevant information is a lower bound on all these data points. So, in this
case the relevant information for all achieved performance levels is 0, as there is always at least one
strategy that performs at least that well, and has no mutual information. The different colours
show how the strategies where optimized, corresponding to the different weighting factors between
performance and low mutual information. For example, the dark blue strategies are only optimized
towards low mutual information, so they gravitate towards the bottom, but achieve little in terms
of performance.
This shows how adding more simulations with varying λ weights allows us to approx-
imate the actual RI function in different places. Again, keep in mind that we are not
interested in the average value of these strategies, but in approximating the lower bound
of all possible strategies for each performance level. Also note, that since there are strate-
gies with zero mutual information and a performance of more than 0.7 this means that
for all performance levels below 0.7 the relevant information is also zero. Even though
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there are no actual strategies with zero mutual information between 0.08 and 0.37, it still
follows from the definition, as there are strategies with at least that performance level,
which also have no mutual information.
So, in summary the approximated relevant information function is zero for all achiev-
able performance levels. This supports our prediction as the resulting approximation here
is in line with the existence of dominant, sensor-invariant strategies.
Case 3, positive Relevant Information
We further modify the game so it is necessary for a good strategy to acquire information
about the game world. Now retaliate is stronger, dealing three times the amount of
damage than a regular attack. But retaliation will now only be activated if a stack has
waited in the last turn. Since the AI chooses strategies at random this should lead to
some opponent’s stacks randomly being able to retaliate. These should be avoided, as
their retaliation attack would be very negative for the attacking units.
A good strategy should be to avoid those stacks, which can be identified via the one
bit of information that encodes if a stack is able to retaliate. Since it depends on the
random actions of the opponent which stacks are able to retaliate it is now necessary to
actually process the sensor information telling an agent which stacks can retaliate.
Furthermore, we also stop the forwarding of attack orders. So, if any player now attacks
a stack that is dead, its attack will have no effect. Thus, the information of whether a
stack has remaining creatures should become relevant.These modifications also make it
harder for the random AI to successfully play the game, as it now has even more options
to chose actions that are bad.
These modified game mechanics should now force the player to use sensor information
to increase its performance. So the resulting RI function should show an increase in mutual
information for higher performance levels.
Case 3, Results
Looking at the graph in Fig. 3.6 we can see that our game play modifications have led to a
measurable change in the scatter plot. It is still possible for the AI to actually develop good
strategies, some winning in more than 70 % of the cases. But for all the strategies found
by the AI adaptation that go beyond a performance of 10 % there seems to be at least a
certain amount of information those strategies need to process. Up to a performance level
of 0.08 there still seems to be a strategy which performs better than others, but uses no
mutual information. For all higher performance levels the minimal mutual information for
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Figure 3.6: A scatter plot showing the relation between performance and mutual information
for all evolved strategies for case 3. The plot includes the statistics for all genomes in every
generation; the actual relevant information is a lower bound on all these data points. In this
case the necessary mutual information seems to increase with performance. The different colours
show how the strategies where optimized, corresponding to the different weighting factors between
performance and low mutual information.
all realized strategies increases. For example, for all strategies above a performance of 0.5
there are no strategies with less than 0.7 bits of mutual information. This indicates that
such performance level necessitates the processing of an average of 0.7 bits of information
per decision.
This increase in necessary mutual information indicates that a higher performance
level also needs a better analysis of the different factors of the game world, or that the
strategies need to be more reactive towards those factors.
We can also see, again, how the different weighting factors push the strategies into
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different areas in the solution space. For example, those strategies with where adapted
with (λ = 0.25) are more optimized towards minimal mutual information, and therefore
are more often found in the are of low or no mutual information with little performance.
Strategies that are more optimized towards performance tend to explore solution that are
better in terms of performance, but have a higher mutual information. But even in the area
around the performance of 0.4, where strategies with different optimization parameters
mix, the all seem to be lower bound by roughly the same function. As explained before,
this is the case because the RI function bounds all possible strategies, regardless of what
they are optimized towards.
In summary, as strategies get better the minimum of necessary mutual information
increases. This also results in an RI function approximation which increases for higher
performance values. This is also in line with out predictions, since the scenario was
constructed in a way that it required the agent to actually pay attention to the environment
to do well.
3.5.8 Comparison of Relevant Information Approximations
To compare the different results I created a graph of the approximated RI function, as
described in section 3.5.5. These graphs basically draw a line under the different scatter
plots, going from the point of zero performance and zero mutual information to the point
that approximates the relevant information for the optimal strategies. They are drawn
along all points that are not dominated, and no point in the scatter plot is below this
graph. They are the actual approximations of the relevant information function.
The resulting graphs can be seen in Fig. 3.7. These approximations of the relevant
information function behave as predicted earlier. The green graph, associated with case 3
shows how the minimal mutual information increases together with the performance level.
The indicates that the scenario of case 3 is a world where an agent has to react to its
sensor input in order to perform well. The graph for case 2, the blue line, shows that it
is possible to reach higher performance levels without mutual information. This clearly
marks the scenario as one where the sensor input does not matter. The red line, the graph
for case 1 should have ideally been a dot. But in our simulation there was a strategy that
had mutual information and performed slightly better. This is likely due to some strategy
winning a few of the games simply by chance. All in all, there is still very little influence
on the performance.
Comparing the three graphs we can see that they are very different, and their shape
could be used to differentiate between the different scenarios. This should demonstrate
that the approach presented here is indeed able to differentiate between the different
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Figure 3.7: A comparison plot showing the approximations of the different relevant information
function for the different scenario. The red line is case 1, where the agent had not influence on
the world. The graph only has a very narrow range of performance levels. The blue line is the
approximated relevant information graph for the second scenario. The agent here could do better
or worse, but no performance level required any sensor input. This is reflected in the graph, as
it spreads over a lot of performance levels, but always has a relevant information of zero. The
green graph is associated with case 3, where the agent needed to react to the environment. The
approximation of relevant information in case 3 suggests that more information is needed for higher
performance levels.
scenarios by approximating their relevant information function.
3.5.9 Discussion of Relevant Information Approximation
While this approximation could serve as a possible analysis tool for game mechanics, and
other designed scenarios, it is not necessarily a good tool for the agent itself. The first
problem is that this kind of approximation requires an external feedback of the utility
that the agent’s strategy achieved, which might not be available to a specific agent. For
example, if the utility is the reproductive fitness, then the agent itself might not be able
to actually measure it and adapt accordingly. In such a case the approximation would
only be possible for a population of agents, and the result would likely be inaccessible for
any single agent in it. Also, even if the utility was available during the agent’s lifetime for
adaptation, then it would still be questionable if a random search through the strategy
space would be the most efficient approach. But better ways of adaptation to find the
optimal strategy are a whole field of study in itself, and not the focus of this dissertation.
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More importantly for the following chapters is another observation. The two different
parts of the fitness function are both based on assumptions we earlier made about living
systems. One is information parsimony, the idea to only process as much information
as needed, in order to save on the cost of information processing. This is realized as a
constraint on the mutual information between input and output of the agent. The other
is the utility of the strategy itself, possibly a measure of reproductive fitness, or a reward
given to the agent. Since both seem to be reasonable assumptions it seems feasible to
assume that either an agent that adapts during its own lifetime, or a population that
adapts over several generations, would, just as the population in the examples, gravitate
toward the actual relevant information vs. performance trade-off function. So, if we were
to observe an optimized system of agents, they would likely be on, and not above the
function.
3.5.10 Focus on Case 3 Scenarios
The other insight that was less evident in the experiment is the question which case we
are likely going to be in? First, I shall argue that the three mentioned cases cover every
possible category for relevant information functions. As discussed in the properties of RI,
there are two specific points in every function, the point of Optimal Relevant Information
(ORI) (associated with the mutual information needed to achieve optimality) and the
point were the random strategy lies (zero mutual information). The ORI point always has
a better or equal performance than random, and it always has a higher or equal amount
of relevant information. Now there are only three configurations for the relation of those
two points:
• Case 1: They are identical.
• Case 2: ORI has zero mutual information, but higher performance.
• Case 3: ORI has higher performance and higher mutual information.
If ORI was to only have higher mutual information and the same performance, then
random would be a strategy that has the same performance and less mutual information.
Therefore random would then be identical to the actual ORI.
Note that in reality most cases are very likely to be Case 3, just because it includes
nearly all configurations but the two very specific cases of Case 1 and Case 2. But for the
following argument let us assume that cases that are very close to a Case 1 or Case 2 are
functional identical with them.
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Returning to our original question, we can now ask what case an agent is likely to be
in? I will argue that the interesting and likely case is Case 3, the one with the actual
trade-off between relevant information and performance.
If the agent were to exist only in a Case 1 scenario, then its actions would not matter.
So there would be no incentive to even develop the ability to act, let alone react to outside
stimuli. Entities suited for this kind of world could hardly be called agents at all.
An agent that existed in a Case 2 scenario would act, but would not need to react. Its
strategy would not depend on any state of the world, so processing sensor input would be
a waste of resources. If we follow the idea of information parsimony we would then end
up with an agent that has no sensor faculties, and a population of such agents would not
be able to, or interested in, getting information from others.
The third case is the only one where actually having sensors and being able to perceive
others to start with can be assumed as a result of development and adaptation. It is also
the only case where getting information, both from the environment and from others, is
useful.
This is somewhat mitigated by the possibility that an agent might only sometimes be
in a Case 3 scenario, which would then be enough to develop the needed faculties to deal
with them, and would still be available to it when it finds itself in a Case 1 or 2 scenario.
So, as a result, an agent that is reactive can assume that it and its fellow agents
are likely in a Case 3 scenario (some of the time), and that the others have developed
strategies on the actual trade-off curve, rather than above it. This is important for the
later chapters, where several arguments assume either that the agent is in a Case 3 world,
or that the agent is at least likely to be in a Case 3 world.
3.6 Unique Relevant Information
3.6.1 Motivation
Assuming that the previously introduced approximation works, then we are now able to
determine what kind of world a specific agent lives in. This is useful for someone who
is actively designing a world (i.e. a computer game designer) and wants to check what
kind of relevant information functions describes this world. But as an analytical tool in
general the provided insight is, at best, that the studied world is one where the agent
needs more information to perform better. More interesting would be to know “where”
the relevant information is located. Or more precisely: which part of the sensor input
contains non-redundant relevant information, needed to determine the player’s strategy?
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This would be beneficial for adapting an agent in the following ways:
• Sensor Adaptation: What part of the world has to be made visible to the agent,
so it can make an informed decision? Sensor input that only contains redundant
or no relevant information is just a waste of resources, and should be removed for
better information parsimony. If the sensor capacity is to be extended, additional
new sensor input could be analysed for novel relevant information, and this could
help to determine if a permanent extension of sensor capacity is beneficial.
• AI Input Reduction: If the sensor input is fixed, or is used across different scenarios,
the same technique could be used to just reduce the amount of sensor input that
is actually considered by the AI controlling the agent. Determining “where” the
relevant information is located in the sensor input can then reduce the input state
space and thereby enhance the AI’s performance.
3.6.2 Definition
To determine the partial relevant information we first need to decompose the sensor input.
In the case of our game the sensor input S is both a random variable, but also a compound
random variable composed of n random variables, such as the health of a creature, the
number of units in a group, their attack power, etc.
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) (3.37)
We will define the partial relevant information of S1 then as:
PRI(S1) = min
p(a|s)∈piopt
I(A;S1) (3.38)
But the problem with this measurement is that it does not consider synergy, nor redundant
information.
Synergy
Synergy is the effect where two variables, X and Y , together contain more information
about a third variable Z than the sum of what both of them individually contain about
Z. In general, this can be expressed as:
I(X;Z) + I(Y ;Z) < I(Z;X,Y ) (3.39)
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A classical example for binary random variables is the XOR case where the state Z is
an XOR of the states of X and Y . The mutual information I(X;Z) and I(Y ;Z) is zero
in both cases, but the mutual information of I(Z;X,Y ) with a vector containing both
variables is 1 bit (assuming that the states of X and Y are distributed evenly).
If this effect would occur in the sensor input, the agent might look at the partial
relevant information of each variable separately and would find that none of the variables
contains any relevant information. This would be misleading, since the overall sensor input
still contains relevant information. This is not only counter-intuitive, but also problematic,
as it would cause the agent to discard variables that actually contain information if they
were combined with other input variables.
Redundancy
The other problem is redundancy, the case where the two variables X and Y contain the
same information about Z. As a result, the sum of the amount of information each has
about Z is larger than the mutual information the joint variable (X,Y ) shares with Z.
I(X;Z) + I(Y ;Z) > I(Z; (X,Y )) (3.40)
This is the case when X and Y are highly correlated, and the effect is maximal when both
variables have either always the same state, or are always in corresponding states. This is
not as problematic as the first example. It would still be possible to identify which sensor
inputs contain relevant information, but the AI might be fed with the same information
several times.
Unique Relevant Information
What we actually want is a measurement that can determine the amount of unique relevant
information a certain sensor input contains, given the rest of the sensor input. We can
address both problems by calculating the mutual information of A and S1, conditioned
on the rest of the sensor input. We shall define S\1 as the random vector that contains
all random variables in S = (S2, . . . , Sn) but S1. The resulting formula for the unique,
partial relevant information then is
URI(S1) = min
p(a|s)∈piopt
I(A;S1|S\1). (3.41)
71
CHAPTER 3. RELEVANT INFORMATION
This can be expressed as the difference between the overall mutual information I(A;S)
and the partial mutual information of the sensor state that does not include S1 as
I(A;S1|S\1) = I(A;S)− I(A;S\1). (3.42)
Not only is this often easier to compute, but additionally, this offers another good inter-
pretation of the unique partial information. Since it is calculated as the difference between
the overall relevant information, and the relevant information with all but one variable, it
can be interpreted as the information an agent would lose about the environment when it
would lose access to that part of its sensor input. Unique, partial relevant information for
a specific variable S1 thereby addresses both problems:
• redundancy: because an agent would not lose the information in S1 if that informa-
tion is also accessible through another variable in S\1.
• synergy: If there is some information only available to the agent if it had access
to both S1 and S\1, then loosing access to S1, one of the two synergistic variables,
would lead to the agent losing access to the synergetic information.
A more detailed mathematical treatment of Synergy and Redundancy, and a formalism for
the decomposition of both into positive atomic units, can be found in (Williams and Beer
2010) and in (Harder, Salge and Polani 2013). The further decompositions are useful, but
not necessary for this specific case, where they would needlessly complicate the formalism.
Also, it should be noted that van Dijk‘s work (van Dijk et al. 2010) about goal oriented
relevant information uses a very similar formalism, but applies it to a different problem.
Concluding, with the unique relevant information formalism it is now possible to mea-
sure how much relevant information is contained in a specific part of either the sensor
input S or the environment R. It can also be used to automatically determine which part
of the sensor input is used by an AI game controller, and which part of the sensor input
can be ignored to speed up computation or reduce the input state space.
3.6.3 Experiment: Unique Relevant Information Approximation
To demonstrate the functionally of the unique partial relevant information formalism I
am going to revisit the strategy game experiment. Since Case 3 of the experiment had an
actual increase of relevant information in regard to performance, we will use the Case 3
scenario to take a closer look at the distribution of the relevant information in the sensor
input. This can help us understand what parts of the environment the neural network
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AI is actually taking into account, and in extension, which elements contain information
necessary to make good strategic decisions.
We assumed in the last section that our modified game mechanic forces the player
to observe which of the opponent’s creatures is able to retaliate, so the player can then
attack a creature unable to do so. So, our hypothesis here is that the variables encoding
the other player’s stacks ability to retaliate should contain unique relevant information.
To verify this, I shall now approximate the unique relevant information that is contained
in the three one-bit random variables that encode, for each enemy creature if it is able to
retaliate. For comparison, I also calculate the graph for the unique relevant information
for the three one-bit random variables that encode the player’s own ability to retaliate.
Experimental Model
For this experiment we are using the same experimental model as described in the case 3
scenario in section 3.5.7. The difference in this experiment is how the mutual information
for the fitness function is measures. Instead of measuring the overall mutual information
we will use I(A;S1|S\1). S1 is the retaliation indicator of the enemy creatures in the first
case and the retaliation indicator of the player’s own creatures in the second case.
The genetic optimization algorithm will then be used to optimize the fitness function,
which is again a weighted combination, optimizing for high performance and low mutual
information.
Due to the modification the resulting strategies should now be optimized to have low
unique mutual information in the particular subset of their sensor input. In other words,
the optimization should look for strategies that do well, but don’t have to use information
in that part of the sensor input. So, I am asking if it is possible to play the game well
without looking at that part of the sensor input.
Results
First, we again produce the scatter plots that includes data points for all strategies that
have been tried out, resulting in the graphs in Fig. 3.8.
We can see that for low performance levels below 0.1, there are strategies that require
not unique information, neither from the opponent’s, nor from the player’s own retaliation
variables. This is consistent with our earlier observation for the case 3 scenario in Fig. 3.7.
There we could see that there are strategies that needed no information from any of its
sensor input to perform on that level. Consequently, there should also be a strategy for
the same performance level, in the same game world, that requires no information from a
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subset of its sensor input.
For higher performance level we can see that the lower bound on the mutual informa-
tion is higher for the unique relevant information in the opponents variables, compared to
the players own retaliation variables. This becomes even clearer in Fig. 3.9, which com-
pares the two approximated unique relevant information functions. This indicates that the
decision of which creature to attack depends more on the opponents ability to retaliate,
then on the retaliation ability of the players own creatures.
Interestingly, there seems to be at least some information contained in the player’s own
retaliation variable, indicating that a high performing strategy needs to consider its own
retaliation variables sometimes. One speculation here would be, that it would be good to
wait with one stack of creatures, and thereby activate the ability to retaliate, if all other
own stacks are also able to retaliate. This would leave the opponents with no good choices
for an attack. But the exact reason for why there is information there is unknown.
This also illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of this information theory based
approach. The quantitative analysis can reveal some information that is not necessarily
visible form an analysis of the game. So, in this case, it indicates that at least some
information needs to be processed from the agent’s own retaliation variable. On the other
hand, it does not necessarily reveal what this means. Why is this information relevant
remains an unanswered question.
In general, the results support our hypothesis about the retaliation variable. At least
some of the necessary information for a well performing strategy has to come from the
other player’s retaliation variable.
3.6.4 Discussion of Unique Relevant Information
The actual use of the unique relevant information analysis depends on which area of
investigation it is applied to. Regarding the design of a game, a possible consequence of
the unique relevant information analysis could be to either exclude the sensor inputs with
low URI from the user interface, or make them less visible so they are not drawing the
players attention away from important information.
If we were to design an AI to act in this world, we might also consider to exclude the
parameters with no unique relevant information from the AI input, to reduce the amount
of data processing.
If we relate this to the overall topic of adaptive agents then this analysis could also
serve as the basis for some form of sensor adaptation. Assuming that we have an external
adaptation process that selects and breeds those strategies that perform well and use little
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information, then the agent could be assume to be on the actual relevant information
function.
The agents itself could then determine how much unique information is provided by
a specific part of their sensor input, by calculating the unique mutual information. This
contains one problem though, namely, that the agent was, in that case, not adapted
towards minimizing the unique relevant information in that specific sensor input. So, it
might be that there is a strategy that is cheaper in regard to that partial sensor input,
but not cheaper in overall mutual information. In this case the agent might overestimate
the information contained in that part of its sensor input.
3.7 Conclusion
A central assumption in the following chapters is that adapting agents apply the principles
of information maximisation and information parsimony not only to information in general,
but specifically to relevant information. I want to argue that agents adapt to obtain a
maximum of relevant information, in the cheapest possible way. Furthermore, I want to
assume that performing better requires a increasing amount of relevant information. To
make this assumption plausible I aimed to convince the reader that we are likely living in
a world that has non-zero relevant information that increases with agent performance (a
case 3 world). In the following simulations, we will deliberately look at case 3 scenarios.
Furthermore, the formalism for unique relevant information allows an agent to deter-
mine how much relevant information is provided by different sensor inputs. It is even
possible to approximate this from the agent’s own perspective, given that we assume that
some previous process (such as adaptation based on information parsimony and perfor-
mance) has put the agent on the relevant information trade-off curve. In this case, the
actual relevant information is similar to the mutual information between its inputs and
outputs, and the unique relevant information for parts of the agent’s sensor input can
then be computed as well. This will form the basis for later arguments, as it enables us to
quantify how some specific part of the sensor input is better than other parts, and thereby
allows an adaptation during the lifetime of an agent that pays more attention to specific
inputs.
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Figure 3.8: The first scatter plot shows data points for all tested strategies for the unique relevant
information for the three one-bit variables that encode the enemy’s ability to retaliate. It shows
how all strategies above a win ratio of 0.1 seem to require at least 0.05 bits of unique mutual
information. The second scatter plots contains data points for all strategies in regard to the
partial unique relevant information for the three one-bit variables that encode the player’s own
ability to retaliate. In comparison to the first graph those random variables contain very little
unique relevant information for higher performing strategies.
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Figure 3.9: A plot showing the approximated partial relevant information function for the oppo-
nents retaliation variables (blue) and the player’s own retaliation variables (red). This indicates
that higher performance levels require more information processing of the opponent’s retaliation
variable then of one’s own retaliation variable.
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Chapter 4
Digested Information
4.1 Chapter Overview
The main question in this chapter is: “Is there something special about how one agent
processes information that makes interaction beneficial for other agents?” Starting from
our initial non-semantic, agent-centric model, the sensor input of the agent is represented
as a set of random variables. No meaning is associated to them, and there is no a priori
distinction between the random variables associated with sensor inputs from other agents,
and those associated with sensor inputs from the rest of the environment. This chapter
presents an argument and supporting simulations regarding the special properties of infor-
mation coming from other agents, which would provide agents with a motivation to focus
their attention on the information provided by another agent’s actions.
I will first present an argument as to why special properties should arise for the in-
formation present in an agent’s actions, which will also introduce the concept of Digested
Information. I will then demonstrate for two models, the Fishworld and the Treasure
Hunter model, how those properties can be measured, and that they actually rise to a
non-trivial level.
In the larger context of this thesis, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that even
a single agent, just motivated by increasing its own performance, will encode relevant
information in its actions.
4.2 Digested Information Argument
Before we look at the results of actual simulations, I will outline the general argument re-
garding the class of models we defined in chapter 2. We established that, for all interesting
78
CHAPTER 4. DIGESTED INFORMATION
models, there is a certain non-zero amount of relevant information. The agent not only
has to obtain this information, but also has to act upon it. If the agent’s behaviour were
not influenced by the obtained information, then there would be no point in investing the
computational power to obtain and process it in the first place. This manifests itself in
a non-zero amount of mutual information between the agents action variable A, and the
state of the environment R.
4.2.1 Presence of Relevant Information in Actions
So the agent, by virtue of trying to optimize its own strategy, will change the communi-
cation channel between its sensors S and its actuators A to ensure that there is a certain
amount of mutual information in I(A;R). Following from the symmetry property of mu-
tual information this also causes the agent’s actions A to contain information about R.
Furthermore, the very definition of relevant information, as the minimal mutual infor-
mation between R and A for an optimal acting agent, suggests that this is not just any
kind of information about the environment, but in essence the information relevant to the
agent in question. To paraphrase, without any direct intent to communicate information,
the agent nonetheless will cause its actions to contain the relevant information for its own
strategy.
So, for example, if an agent encounters a hazard like a fire, and then starts to move
away from it its actions contain some relevant information. Namely, that it would be
good to move in a certain direction (away from the fire). Its actions do not contain the
information that there is a fire, since the agent could also be fleeing from a predator, or
some other kind of hazard. But then this kind of information does not seem to be relevant
right now, because fleeing seems the right action in regard to both situations, and therefore
all the relevant information is present.
4.2.2 Relation between Performance Increase and Relevant Information
Furthermore, there is a similar argument as to why an agent that performs better is also
likely to encode more relevant information in its actions. In the chapter on “Relevant
Information” I outlined how relevant information can also be defined for any suboptimal
performance level. For every performance level the relevant information is the minimal
mutual information of R and A, for all strategies that perform at least this good, or
better. It follows from the definition, that any higher performance level has either the
same amount of relevant information, or more relevant information than the performance
level it is compared with. This means that any increase in performance is likely to cause
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an increase in the relevant information as well, or at least, keep the relevant information
on the same level. Again, an agent just motivated by increasing its own performance, is
now also motivated to increase the amount of information about the environment.
To illustrate, assume a scenario were agents are interested in moving away from possible
predators. The optimal strategy keeps you as far away from any predators as possible.
But not all predators are equally likely to be spotted, and some agents are better at
spotting predators than others. So, while all agent’s movement contains some relevant
information in regard to predator positions and possible movement routes, the agents
that have better sensors are likely to perform better. They might react to some kind of
environmental information (the location of hidden predators) that other agents might not
have. Therefore, their actions then contain more relevant information than the actions
of other, less observant, agents. This would indicate that it might not only be good to
observe other agents, but also that it might be better to observe better agents.
4.2.3 Relevant Information Density in Environment and Action Vari-
ables
Taking a closer look at the two random variables, R and A, for which the mutual informa-
tion is calculated we realize that it is reasonable to assume that the number of states R
can assume is, in general, much larger than the states of A. A only encodes the different
actions one agent can take, while R encodes the entire state of the world, apart from
the agent itself. There might be rare cases where the agent is more complex, i.e., has
a larger state space, than the entire environment it is in, and consequently A might be
larger or similar in size to R. But then we need to remember that at least for the multi
agent case, were multiple, similar agents populate the environment, that those similarly
complex agents are also part of the environment from the perspective of the first agent.
Their mere presence again increases the space of R well beyond that of A.
Lets for now assume that R is indeed much larger than A. We also assume that
there is a certain amount of relevant information, expressed in a non-zero amount of
mutual information I(A;R). The overall amount of information a variable X can encode
is limited by the entropy H(X),
H(X) = −
∑
x
P (X = x) log(P (X = x)). (4.1)
The entropy itself is limited by the size of the alphabet X of X, the maximum amount of
entropy is log |X |. Since the state space of R is larger than A, the amount of information
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R can encode is also larger. But both variables have to encode the same amount of
relevant information. So it follows that A will have to encode the same amount of relevant
information, but will have to do so with less bandwidth, as its channel capacity is limited
by its self information I(A;A) ≤ log(|A|). Therefore A should contain relevant information
in higher density, meaning that the ratio between relevant information and entropy of A is
higher. Similarly, if we formalize the variables R and A as collections of random variables,
consisting of several random variables with state spaces with similar cardinality, then R
would contain more variables than A. In that case A would have to put all relevant
information into a small number of variables, while R could encode the same information,
very inefficiently, spread out over many variables.
To illustrate, assume that we wanted to know the outcome of a presidential election
with two candidates. We want to donate to the winner before the election ends to gain his
favour. The information regarding who will win is fully present in the environment, since
could go and ask everyone who they will vote for. This will eventually lead to us knowing
who will win the election (assuming for simplicity, that no voter will change their vote).
But the information is badly formatted: every time we ask one voter, we take up one bit
of information, but we gain very little information in regard to the one bit of relevant
information we are interested in, namely who will win the election. If there exists another
agent like us, with similar motivation, who may have done this already, we could instead
try to learn who they gave their money to. This again would be one bit of information,
but it would tell us who he thinks will win the election. Assuming that the other agent
has done its own research properly, the one bit associated with its action will contain all
the information we want to know, in one single bit.
All in all, it seems reasonable that the limitation in the state space of A will increase the
“density” of relevant information, and if another agent only had limited sensor capacity,
then it might be reasonable to focus on this other agent, rather than the environment.
4.2.4 Transport of Relevant Information through Memory
For this case we assume that the agents in question are equipped with some internal states
that serve as memory, as defined in chapter 2. So, instead of being purely reactive to the
current sensor input, the agent can also use information encoded in its internal states to
take a decision. Since the only information that matters is the relevant information, it
is reasonable to assume that an agent optimized towards performance, encodes relevant
information in its memory.
When an agent now acts upon its memory, it basically encodes relevant information,
from the past, possibly gathered in another location, in its actions. In the here an now of
81
CHAPTER 4. DIGESTED INFORMATION
the agent, this information might not be present in any other form. So, it is possible, that
relevant information is present in one agent’s action that is not available in this location
and at this point in time.
Again, the example of the agent fleeing from a fire comes to mind. The agent moving
past another agent might not tell the other agent that there is a fire nearby, but it fleeing
behaviour might indicate to the other agent that there is some kind of danger in another
location it does not know about. If the first agent was not present, and therefore did not
flee, then the second agent might never have learned this piece of information, because it
was not available at that point in time and space.
4.2.5 Digested Information
Summing up our previous argument, we see that one agent’s actions have several properties
that distinguish them from other environmental variables. If we consider one agent’s
actions to be part of the environment of another agent, then, via the argument from the
last subsection, these actions contain information not only relevant to the first agent, but
also to the observing agent. This information, which I will call digested information, is
beneficial because:
1. Agents encode relevant information in their actions.
2. The better they do, the more likely they are to encode more information.
3. The actions of an agent might exhibit a higher density of relevant information than
other parts of the environment.
4. These actions might, in addition, provide information not available at that point in
space and time otherwise.
In essence, when we talk about digested information, we describe the relevant infor-
mation in the environment that is visible in another agent’s actions. Importantly, note
that this phenomenon does not rely on another agent’s willingness to communicate infor-
mation, since the agent-internal, motivating factor for producing digested information is
the agents own performance. This argument does not rely on some kind of group fitness
motivation, or an interest in reciprocal, cooperative information sharing.
All we claim here is an agent, only motivated by its own performance, is already
digesting the relevant information in the environment and “ejecting” it back into said
environment with its actions.
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To further support our theoretical argument I will now present two simulation models
that demonstrate the digested information principle. The simulations will support the
four properties I argued for with quantitative measurements. This will also demonstrate
that the overall principle can be expressed in quantitative terms, and said measurements
can be used by another agent to focus its attention on other agents, or interact with them.
4.3 Non-Social Agent Simulations
In this section I will present two different models to illustrate and support the digested
information concept. The first simulation, the “Fishworld” model, is a grid based search
task. In this chapter I will mainly focus on this model, which will also be the central
simulation model for the rest of the thesis. In this chapter it will be used to demonstrate
the first three properties of digested information outlined in 4.2.5.
The second simulation, the “Treasure hunter” model, features an even simpler deci-
sion model, and it will be used later to investigate some social learning and information
replication phenomena, that could be seen, but not easily demonstrated in the Fishworld
model. The main purpose of the second simulation in this chapter is to demonstrate the
digested information properties for a second, different model, and also to investigate the
difference between agent decisions, and the actual visible results of an agent’s decision.
4.3.1 Fishworld Model
First we created a model where an agent has a simple information acquisition task. This
model will serve as a baseline for our question regarding how the performance of that
agent could be enhanced by observing other agents.
The single agent model considers an agent situated in a grid world of size n × m
with periodical boundaries (torus shaped) in which there is one single food location. The
agent’s location, and the location of the food are randomly generated at the start of the
simulation, and the goal of the agent is to determine the location of the food source, in
the shortest time possible. At each time step the agent can execute a move action which
moves it one cell up, down, left or right. The agent then gets new sensor inputs; it is able
to see the state of the world in all cells not more than 2 cells away from it, and perceives
whether those cells are empty or contain a food source. After the observation, the agent
then decides where to move next. This behaviour is repeated until the agent finds (but
not necessarily reaches) the food.
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Figure 4.1: A sample grid world of the size 15 x 15. X indicates the position of the agent, F the
position of the food source. The grey area is the cells visible to the agent in position X, and the
arrows indicate the cells the agent can move to in the next time step.
4.3.2 Infotaxis Search
The basic algorithm to generate the single agent’s behaviour is a modified version of
the “Infotaxis” behaviour (Vergassola et al. 2007). The basic idea behind the infotaxis
approach is for an agent to always act in a way that maximises the expected information
gain. I modified this idea for a discrete grid world scenario. At each time step the agent
chooses the action that has the highest expected reduction in entropy, with regard to the
relevant information the agent is after. In case of the fishworld model this is the location
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of the food source.
Technical Details of Infotaxis
My application of infotaxis to the fishworld scenario is a greedy information maximisation
algorithm that selects a specific action from a list of possible action for each time step.
The agent determines its actions by using an internal memory which stores information
about the world. In fact, this internal memory acts as a Bayesian model for the location
of the food source. More precisely, the internal memory is an array that has the same
number of cells as the world. Each memory cell is associated with a cell in the world.
Those cells store the probability for a cell to contain food, given the past experience of
the agent.
Initially, all cells have the same probability of 1/(nm), in an m × n world. However,
as the agent moves around, it discovers that some cells are empty or contain food. The
distribution of probabilities is adjusted by setting either the probability of a cell to zero
in the case that there is no food in it, or to one in case where the cell contains food. In
all cases the probabilities of the remaining cells are normalized, to ensure that the sum
of probabilities is always one. The remaining uncertainty about the location of the food
source position is reflected by the probability distribution, and can be measured in terms
of entropy H(F ), where F is a random variable encoding the expected position of the
food. As indicated before, the entropy computes to
H(F ) = −
∑
f
P (F = f) log(P (F = f)). (4.2)
To determine which way to go, the agent considers all its possible moves and decides which
move has the highest expected reduction in remaining entropy, according to Fˆ , its internal
(Bayesian) model of F , the random variable encoding the food source. At each time step,
the calculation of the expected entropy reduction of Fˆ is done by using the respectively
current distribution of Fˆ . Thus, the expected reduction of entropy is based on the agent’s
current “knowledge” about F .
To formalize this, we first have to define the set
W = {w = (i, j)|0 < i < (n+ 1), 0 < j < (m+ 1)} (4.3)
that contains the positions w of all the cells of the grid world. The values i and j are
the coordinates of the position on the grid world. Note that the random variable F that
encodes the food source position from the perspective of the agent uses W as alphabet,
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with |W | = n ·m for an n×m world. Also, since we are considering a world with periodical
boundaries both sides of the equation (i, j) = (i + n, j + m) denote the same position.
Depending on the position of the agent wa, there is a set that includes all the positions
that are visible to the sensor of the agent. If the agent now takes an action a from a set
of possible actions A starting from the current position, one obtains a set Sa as the new
set of sensor inputs after the move.
To calculate the expected entropy reduction ∆H(a), depending on the action a, two
main cases have to be considered. In the first case the actual location of the food source
f ∈ W would be in Sa, the sensor range after the action a was taken by the agent. The
agent assumes that this occurs with the probability of
P (f ∈ Sa) =
∑
f∈Sa
P (Fˆ = f) (4.4)
in reference to the agent internal model F . In this case the agent’s uncertainty after
carrying out action a, H(Fa), would be reduced to zero, and the reduction of entropy
would be the difference H(Fˆ ) − H(Fa) = H(Fˆ ). In the other case, the location f of
the food source is not in Sa. This occurs with a probability of 1 − P (f ∈ Sa). In that
case, we have to calculate an updated probability distribution for Fˆ , called Fa. According
to Bayes’ rule, P (Fa = f) = 0 for all f ∈ Sa, the resulting probability for all observed,
empty locations to contain the food source is zero. The remaining locations are normalized
accordingly to
P (Fa = f) :=
P (Fˆ = f)∑
w/∈Sa P (Fˆ = w)
, for all f /∈ Sa. (4.5)
This divides the remaining non-zero probabilities, by the sum of their probabilities, nor-
malizing the overall sum of all probabilities to 1. This updated version of Fa can then
be used to calculate the reduction of entropy in the second case, which is given by the
difference H(Fˆ ) − H(Fa). If we put all this together, the expected reduction of entropy
for taking action a is
∆H(a) = P (Fˆ ∈ Sa) ·H(Fˆ ) + P (Fˆ /∈ Sa) ·
(
H(Fˆ )−H(Fa)
)
. (4.6)
To summarize, each step the agent selects the action a that maximises ∆H(a). If sev-
eral actions lead to the same expected entropy reduction, the agent selects one of them
at random. The sensors are then updated as described above, and this behaviour is re-
peated until the food source is located. Essentially, this behaviour implements a version
of Vergassola et al.’s infotaxis search and I will refer to it as such in the subsequent text.
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Figure 4.2: The distribution of time it takes the agent to locate the food source with an infotaxis
search. The actual numbers correspond to occurrences in 50000 trial runs. The distribution
approximates the theoretical optimum distribution (the orange rectangle in the graph), with a
rough 4 % chance to find the food in round 1, and an even distribution of search time between the
first 120 rounds.
Random Search
As a baseline for comparison I also implemented an alternative method of behaviour
generation, i.e. random search. The random search agent basically checks its sensor every
turn to determine if it can sense the food source. If it can sense the food it has finished its
task of finding the food. If it cannot, then the agent will move into a random direction,
with a chance of 1/4 for each direction. This behaviour will be continued until the agent
finds the food.
4.3.3 Performance of Infotaxis
As a measure of performance I record the time it took the agents to locate the food
source. On average, the agents with the infotaxis behavior outperform agents that chose
their direction at random by a significant factor. For a 25× 25 world, the average search
time for the location of food, measured over 50000 trials, is ca. 76 turns for infotaxis
agents, and around 450 turns for random walk agents.
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Optimal Searchtime
This compares well against the theoretically optimal searchtime for a non-social strategy
which can be calculated as follows. A 25 × 25 grid world has 625 positions. The agent
perceives 25 positions in round 0, therefore it has a chance of 25/625=1/25 to find the food
source in round 0. No matter how the agent moves, the maximum amount of positions
that could enter its sensor range that were not previously seen is 5. So, it would take
at least 120 turns to sense all positions and thus have a probability of 1.0 to find the
food. None of those positions are more or less likely to contain food, so the order in which
they are searched can be considered arbitrary. By this reasoning we can deduce that the
probability to discover the food source prior to or in round t grows linearly with t. The
average search time for the second case is half of the maximal search time of 120 turns, i.e.
60. Hence, the two different cases have the expected search time of 0 and 60 respectively,
therefore the optimal search time calculates to
0 · 1
25
+ 60 · 24
25
= 57.6. (4.7)
In general, the optimal search time for an n×m grid world, with a sensor range of r is
0 · (2r + 1)
2
(n ·m) +
n ·m− (2r + 1)2
2r + 1
·
(
1− (2r + 1)
2
n ·m
)
. (4.8)
Search Time Distribution
Taking a look at Fig. 4.2 we see that the distribution of search times approximates an
agent with an optimal strategy. There is a high probability to find the food in the first
round, and it looks roughly equally probable to find the food in any of the next 100 rounds.
This is not too surprising because in this simple scenario infotaxis behaves very similar to
exhaustive search, which would be optimal.
The main difference I observed were a few instances in which the agents take a sub-
stantially longer time to find the food source. Closer inspection of those simulations shows
that the agents sometimes get trapped in a local optimum of the greedy infotaxis search.
Since the agent only considers the information gain for its immediate next step, it is pos-
sible that it ends up in a situation where all the cells it could reach with one step are
already explored. In this case, the next direction is chosen at random. The agents do not
necessarily move towards the closest patch of unexplored territory. Visual inspection of
the agent’s behaviour indicates that in those cases it is entirely possible for the agent to
perform a random walk for considerable time before finding an explorable area again. A
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possible way to circumvent this for future research would be to give the agent the ability
to consider several future steps in deciding on an action in order to give it a more directed
walk towards areas where its internal model has non-vanishing probabilities.
4.3.4 Relevant Information Encoding
I now want to address one of the core theses expounded earlier: Using the information-
theoretic framework, I aim to verify the assumptions about the relevant information in the
agent’s action. The question I want to answer is how much information does the agent’s
action contain about the position of the food source?
To do so quantitatively, I ran 100,000 single agent trials and recorded the states of the
random variables:
• A: the action of the agent, specifically the direction of its last move.
• F : the location of the food source relative to the agent.
In each simulation the agent started from a random position and repeated the infotaxis
search until it found the food source. Once the food source was discovered the simulation
ended immediately, and the next trial run started, with a new initial position. The agent’s
actions and the relative food source position were logged after each time step.
Based on this data I am able to calculate the joint distribution of P (A,F ). This makes
it possible to calculate the conditional entropy of H(F |A) by simply summing over the
conditional entropies for each of the four actions
H(F |A) = −
∑
a
P (A = a)
∑
f
P (F = f |A = a) log(P (F = f |A = a)). (4.9)
Figure 4.3 shows the probability distributions of the relative food source locations for each
move action. Two things become clear from the picture. The resulting distribution for the
different actions are similar, if rotated regarding their corresponding action. Nothing in
this simulation favours any specific direction, the action called “north” is just labelled thus
by arbitrary convention. Also, the conditional distributions for the food source location
given the agent’s last action are not uniform. There is an area of zero probability in that
part of the world that was observed by the agent before it decided to move, and there
is an area of high probability in the area the agent moved towards. This non-uniform
distribution of H(F |A) indicates that there is information in A about F as the mutual
information should be larger than zero:
I(F ;A) = H(F )−H(F |A) ≥ 0. (4.10)
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Based on the data visualized in Fig 4.3 this value can be computed. In this specific case
we consider a 20 world, which contains 400 possible locations for the food source. A priori
nothing is know about the location, so I assume a uniform distribution, resulting in an
entropy for F of
H(F ) = −
∑
f
p(f) log(p(f)) = 400 · 1
400
log
(
1
400
)
≈ 8.643856 (4.11)
Following from Eq.(4.9) I can calculate the conditional entropy H(F |A) based on the
data visualized in Fig. 4.3, by calculating the conditional entropy for each action a as
H(F |A = a), and then calculate the weighted sum over all actions a ∈ A. The result is
ca. 8.514056. Subtracting one value from the other, as in Eq. (4.10), I get 0.1298 bits of
mutual information between A and F . This value indicates how many bits of information
the action of an agent contains, on average, about the location of the food source. Note
though, that this calculation is based on the uniform prior for F , which was chosen for
this general, objective look at the mutual information, as it corresponds to the actual
distribution of the food source location in the world. If an agent were to evaluate the
mutual information with a different prior for F , then the results may change.
Stigmergy vs. Digested Information
An alternative way to determine the mutual information would be to use the marginal
distribution of F as a prior. This distribution can be obtained from our sampling by
summing up the probabilities for specific outcomes in F , over all outcomes in P (A,F ).
Fig. 4.4 shows the probability distribution of the relative food source location, regardless
of actions A. To avoid confusion, I will call this distribution Fp.
It is noticeable that Fp is not uniformly distributed. Calculating the entropy of H(Fp)
results in 8.599144 bits, which is lower than the 8.643856 bits of the uniform distribution.
If I were to calculate the mutual information between the agents action A and the relative
food source location with this marginal distribution Fp as a prior, rather than with an
assumed uniform distribution F , the resulting information would be lower.
I(Fp;A) = H(Fp)−H(F |A) ≈ 0.084088 (4.12)
The conditional probability here is still the same H(F |A) obtained from statistics, as
F and Fp are the same random variable, just with different prior distributions. Their
conditional distributions after observing A are identical.
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(a) Agent moved West
X
(b) Agent moved North
X
(c) Agent moved East
X
(d) Agent moved South
Probability0.0 0.0045
Figure 4.3: The four figures show the probability distribution of the food source location in a 20
× 20 world relative to the agent and dependent on the agent’s last move. The agent’s current
position is denoted with an X, and the arrow indicates the agent’s last movement. The black areas
have zero probability, as they are all within sensor range in the agent’s last position.
Since this is a different value than the one calculated for I(A;F ) the question that
now arises is: Which of those two calculations actually tells us how much information an
agent’s actions contains about the location of the food source? Or, what does the value
in Eq. (4.12) actually mean?
To answer this it will be useful to decompose the information gained from an agent
further. Looking at Fig. 4.4 we can see that, even if we could only observe an agent’s
position but not its last movement, we would still get some information about the food
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source location. The distribution of Fp is not uniform, and if we were to compare it to the
a priori uniform distribution of the food source location F we could measure an average
information gain for observing an agent’s position as
H(F )−H(Fp) ≈ 8.643846− 8.599144 = 0.0044712. (4.13)
While the agent’s position is initially random in relation to the food source, the agent’s
repeated actions change the world in a systematic, non-random way. In general, when an
agent acquires information from the environment and acts upon it then this can change the
environment in a way that reflects this information in the environment itself. In theory,
this could be used to store information outside an agent, or communicate said information
to other agents. This effect has been described as a form of stigmergy in (Klyubin, Polani
and Nehaniv 2004), where the effect was also quantified for a similar grid world scenario.
The data suggests that this is a similar phenomenon. The agent explores the area, and its
position alone contains information about the location of the food source. In our specific
case this information essentially conveys that the source is less likely to be close to the
agent, because the agent would then have been more likely to have found it, and the
simulation would have already been over.
Therefore, I call the information described by the difference between the uniform dis-
tribution, and the food source distribution knowing an agent’s position, formalized as
H(F )−H(Fp), Stigmergy information.
Realizing that the agent’s position in itself already contains information, we can then
rephrase our initial question. How much more relevant information does knowing an
agent’s action provide, if we already know the agent’s position? This requires a decompo-
sition akin to the unique relevant information analysis discussed in chapter 3.
To compute the unique information in the agent’s action, I compare the remaining
average entropy for just knowing an agents position H(Fp), with the entropy of F when I
also know the agent’s last move, which is H(F |A). This essentially is a mutual information
computed in Eq. (4.12), H(Fp)−H(F |A), which I will call unique action information(UAI).
The resulting value for the UAI in bits for a 20 × 20 world is 0.084088.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the different values and offers a comparison to the
random strategy’s values. The digested information I(A;F ), which is the overall reduction
in entropy from an a priori position of maximum ignorance to the a posteriori distribution
after observing an agent’s action decomposes into the sum of a.) the stigmergy information
gained from observing an agent’s position and b.) the information the agent’s actions
provide on top of that (unique action information).
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Figure 4.4: The probability distribution of F given the position of an agent (with infotaxis be-
haviour) who just moved, averaged over the different possible actions. This illustrates how the
agent’s position, even without observing the agent’s action, contains information about the food
source location.
Infotaxis Agent Random Agent
Uniform Dist.: H(F ) 8.643856 8.643856
Position Dependent Dist.: H(Fp) 8.599144 8.531202
Stigmergy: H(F )−H(Fp) 0.044712 0.112654
Action Dependent Dist.: H(F |A) 8.514056 8.519220
Unique Action Information: H(Fp)−H(F |A) 0.084088 0.011983
Digested Information: I(A;F ) 0.129800 0.124636
Table 4.1: Overview for the different amounts of information to be gained by observing the infotaxis
and random agent. All measurements in bits.
Comparison to Random Strategy
Table 4.1 also contains the information values gained from observing an agent using the
random strategy. Unless the food is found, the agent will move in a randomly chosen
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direction. Observing this agent’s actions provides less information than observing the
infotaxis agent, but still contains a considerable amount of information. This might first
be counter-intuitive, as the agent seems to not react to any of its sensor inputs (choosing
its actions at random), and thereby it is unclear how information about the food source
can be observed in the agent’s actions. But in fact, the agent does react to its sensor input,
specifically when it decides whether it is going to move. At that point the agent checks
if the food source location is in the sensor input, and then reacts accordingly, possibly
ending the simulation, and thereby also the recording of data.
This is reflected in the composition of the gained information. As we see in Table 4.1
most of the information gained comes from the actual position of the agent (via stigmergy),
and very little is encoded in the actions itself. Note though, that the random agent has
more information about the source location stored in its position than the infotaxis agent.
Comparing the action independent distributions of Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5, it looks like the
random agent created a more informative gradient of probabilities around its position.
This might be an effect of a longer time spent in the environment per simulation. As the
random agents roughly need six times longer to locate the food source, this might give
them more time to inject information into the environment via their actions, and thereby
their position might contain, on average, more information.
Nonetheless, the overall information gained from the random strategy is worse, and
if we were to just focus on the information gained from the actions, then this difference
becomes even larger.
Comparison to Non-Agent Environment
Another aspect of the digested information concept suggests that there might be more
information to be gained from observing other agent’s than from the rest of the environ-
ment. This leads to a comparison between how much information can be gained from
observing an agent vs. observing the environment, minus the agent. This is also helpful
to get a scale to measure information gain against. Currently all we know is that there
is some information in the agent’s actions, but it is unclear if 0.1 bit of information is a
substantial amount.
Again, let’s look at a 20 × 20 grid world, which has 400 cells. 399 of them are empty,
one contains the food source. If the agent were to observe one cell at random, two cases are
possible. If the food source is observed, the entropy will be reduced to zero immediately.
In the other 399 cases the entropy will be reduced to a uniform distribution with 399
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Figure 4.5: The probability distribution of F dependent on the observation of a random agent
who just moved, without taking the last move into account. Even the random agent encodes
information about the food source in its location, because every turn the agent checks if it can
sense the food, and only moves if it cannot.
instead of 400 states. The average reduction in entropy can therefore be computed as
399
400
· (log 400− log 399) + 1
400
· log(400) ≈ 0.02523. (4.14)
If we compare the information gained from the action of an agent with sensor range of 2
(≈ 0.13 bits), to the information gained from observing a single cell (≈ 0.03 bits), then
the information from the agent is significantly higher. This is true, even if we take into
account that the cell only has two states, while the agent’s actions have four states, and
hence twice the bandwidth of the cell.
Note that both the information gained from another agent, and the information gained
from a cell in the environment are determined here based on a uniform prior, so the indicate
the information gained if nothing was yet know about F . If an agent had prior knowledge
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Figure 4.6: Graph depicting the relation between encoded mutual information and search time for
different sensor ranges. Data taken over 10.000 simulated trials. Labels on each note indicate the
associated sensor range. An increase in sensor range lead to an increase in both performance and
mutual information.
about F , then those values would be different. Here I only consider the objective outside
view, which is based on a prior of maximal uncertainty.
4.3.5 Performance Dependency
I also predicted that an increase in performance would lead to an increase in digested in-
formation. To support this claim I implemented two modifications of the original fishworld
model that should increase the performance of the individual agent. This should allow us
to observe how the encoded relevant information is affected by a change in performance.
Sensor Range Increase
The first modification is an increase in sensor range. Instead of being able to sense only
those world cells that are not more than 2 squares away, the agent can now see squares
up to r square away. This should allow an agent to take in more information per turn,
increase its performance, and also increase its encoded relevant information. Note that this
change also increases the agent’s capacity for information intake, which in turn changes
the optimal search time of the agent, since this new agent can take in more unexplored
cells per turn than the more limited agent.
The graph in Fig. 4.6 shows how the change in sensor range r affects both the perfor-
mance and the mutual information I(A;F ). With increasing range the performance of the
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agent increases, as predicted. The agents with longer sensor range take less time to find
the food source. More importantly, the increase in range also leads to the agent’s action
containing more information about the food source location. So, in this specific case the
performance increase is accompanied by an increase in the mutual information between
the agent’s actions and the food source location, which is in essence an increase in relevant
information.
Note though, that the increase in sensor range also increased the agent’s intake of
information. While this increases both the agent’s performance and the encoded relevant
information, it is unclear if this is, as argued for earlier, a result of moving to a different
point on the relevant information trade-off curve, or simply a result of more information
being available to the agent, which is then processed through to the other end. Either
case would support the original argument, but I thought it prudent nonetheless to design
a scenario were the increase in agents performance is caused by a change of the processing
alone.
Horizon of Information Maximization
My second method to increase the agent’s performance is based on changing how far into
the future the agent maximises his information gain. In the original, greedy implemen-
tation, the agent would only consider what the result of its next time step would be. As
described earlier, this would sometimes result in the agent “being stuck” in an explored
area, where all adjacent cells have been explored. The agent would then act randomly,
where a better strategy would be to move directly for an unexplored area further away.
Therefore, I modified the original infotaxis adaptation for the gridworld scenario with a
changeable horizon, so it would now optimize its behaviour for expected information gain
over several turns.
I established earlier that in the state t the information gain for the next turn can be
computed as
∆H(t, a) = P (F ∈ Sa) ·H(F ) + P (F /∈ Sa) ·
(
H(F )−H(Fa)
)
. (4.15)
This equation consists of two terms, one that corresponds to the information gain if the
food source is found in the next time step: P (F ∈ Sa)·H(F ), and another that corresponds
to the information gain if the food is not found: P (F /∈ Sa) ·
(
H(F )−H(Fa)
)
. If we want
to expand the potential information gain following from an action a further, we only need
to look at the case where the food was not found; in the other case the simulation would
end anyway, and there would be no information to gain. For the case in which the food
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was not found it is also clear what situation we are in. The agent is in a new position,
and every cell in the sensor area does not contain the food. Lets call this state t+ a.
Thus, it is possible for t + a to recursively construct a virtual future state of the
agent’s internal model, and apply the infotaxis algorithm to that state. The same formula
as for ∆H(a) can be used to calculate which new action a1 will yield the highest expected
reduction in entropy. The resulting information gain can be expressed as
max
a1∈A
∆H(t+ a, a1). (4.16)
This amount of information can then be included into the agents consideration in the first
step, as a potential information gain available in the situation resulting from its action a.
This can be expressed as
∆H(t, a) = P (F ∈ Sa) ·H(F )+P (F /∈ Sa) ·
(
H(F )−H(Fa)+ max
a1∈A
∆H(t+a, a1)
)
. (4.17)
This recursive function allows us to compute the potential information gain of an action
a for several steps into the future. Two things have to be considered though. Obviously,
as a recursive formula the potential information term itself contains more potential infor-
mation terms. So, to compute the value, one has to determine a cut-off horizon, a point
in the future after which the potential information gain is not considered any more. Fur-
thermore, this computation requires the creation of a lot of “virtual” memory states on
which infotaxis is computed. Each step multiplies the number of virtual states with the
number of available actions. This makes computing this value for long horizons infeasible.
Nevertheless, for short horizons it is possible to compute, and should improve the
performance of the agent. Especially regarding the previously mentioned performances
where an agent would get “lost” in a previously explored area, and had to resort to
random search. Now the agent would be able to detect unexplored areas up to n squares
away, were n is the horizon of its search.
In Fig. 4.7 we see the results from another 10 000 simulations, for different look ahead
horizons. We can observe that an increase in the temporal horizon increases the perfor-
mance of an agent, and at the same time also increases the agent’s mutual information
between its actions and the food source location. Both increases here are much smaller
than in the sensor range example, which is likely due to the fact that the sensor input
capacity of the agent remained unchanged. The agent could only improve based on bet-
ter information processing, and not because it had access to more information, as in the
previous example. This also means that in this case the agent could not surpass the lower
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Figure 4.7: A graph depicting the relationship between the agent’s performance and mutual infor-
mation between actions and food source location for different look ahead horizons r. The value of
r indicates for how many steps into the future the agents tries to maximise its expected reduction
in entropy, with r = 1 being greedy infotaxis.
bound on optimal search time calculated earlier. Concluding, the simulations seem to sup-
port, for both cases, that an increase in performance will lead to an increase in digested
information.
4.3.6 Discussion of Fishworld Model
Summarizing the result, the Fishworld model seems to support the properties predicted
in the digested information argument in section 4.2. For these model it is true that the
single agent’s actions contain information about the relevant information (the food source
location), and this is achieved without any motivation on the agent’s part to communicate
said information. Even the random behaviour, which did very little in terms of information
processing, still injected a certain amount of information about the food source location
into the agent’s actions.
It also appears that the per bit density of information about the food source location
is higher in an agent’s action than it is in the cells in the environment. This, of course,
could be averted by choosing a different representation of the states of the environment,
99
CHAPTER 4. DIGESTED INFORMATION
or by designing the simulation differently. Nonetheless, this should at least indicate the
possibility of such a higher density in a model that is not particularly contrived.
Furthermore, both the external modification in sensor range and the behaviour modifi-
cation of longer look ahead for the information maximisation, demonstrated a relationship
between an increase in performance and an increase in relevant information.
Only the last point, the transportation of information through memory, remains some-
what unsupported. Looking back at Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.2 we can see that both an agent’s
current location, and action contain information about the probability of the food source
location in cells far out of the agent’s current sensor reach. This could be used to argue
that somehow this information must have gotten into the agents current actions through
its memory. But then the distribution in Fig. 4.5 shows a similar distribution for the
random agent, where it is clear that this agent did not act on any kind of memory. The
implementation of a random agent could be made as a purely reactive, memoryless agent.
Nonetheless, the random agent’s location contains information about the food source loca-
tion. The likely explanation here is a process called stigmergy, as discussed in (Klyubin et
al. 2004). Since the agent’s actions change the environment, it is possible to systematically
change the environment to contain some information. Technically, most search algorithms
in this scenario would do this, since they are likely to move the agent closer to the goal.
As a result the agent’s position should generally contain some information about the goal
location. So, in a sense, the agent uses the environment as an external memory, in this
case specifically its current position. This or course further complicates an analysis of how
the information contained currently in both the agent’s actions and the agent’s position
has gotten there.
The decomposition into stigmergetic and unique actions information is helpful here, as
it shows a clear difference between the random and the infotaxis strategy. The compara-
tively high amount of unique action information for the infotaxis strategy indicates that
the actual action of the agent contains the majority of the digested information, while
the random agent provides mainly stigmergetic information. Also, if we compare how the
probability distribution in cell far away from the sensor reach changes with and without
observing the last action, we also see that knowing the actions of the infotaxis agent has
a much higher impact here. This further indicates that in the case of the infotaxis agent
information about these locations is actually transported in the internal memory.
In any case, it seems to be clear that both agents somehow transported information
from a different location or time to the present location and time. Furthermore, the
question if an agent’s actions contain information that is not available otherwise, should
become much clearer in the next chapter, when I will demonstrate how the information
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displayed in one agent’s actions can be used by another. Concluding, this specific model
acts as predicted by the digested information argument, and its results support the initial
concept.
4.3.7 Treasure Hunter Model
I will also introduce a second scenario where it is possible to only observe the decision the
agent takes, without taking in additional information, such as the agents position, or the
outcome of that decision. This simulation shares several properties with the simulations
discussed in the related work section on Social Bayesian Learning, but we will deal with
the social aspect of this scenario only in the next chapter. For now it will just serve to
demonstrate the main properties of digested information for a second model. Therefore,
the agents in this simulation are not able to observe anything about other agents. I will
describe what could potentially be observed, to determine if there is digested information
in those observable actions, but in this simulation, the agent itself are not capable of
observing anything related to another agent.
The agents in this scenario are treasure hunters, they are looking for a specific treasure
located in one of n locations. Each turn an agent can choose one location to go to, and
look there for the treasure. It will then leave the harbour where all agents are located
and will be able to observe the state of the chosen location (containing the treasure, or
not). Once the agent found the treasure it stops playing. It is the replaced by a new,
ignorant agent, so the agent population remains constant. The treasure is placed in a
random location at the beginning of the simulation.
The agents’ actions can be observed when they are leaving for a specific location, and
it is then clear what location they are going to. The agents cannot be observed coming
back, and it cannot be observed if the agents found the treasure.
Since we are asking how much relevant information is present in a single action I have
to introduce some additional constraints. If agents were identifiable, and we could use
the context of the simulation to inform our decision, it would be easy to just look for an
agent that does not return. But what we want to model is the information one can get if
one were to turn up at a random time during the simulation, and just observe the next
agent leaving. To capture this I added the following constraints: Once agents stopped
playing, they are replaced with new agents which have no information about the world.
Also all agents are indistinguishable, and the order of their moves can be considered as
random. Also, agents cannot be observed returning from any location, regardless if they
found treasure or not. Formally, all that can be observed is one random variable A, which
has as many states as there are locations |A| = n, and which state indicates which location
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Figure 4.8: Diagram of the Treasure Hunter Scenario. The active agent chooses on each round
which location to explore. The observers can only observe that choice.
an agent is locking for the treasure.
Agent Behaviour Generation
Similar to the grid world simulation the agents have an internal memory variable that
is basically a Bayesian Model of the treasure location. The treasures location will be
denoted by T , and the internal model as Tˆ . When the agent has to decide which location
to visit it will act in a way consistent with the infotaxis approach, going to that location
which will lead to the greatest expected information gain. For this simple model this is
identical to going to the location with the highest probability of the treasure being there.
In case of a tie, the agent would chose one of the optimal locations at random. Given that
the agents initialize their model Tˆ with a uniform distribution; this means the non-social
single agent basically choses a random location it has not previously visited. Since nothing
else can be done to gain more information, as agents in this simulation are not capable of
observing each other, this implements an optimal strategy for the agent. For a world with
ten locations it takes ≈ 5.5 tries to find the location with the treasure.
Encoded Information
Recording the observable actions taken by the agents we can observe a distribution for
A as depicted in Fig. 4.9. Keep in mind that those agents that have found the treasure
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Figure 4.9: A plot showing the probability of observing an agent going to a specific location, if
the treasure is located in position 1 and there are 10 locations. The grey bars are for observing
infotaxis agents, while the white bars show the observations of random agents. The data was
gathered by 100,000 observations on simulated agents.
are replaced with ignorant new agent. A is just the recording of all actions taken by the
agents, as they are indistinguishable.
Fig. 4.9 shows that the actual location of the treasure has significantly more visits
than the other locations, even though none of the agents going out know where it is. This
again, is an effect based on agents making decisions on previously processed information.
The agents know where the treasure is not, and this influences their decisions. In turn,
this information is detectable in their actions.
For this specific case this can be explained by looking at all possible outcomes of
an agents search. Any agent is just randomly and exhaustively searching through every
location, never visiting one twice. It cannot gain any insight into which location would be
more likely (in the single agent case), so the time it takes to find the treasure is uniformly
distributed between 1 and the number of possible location. So all search time duration
from 1 to n are equally likely. For a world with 10 locations this means the average search
history of an agent has a length of 5.5, but each of those search histories contains the
location of the treasure at the end. While we cannot know if an agent is currently going
to the location with the treasure, we know that 1 out of 5.5 actions are going to the right
location.
Based on the observed joint distribution of A and T it is possible to compute the
mutual information between the actions taken and the location of the treasure. In this
case the marginal distribution of T for all observed events is uniform, which indicates
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that there is no stimergic information in this model. This is consistent, as all that can be
observed are the actions itself, and the actions do not change anything in the state of the
world as the move action in the fish world scenario did.
So, all the mutual information in I(A;T ) is entirely contained within the actions. The
mutual information in this case computes to ≈ 0.042799. We can compare this to a random
strategy, where the agents just choose a location at random and do not have any memory.
Taking a look at the sampled distributions of actions in Fig. 4.9 we can see that the
distribution is nearly uniform, hence the (empirical) mutual information for this case is ≈
0.000026.
We can also compare those values to the information gained from observing a random
location, which is the information an agent gains when it makes the decision to visit a
specific location. The information for observing one random location is ≈ 0.468996. This is
actually higher than the information provided by the agent’s actions, but not necessarily
violating the earlier argument. Higher density was assumed for cases where the state
space of an agent’s action is significantly smaller than the state space of the environment.
While this seems to be a reasonable assumption in real world scenarios, it is not the case
here, where the agent’s actions have as many states as the environment itself. Due to the
simplicity of the model it is not really feasible to implement a better strategy for a single
agent, so there is no comparison for different performances here, apart from comparing
the actual strategy with a random strategy.
One thing that is highlighted in this model is that the storage of information in the
memory of one agent is crucial for it to display this information when it takes the action to
embark to another location. The decision taken at the harbour is influenced by information
only available elsewhere, and is then displayed at the harbour, via the agents actions. In
summary, this simulation also seems to display the properties outlined by the digested
information concept.
4.4 Chapter Conclusion
The initially outlined properties of digested information regarding the presence of relevant
information in an agent’s actions seem to hold for the discussed simulations. This now
allows me to address the question if the information in the environment that is produced
by another agent is somehow special? As demonstrated in the chapter, the answer is
“yes”. Especially the information related to another agent’s actions not only contains
relevant information (this follows already from chapter 3), but an agent is also motivated
to maximise this relation. Assuming we are in a scenario where there exists a non-zero
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trade-off between information processing and performance (a type 3 world, as discussed
in section 3.5.10), then an agent that tries to increase its performance is at the same
time increasing the relevant information encoded in it actions. Whether the agent can
actually perform this adaptation during its lifetime (via learning) or this adaptation only
happens through an evolutionary process in the population is secondary, as both lead
to a similar conclusion: As a side-effect of a beneficial adaptation for the agent itself,
the agent also creates a high-capacity channel from the relevant information to its own
actions. Furthermore, since the actions of the agent are likely to have a much smaller
state space than the environment, this will also lead to a higher per-bit density of relevant
information, as demonstrated in the simulations. In essence, agents are motivated to be
efficient preprocessors for just the type of information needed by other agents of their own
kind.
Connecting this to the overall question driving this thesis, it should be clear that the
digested information can offer a powerful incentive for sensor evolution and adaptation.
As I demonstrated in chapter 3, the relevant information in parts of the sensor input can
be quantified with agent-internal measurements, such as the unique relevant information
measure. Let us consider the perspective of an agent that treats all its inputs as simple,
indistinguishable data, and has so far only adapted to use the information provided by the
environment to locate the food. Such an agent could then recognize (again, either by some
active learning method, or through evolutionary adaptation) that the information related
to other agents actually contains a lot of information relevant for its own actions, and
adapt both its sensors, and it strategy accordingly. This should then lead to the minimal
definition of social interaction made at the beginning of this thesis, where the actions
of one agent become directly influenced by the actions of another agent. The following
chapter will deal with what actually happens when an agent makes this adaptation, and
demonstrates how this results in phenomena also present in real, biological agents.
In summary, the main message is that an agent that does better than random in
a world were information matters has to encode this information in its actions. The
agent can try to obfuscate this information, or only act when it is not observed, but
the bottom line is this: If the agent wants to act according to its information, then this
information is contained in its actions. Furthermore, this chapter should also demonstrate
that information theory is able to quantify this effect, and can be used to demonstrate, as
for example in the random agent’s case, that there might still be information present in
observed systems, even if we do not see it at first.
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Social Bayesian Update
5.1 Chapter Overview
The last chapter demonstrated that an agent’s actions at a specific performance level
have to contain a specific amount of information about aspects of the environment that
are needed to achieve this performance level. As discussed in the chapter of relevant
information, I assume that the amount of relevant information for higher performance
levels is higher than zero for those worlds we are interested in.
I did then argue that under an evolutionary perspective this should give a selective
advantage to an agent adapted as to incorporate this information into its own decision
making process. In this chapter I will make the assumption that the agent can differentiate
between the environment at large and other agents, and investigate how the digested infor-
mation stemming from other agents can be incorporated from an agent-centric perspective,
and what kind of problems are likely to arise from this.
Keeping with the information theoretic framework, I will use Bayes’ Theorem to in-
corporate the additional information gained form other agents into the agent’s internal
Bayesian Model. I will also outline the shortcomings of the naive Bayesian Approach used
by the agents, as it is at the root of some of the problems social agents encounter.
I will then demonstrate how Bayes’ Theorem can be adapted to the Fishworld and
Treasure Hunter Scenarios, and take a look at the resulting behaviour. I will demonstrate
that the inclusion of social information is beneficial if a single agent develops it, but can
become quite harmful if this adaptation spreads through the agent population. I will then
link the result here to phenomena observed in Social Learning literature, especially those
on Bayesian Social Learning, and Social Learning in Random Networks.
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5.2 Bayes’ Theorem
To integrate the action information into the agent’s internal model, I will use Bayes’
Theorem, which is usually stated as:
P (X|Y ) = P (Y |X)
P (Y )
· P (X) (5.1)
The random variables X and Y can be interpreted as propositions (facts about the world),
or hypothesis that are either true or false. Bayes Theorem then addresses the question
how the probability of X changes if one was to observe the event Y = y, or consider the
evidence that Y is either true of false.
To illustrate, image there are two urns, one contains two black and one white marble,
and the other contains two white and one black marble. They are indistinguishable oth-
erwise. I now chose one urn at random and blindly draw a marble, which is white. What
would be the probability that this was the urn containing two white marbles?
X = white in this case would be the hypothesis that the urn drawn from was the
white majority urn. So the a priori probability that I picked that urn would be P (X =
white) = 0.5. Y = white is the proposition that the marble drawn is white. P (Y = white)
is the marginal probability that I would draw a white marble, assuming only my a priori
knowledge the system. That would be P (Y ) = 0.5; considering that I could draw randomly
from the black or white majority urn, it is equally likely to draw a black or a white marble.
The conditional probability of P (Y = white|X = white) then quantifies how likely it is
to draw a white marble, if the urn drawing it from is actually the white majority urn. In
our case, this would be P (Y = white|X = white) = 2/3. Putting those values into the
formula I get:
P (X = white|Y = white) = (2/3)/(1/2) · 1/2 = 2/3 (5.2)
So after drawing one white marble the probability that I am standing in front of the white
majority urn is 2/3. If we turn the question around and assume X = black to mean I am
in front of the black majority urn, then the formula remains largely unchanged. The a
priori probability of P (X) is the same, and also P (Y ) remains unchanged. P (Y |X) equals
1/3 , and as a result, P (X|Y ) is also 1/3. This is the expected result, since both results
should add up to 1, because in this case one of them should be exclusively true. Also note
P (Y ) remains unchanged, independent of what hypothesis X we are choosing. It can be
considered as a normalization factor, making sure that the probabilities add up correctly
to one.
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5.2.1 Naive Bayes’
For the models in this dissertation it is necessary to integrate more than one observed event,
since the agents observe several other agents and parts of the environment repeatedly. The
general and optimal solution would be to treat all observed events as one large compound
random variable and perform a single Bayesian Update with them.
Coming back to the urn example, this is like repeatedly drawing marbles from one
urn (putting them back after each draw). For each of the n draws, the marble’s colour
is formalized in the random variables Y1, Y2, ..., Yn. They all can be expressed as one
compound variable Ya = (Y1, Y2, ..., Yn). Based on our knowledge about the system, it is
possible to determine the probabilities for each state of Ya, and thereby it is possible to
calculate the marginal distribution of Ya, and the correct a posteriori probability of X,
which encodes if the urn is a black- or a white-majority urn.
This approach becomes problematic if the probabilities of Y cannot be determined via
model assumptions, but have to be obtained from statistical sampling. In such a case one
would have to obtain enough samples to determine the probabilities of every state of Y to
a sufficient degree of accuracy. For example, imagine we were to look a medical data and
wanted to know the probability of a having a specific medical condition, encoded in X,
based on a list of 100 binary symptoms Y1, Y2, ..., Y100. To obtain good statistics it would
then be necessary to find a large enough group of patients for each of the 2100 symptom
combinations to then determine the probability of a patient in that group having illness
X. This is obviously not feasible.
A solution to this problem is called the Naive Bayesian Approach. To apply it, one
makes the assumption that all observations Y are independent conditioned on X, or that
the systems in question approximates this property close enough so the error resulting
from this assumption is negligible. This can be formalized for a range for observations
Y1, Y2, ..., Yn as
I(Yi, Yj |X) = 0 : 0 < i ≤ n, j : 0 < j ≤ n, i 6= j (5.3)
In this case the chain rule can be applied to decompose the multi-variate update into
several consecutive single Bayesian updates so that
P (X|Y ) = P (Y1|X)
P (Y1)
· P (Y2|X)
P (Y2)
· · · · · P (Yn|X)
P (Yn)
· P (X) (5.4)
The naive approach has several advantages:
• It is only necessary to gather enough statistical data to determine the influence of
each single observation on X separately. This greatly reduced the amount of needed
108
CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL BAYESIAN UPDATE
data.
• Updates can be applied in arbitrary order, so it is not necessary to sort or prioritize
the observations.
• Later additional observations can easily be integrated by a multiplication of the
current probability assumption at a later point.
These points make the approach well suited for an agent who can potentially observe
other agents, and then wants to integrate the information gained at a specific point in
time with its current prior (which might already contain information gained from the en-
vironment). The alternative, a complete and “correct” Bayesian Model on the other hand
is infeasible for several reason. The necessary statistics to model any possible sequence of
interdependent observations would be extremely large, which makes both obtaining and
storing them difficult. Furthermore, it would also require the agent to store all its ob-
servations into a separate memory, so after each new observation it could then look up
the appropriate update for the overall sequence of observations and then apply this to an
initial prior. With the naive model the only need for persistent memory is the storage of
the current probability assumption for X.
The same advantages also lead to the widespread application of the Naive Bayesian
Theorem in areas such as machine learning, network monitoring, and others. Related liter-
ature reports good classification results for different examples of real world data (Hand and
Yu 2001), even when the independence assumption was violated. Furthermore, (Domingos
and Pazzani 1997) shows that it depends on the nature of the dependencies between the
observations how far the naive models differs from the optimal actual Bayesian classifi-
cation. Consistent dependencies (those that support a certain classification) are worse
than inconsistent dependencies (those that cancel each other). If the dependencies fully
cancel each other out, e.g. if they are symmetrically distributed, then the naive Bayesian
classification even achieves optimality.
5.2.2 Adaptation to the Fishworld model
To further investigate the use of digested information for a agent in a multi-agent world I
now want to modify my original fishworld model so agents are able to include information
from other agents via Bayesian Update. As outlined in the last section, I will use the
simplified Naive Bayesian Model for reasons of feasibility (feasible both for implementation
in a computational model, but also more feasible in terms of ease of adaptation for the
agent)
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In our specific model we want the agent to use Bayes Theorem to update its hypothesis
about the food source location when it obtains evidence in the form of other agents move-
ment. The a priori hypothesis is the internal probability distribution Fˆ , which assigns
each cell in the world a probability for it to contain the food. Since Fˆ is not a single
proposition, but a random variable with n ×m states, we treat this as n ×m separate a
priori hypotheses. Bayes Theorem can be applied to each of them separately, just as we
demonstrated with the white and black hypothesis.
P (Fˆ = f) is the probability that the hypothesis that the food is in location f is
true, where f is an element of W , the set of all world cells. We immediately see that all
P (Fˆ = f) are mutually exclusive, and that one of them must be true. As a result, we
know that ∑
f∈W
P (Fˆ = f) = 1. (5.5)
A similar argument can be laid at the posterior probabilities of P (Fˆ = f |A = a) that
quantify how likely a certain food source position is if an agent was observed to perform
the move action a. They also have to add up to one:∑
f∈W
P (Fˆ = f |A = a) = 1. (5.6)
The marginal probability P (A = a) can also be determined quite easily. Either by argu-
ment, where it follows from the rotational symmetry that any move action a is equally
likely, and therefore P (A = a) = 14 . Alternatively, this can also be determined with
the statistical measurement of the infotaxis agents, which supports our assumption of
P (A = a) = 1/4, disregarding noise.
The last value we need to determine for each location f , is the conditional probability
of P (A = a|F = f). The probability of a certain action a, if the food source is in f . This
value can be calculated, for every f and a, from the statistics of the infotaxis agent. For
example, if the action a is north, and the position is 3 cells directly north of the agent,
we can then look at the statistics and count how many times in 10 000 trials the agent
has been 3 squares south of the food and moved north. This value is then divided by the
overall amount of times the agent has been 3 squares south of the food. So, in context,
the question P (A = north|F = 3north) answers how likely is the agent to move north, if
the food is three squares north of it. Note that the position f in this case is calculated in
relation to the position of the observed agent, and is relative only to the observed agent.
Putting all those values together we can calculate for every f :
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P (Fˆ = f |A = a) = P (A = a|F = f)
P (A = a)
· P (Fˆ = f) (5.7)
• P (Fˆ = f), the a priori probability, is the internal model of the agent for mapping
the probability distribution of F , as gained by their own experience so far;
• P (A = a) is the probability of an agent taking the move action a. Rotational
symmetry suggests a probability of 1/4 for each action a ∈ {north, west, south, east}.
Measurements in our single agent simulation confirm this. This is a normalisation
factor, so the overall sum of probabilities is still 1.
• P (A = a|F = f) is the probability of another agent performing action a if the food
is in position f . Note that the position f in this case will always be calculated in
relation to the position of the observed agent.
Note that the agents I used to gather the statistics were non-social and thus blind
to the actions of other agents. They behaved as described in the Infotaxis part of this
paper. So even though agents in the simulation have the ability to sense other agents and
update their internal world models they still calculate their Bayesian update under the
assumption that all others are non-social agents. For reasons of brevity I will use the term
social to denote agents that use the Bayesian Update with information gained from other
agents.
Also keep in mind that we used those agents to create the statistics to calculate the
probabilities for P (A = a|F = f), so the F in this formula refers to is the actual position
in the word, rather than the assumed probability distribution internal to the agent.
5.3 Social Fishworld Simulation
In the next experiment I will now look at simulations that contain multiple agents, where
some of the agents have the ability to perform the previously described Naive Social
Bayesian Update. To focus on the effects produced by the Bayesian Updates I limited
other channels for agent interaction. There is no collision detection, so agents can freely
move into a similar space. There is also no competition for scarce resources, so the food
source will not be used up by other agents finding it.
The general goal of the agents is similar to the single agent scenario, the agent wants
to detect the food source location in the shortest time possible. The agents still employ
the infotaxis strategy. The social agents add an additional step to their decision making
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process. First they will check, as usual after a move, if any cell around them contain the
food source. If not, they will then check within their sensor range if they can observe
any agents. If this is the case they will then, for each agent separately, perform a Naive
Bayesian Update, based on the last move of the other agent. The order of application here
is irrelevant, because the Naive Bayesian Update creates the same result, regardless of
order. After the agent updates Fˆ , it resumes the previously described infotaxis behaviour
to generate its next move action.
Note that agents which have successfully located the food stopped moving and are no
longer perceivable by other agents. This was done to increase the challenge, since it would
have been trivial for another agent to infer from seeing another non-moving agent that
the food must be within the sensor range of that agent. As a result, the agents cannot see
any agents which know where the food actually is.
This model, which includes the possibilities for the agents to use the Bayesian update
not only on the environmental variables, but also on other agents they accidentally en-
counter will be called the Social Bayesian model. Apart from the update of the internal
model before another infotaxis action is chosen it is identical to the infotaxis model.
5.3.1 Results of Social Bayesian Fishworld
First I equipped a single agent with the ability to perform the social Bayesian Update,
where all other agents in the simulation would use the non-social Infotaxis approach. I
then varied the number of agents in the simulation, and ran 10,000 simulations each in a
25× 25 grid world to measured the average time it took the one social agent to locate the
food source. At the beginning of each of the simulations all agents were put in a random
location, and their internal world model was initialize as uniform distribution.
The resulting performance of the social agent can be seen in Fig. 5.1. The search
time of the one social agent is influenced by the number of other, non-social agent in the
simulation. The social agent search time decreases with an increasing agent population
until there are about 50 agents in the simulation, and then increases for larger numbers of
agents. The performance of the non-social agents is not depicted, as it remains constant
throughout the different simulations.
The most obvious conclusion here supports the claim that Digested Information pro-
vides information otherwise not available to the agent. The dotted line in Fig. 5.1 shows
the lower bound for search time achievable to any non-social agent. As we can see, the
agent using information gained from the actions of others can perform better, e.g. has
a lower search time, than this lower bound. The only information the agent obtains, in
addition to the information about the local cells picked up from its environmental sensors
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Figure 5.1: A graph showing the dependencies between the number of agents in the simulation
and the average search time of one agent. Each data point is the average of 10,000 simulation for
each number of agents. The values are calculated for one specific agent, who is either the only
social agent in a world with non-social agents (white box), or is a social agents in a world where
all others are also social agents (black circle).
is the information contained in other agent’s action. Since the agent could not perform
this well with only the locally available environmental information, this requires the other
agent’s actions to provide information that is not locally available right now. This shows
that the other agent has to transport relevant information either through space or time
to then display it in its actions here and now.
Since the agent seems to profit from this new ability (at least if there are less than 100
agents in the simulation) I also modified the simulation further, so that every agent is now
able to perform the social Bayesian Update. All other aspects of the simulation remain
unchanged. The resulting average performance for different numbers of agents can also be
seen in Fig. 5.1. Again, the performance first increases with a growing number of agents,
up to about 80 agents. If the amount of agents in the simulation increases further, then
the performance drops again, indicated by an increase in the average search time.
5.3.2 Interpretation
The obvious question here is ”Why does an increase in other agents beyond a certain
point worsen the performance of the Social Bayesian Update agent?”. This is particularly
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puzzling, since we established that the other agent’s actions contain useful information,
and that an agent can actually profit from observing said information (as seen for the
simulations with less than 100 agents in the environment).
Some common explanations, which might be very reasonable for this phenomenon in
natural system, can be excluded due to the design choices of the simulation. This was
done intentionally to focus on the effect the information has. Since there is no collision in
the simulation, meaning several agents can be in the same cell, there is no overcrowding
effect, or agents blocking others with their presence. Similarly, there is no competition
for scarce resources, so the food source does not get depleted by other agents. This also
means more agents do not limit the access to the food source for other agents. Basically,
the other agents can only see and be seen, but not be interacted with further. Therefore,
the explanation to the worsening performance with too many agent’s should related to
either the information transfer from other agent’s actions to the social agent, or to the
information transfer from the social agent’s actions to the sensors of other agents.
Another possible problem for the agent could be the lack of good statistical data
for the other agent’s behaviour. As all the data is gathered for non-social agents, using
the resulting conditional probabilities for the social Bayesian update might introduce a
certain amount of error, if the observed agent’s behaviour differs from the non-social
agent. Obviously, other social agents act somewhat different to non-social agents (this
can be easily seen from the difference in performance), so this could explain why updating
with their information might have a negative effect. But this also seems unlikely to be the
main cause for the increase in search time. We see in Fig. 5.1 that the worsening effect of
too many other agents in the environment is larger when the other agents are non-social,
in which case the used statistics would be correct.
Nevertheless, the problem has to be connected somehow to the social Bayesian Update
process, as it is the only way how one agent can affect another. Therefore, a closer look
at the information in the observed actions is warranted.
5.4 Single Symbol Information
After examining the overall effect of the Social Bayesian Update on agent performance, I
will now analyse the effects of a single sensor input. I will introduce two measures, internal
certainty and external correctness. The first is the resulting actual reduction in entropy of
the internal model, the very value which infotaxis aims to maximise. The second, external
correctness, measures how well aligned the agent’s internal model becomes with the actual
state of the world.
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Both measures are very similar to the ones presented in (DeWeese and Meister 1999);
the main difference being that the measures are taken in regard to a specific agent’s
perspective. So, I do not ask how a single symbol would affect certainty on average,
which would basically be mutual information, but how it does affect a specific agent at
a specific time. The difference manifest itself mainly in the selection of the priors. This
is particulary interesting for correctness, where a symbol can be misleading in general
(worsen the average correctness), but still “correct” for a particular agent, or vice versa.
Note also, that this analysis is done regarding an agent’s perspective, not from an
agent’s perspective. Meaning that the measurement reflects how much an agent would
gain from a single symbol, but this measurement cannot be taken by the agent itself. If
it was possible for the agent to evaluate the correctness of a Bayesian Update, then it
would be pointless to do so, as the agent would already know where the food source is.
Therefore, the correctness can only be evaluated from an omniscient observer perspective,
or after the agent learns where the food source is.
I will use this analytical tool to investigate two questions. Once again I take a look at
how the information gathered from agents differs from the information gathered from the
environment. I am also interested to see what happens to the information gained from
other agents if there are too many agents in the simulation.
Internal Uncertainty
Information, in regard to information theory, can be classified as the average reduction of
uncertainty (or entropy) caused by observing a specific variable. This aligns well with the
use of information as mutual information in this thesis, since mutual information I(X;Y )
between X and Y measures how much the entropy of X would be reduced if Y was known,
and vice versa.
In our specific scenario the two variable in question are Fˆ (the internal probability
distribution of the food source location) and F (the actual food source position). Infotaxis
aim is in fact to reduce the entropy H(Fˆ ) of the internal distribution, which I will call
internal uncertainty, as quickly as possible.
Thus, one way to evaluate the quality of a given sensor input would be to measure the
actual reduction in entropy to the internal variable Fˆ . For this measurement, let s be a
specific sensor input S = s, were S is the random variable that encodes all sensor input
states. Then Fˆb is defined as the internal variable’s state F before s was observed, and
Fˆs its state after s was observed. Then the actual reduction of uncertainty for s can be
defined as
∆Hs = H(Fˆb)−H(Fˆs). (5.8)
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Note that this measurement only relies on the agent’s internal variables, so this value
could be measured by the agent internally. It measures the increase or decrease of certainty
the agent has about the world state. A piece of information that increase this certainty the
most would have the highest ∆Hs. Also, since the measurement is defined as the difference
of entropy between two points in time, it is obvious that all reductions in entropy over a
single simulation have to sum up to the overall reduction from maximal entropy to zero
entropy once the food is found. In other words, to find the food, the agent basically has to
reduce its internal entropy to zero, meaning the agent has to process enough sensor input
to provide it with enough entropy reduction.
External Correctness
The second way to evaluate a single piece of information would be to check if the agents
internal assumption are more or less correct after processing that piece of information.
In terms of probability distribution this can be done be evaluating how well the agent’s
internal probability model Fˆ approximates the actual food source position encoded in F .
This measure will be called external correctness.
The formalism used here to evaluate this is called the Kullback-Leibler divergence. It
can be computed over two probability distribution that are defined on the same alphabet.
In our specific case both F and Fˆ are both defined over W, the set off all world cells. The
Kullback-Leibler divergence is then defined as
DKL(F ||Fˆ ) =
∑
x∈W
P (F = x) log
P (F = x)
P (Fˆ = x)
. (5.9)
The KL divergence is, per definition, non-negative, and will attain its minimal value 0
when the internal distribution Fˆ is identical to the actual distribution F . If f ∈ W is the
actual location of the food source, then
P (F = x) = δxf . (5.10)
The KL divergence will be zero when P (Fˆ = f) = 1, meaning that the agent has located
the actual food source, and is correct about it. By convention the KL divergence is infinite
if we have to divide a non-zero probability by zero. In this specific example, this is the case
when we have a state in F with a non-zero probability, where the corresponding state of Fˆ
has a probability of zero. The only non-zero probability in F is the one for P (F = f) = 1,
where f is the actual location of the food source. So, for the KL divergence to be infinite,
the probability for f in the internal distribution has to be zero, P (Fˆ = f) = 0. This
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also means that no Bayesian update could create a state where P (Fˆ = f) = 1, making
it impossible for the agent to ever arrive at a fully correct model. The agents model
about the world in this case is not just very wrong, but basically broken. An infinite KL
divergence captures this well. For all other cases the KL divergence is finite.
Following from the definition of the KL divergence in Eq. 5.9 and the property of F
to vanish for all cases were F is not the food source f (see Eq. (5.10)), the KL divergence
can be calculated as
DKL(F ||Fˆ ) = P (F = f) log P (F = f)
P (Fˆ = f)
= log
1
P (Fˆ = f)
(5.11)
If we accept this as a measure of how correct our agent’s internal modelling of the world
state is, we can then also check how its correctness was affected by a single symbol s.
Again, Fˆb is defined as the internal variable’s state Fˆ before s was observed, and Fˆs its
state after s was observed. The change in correctness is then measured as
∆KLs = DKL(F ||Fˆb)−DKL(F ||Fˆs). (5.12)
Note though, that this value can only be evaluated if one either has an outside view on the
overall system, or if an agent would actually store all its internal probability distributions
over time, and evaluate their correctness after finding the actual food source location. This
measurement cannot be used by the agent at the time when the agent actually does the
update. Also, just as for the other measurement, this value has to eventually add up to
the overall reduction in KL divergence of the initial uniform model to zero KL divergence,
when the food source is finally located.
5.4.1 Single Agent Experiment
First I will take a look at the single, non-social agent case. For this I reran the original
grid world search task outlined in chapter 4. The simulation contains a single agent, in
a 25 × 25 world, its behaviour generated by the infotaxis algorithm. What I want to
determine now is how each sensor input changes the internal probability distribution of
the food source location.
The sensor input event s contains the states of all the world cells in sensor range of
the agent for one time step. This corresponds to all the information the agent can process
before it has to make the next decision. For a sensor range of 2 this means there were
25 cells to evaluate, each with two possible states. The processing of those potential 25
bits of information was considered as one event. For each of those sensor inputs s the two
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Figure 5.2: A scatter plot showing the change in both internal entropy ∆Hs and external correct-
ness ∆KLs for different sensor input events. Each data point depicts the values for the observation
s of all world cells in sensor range in one time step. The graph shows the accumulated data for 5
full search tasks, recorded in a 25× 25 world, with sensor range 2. The outlying points are those
observations in which the agent actually finds the food source location.
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Figure 5.3: A graph showing the development over time of both internal uncertainty (Entropy)
and external correctness (KL divergence) for a single agent. Measurements were taken for a single
simulation in a 25× 25 world, with a sensor range of 2. The steep drop at the end corresponds to
the time when the agent actually discovered the food source location.
values, for ∆KLs and ∆Hs, were recorded. The measurements in Fig. 5.2 were taken for
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5 agent search tasks1, each data point is the combination of a single ∆Hs and ∆KLs for
a specific s.
Looking at the data in Fig. 5.2 we see that the values for uncertainty reduction ∆Hs and
increase in correctness ∆KLs correlate perfectly for the single agent case. The five large
outliers are the values associated with the last steps in each simulation, the one where the
agent actually locates the food source, and thereby reduces its remaining entropy. Apart
from the final observations the recorded values are always positive, or at least zero, but
relatively small. They were plotted on a logarithmic scale to show that most of them
actually have non-zero values.
Fig. 5.3 is a plot of the development of both the entropy H(Fˆ ), and the KL divergence
after each time step for one specific simulation. The development seen here is typical
for a single agent simulation. Each time step reduces the uncertainty, and increases the
correctness of the agent. The steep drop at the end happens when the agent actually
finds the food. The only major difference difference between simulations is the time step
at which this actually happens. Also, for some rare cases there are short plateaus where
the uncertainty and correctness remain constant. Those correspond to the phenomenon
mentioned earlier, where the agent explored all locations in its immediate reach, and
therefore will move around randomly, without any immediate information gain.
Based on the observed data in both figures, it is clear for the specific single agent
fishworld case that every reduction in uncertainty is accompanied by a reduction of the
KL divergence with a proportional amount, and vice versa. This single agent simulation
therefore seems to be extremely well suited for the agent’s current mode of information
processing and decision making because infotaxis tries to maximise the reduction in en-
tropy and thereby maximises its gain in correctness.
While both ∆ values could, in theory, be negative, this is not the case here. Fur-
thermore, the correlation between both values, meaning those inputs that decrease the
uncertainty also increase the correctness, suggests that it might be possible for the agent
to actually determine the correctness of a single input by relying on its internal measure-
ment of entropy reduction. But, as we will see in the next section, the general case, or a
case involving other agents might not be so accommodating to the agent.
5.4.2 Results for Social Bayesian Update
This sections applies the single-symbol information analysis on a multi-agent simulation
where all or some agents use Social Bayesian Update. It contains a series of experiments,
1The low number of trial runs here is not statistically meaningful, but was chosen as to not clutter the
graphical representation. The interpretation, therefore, should only be used qualitatively.
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all of them are situated in a 25× 25 gridworld, with sensor range 2. There are 4 different
parameter combinations:
• 40 Agents, one agent using Social Update
• 40 Agents, all using Social Update
• 200 Agents, one agent using Social Update
• 200 Agents, all using Social Update
In the single social case only one agent will be able to use the Social Bayesian Update.
The data recorded in this case will be for this one social agent. In the all social case every
agent in the simulation has ability to perform the Social Bayesian Update, and the data
will be recorded for one, arbitrarily chosen agent.
The simulations with 40 agents were chosen because both the single social, and all
social case behave similar in terms of performance for this set of parameters, as seen in
Fig. 5.1. The simulations with 200 agents were chosen to take a closer look at why the
agents suddenly perform worse with more agents being present in the environment.
This time two different kinds of data points were collected. As in the last simulation,
one type of data point contains the differences for KL divergence and entropy before and
after processing all the environmental sensor information (the state of the world cells).
The other type is the difference before and after processing all information gained from
other agents in sensor range, which will be called the Social Update. So, the second type of
data collates all the information gained from other agents in one time step. Furthermore,
I also record the development of both KL divergence and internal entropy over time.
Development over Time
First, lets take a look at the development of the measurements over time. In Fig. 5.4
we can see the development of both KL divergence and internal entropy for 10 different
search tasks for a social agent in a world with 40 other social agents. Again, this is only a
randomly chosen sample of 10 trials, but we can still gain some qualitative insights here.
First, note that only 8 of the 10 search task actually show development over time, as 2
ended immediately, with the food source being sensed in the initial round.
For the other 8 search tasks, there seems to be a general trend for both the KL
divergence and entropy to decrease over time, with a sharp drop at the end, when the
food source is actually located. Different from the simulations where the agent used only
the environment to update its internal state, we can now see that both external correctness
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Figure 5.4: The graph shows the development of both internal uncertainty (Entropy) and external
correctness (KL divergence) over the course of 10, randomly chosen, consecutive search tasks. The
measurments were taken for one specific agent using social update, in a 25 × 25 world, with a
sensor range of 2. The world contained 40 agents, all also using social update. Two of the search
tasks ended immediately, as the agent could sense the food source location in the first turn.
(KL divergence) and internal certainty (entropy) can also become worse as time progresses.
For example, the 6th simulation shows a very high peak, where the KL divergence becomes
nearly trice as large as its starting value, indicating that the agent’s internal model assigned
a very low probability to the location where the food source actually was. Note that this
also coincides with the 6th search task beeing the one that took longest (ca. 70 time
steps). Likewise, the internal certainty also can become worse over time, as can be seen
in several search tasks in Fig. 5.4.
The second thing we can already see from the rough analysis of Fig. 5.4 is that the clear
correlation between entropy and KL divergence, which existed for the case with only the
environmental update, is not present here. In several cases one of the two values increases,
while the other values decreases at the same time, or vice versa.
The other parameter sets (different amount of agents, either all social or only one agents
social) produce qualitatively similar graphs where it also becomes clear that both KL
divergence and entropy can increase, and that they are no longer perfectly correlated. The
graphs itself are not shown here, as the differences between graphs of the same parameter
set are larger than the differences between parameter sets, so it seems that no further
insight can be gained from comparing the temporal development of KL divergence and
entropy for different parameters on a qualitative level.
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Decomposition in Environmental and Social Update
As a next step I looked at the data points for the environmental and the social update
separately. In the scatter plots in Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 each data point indicates the
difference in KL divergence and entropy for a single update, either the sensing off all cells
in sensor range (environmental update), or the processing of all visible agent’s actions
(social update). So one data point each is collected for every time step in the simulation.
The graphs contain the accumulated data points for 50 simulated search tasks, in the usual
25× 25 gridworld, with a sensor range of 2.
Looking at Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 we can see that the collected data points now can
be in any of the four quadrants, indicating that the information gain from a single sensor
input can now affect the agent in the following ways:
upper right more correct, more certain
upper left more correct, less certain
lower left less correct, less certain
lower right less correct, more certain
In general, the upper quadrants should be preferable for the agent, as they indicate a gain
in actual correctness, rather than just an increase in certainty about the world that might
or might not be wrong, but it should be noted that in order to complete the search task
the agent has to both reduce its uncertainty to zero, and be completely correct about it.
Regarding the data there are some general observations that can be made. Each of
the 4 different experiments has sensor observations in each of the 4 quadrants. There is
however a tendency for the social update information to be on the right side, where the
agent becomes more certain. In the next section, we will look at the average values for
the single symbol information, where table 5.1 will support this visual impression with
quantitative data, taken for larger samples sizes.
The information for single environmental updates on the other hand is never “mis-
leading”, in a sense that is does never lower the external correctness for any of the four
experiments. The outlying points, those that have both a high gain in certainty and
correctness are those associated with actually finding the food, i.e. the complete reduc-
tion of the remaining uncertainty and KL divergence. Apart from those events, most
of the environmental updates seem to decrease the agents certainty, while increasing the
correctness.
Specifically, looking at the plots for the simulation where all agents have the social
ability in Fig. 5.5, there is a comparatively large deviation from the center for both the
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Environmental Update, 40 Agents, all Social
Figure 5.5: Four plots showing the gain in external correctness and reduction in internal entropy
for single sensor events. The two left plots show data for sensor inputs coming from other agent,
while the right graphs show data for environmental sensor input. The two upper graphs are data
from 10 search tasks of one social agent located, in a world with 40 non-social agents. The two
lower graphs are data from a social agent located in a world where the other 40 agents are also
social.
social update and the environmental update. The social update events here make the
agent more certain, but less correct, while the environmental updates make the agent
more correct, but remove certainty.
Little difference can be seen for the simulations with 200 agents. Both, the single
social, and and the all social case, have quite similar plots. The social update information
is clustered around the center, and the environmental update seem to mainly reduce
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Figure 5.6: Four plots showing the gain in external correctness and reduction in internal entropy
for single sensor events. The two left plots show data for sensor inputs coming from other agent,
while the right graphs show data for environmental sensor input. The two upper graphs are data
from 10 search tasks of one social agent located, in a world with 200 non-social agents. The two
lower graphs are data from a social agent located in a world where the other 200 agents are also
social.
certainty, while increasing correctness, apart from those events where the food source is
actually located.
Quantitative Comparison of Social and Environmental Update
To evaluate those differences quantitatively the average value over 10,000 search task
simulations for both ∆Hs and ∆KLs was computed. The resulting measurements can be
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KL Div. Social KL Div. Envi. H Social H Envi.
40 Agents, one social -0.0113 0.1348 0.0889 0.0893
40 Agents, all Social -0.1542 0.2676 0.2031 -0.0396
200 Agents, one Social 0.0139 0.0599 0.0567 0.0498
200 Agents, all Social 0.0313 0.0653 0.0669 0.0725
Table 5.1: This table gives an overview of the average reduction in internal entropy and the gain in
external correctness for different scenarios. The values are averaged over 10.000 simulations, and
are separated by social update information and environmental information.
found in table 5.1.
Note, that the sum of the social and environmental reduction in KL divergence and the
sum of the social and environmental reduction in entropy are directly related to the average
search time. This follows from the previous definition of ∆Hs and ∆KLs as differences
between a state before and after observing a symbol s. The full entropy and KL divergence
have to be reduced to zero to complete the search task, so the average reduction in entropy
and in KL divergence is the overall reduction divided by the time steps it takes to find
the food. The measurements taken over 10,000 trials reflect this. If one was to add the
average ∆Hs for the environmental update, and the average ∆Hs for the social update,
then the sum would be average ∆Hs for one turn. This value corresponds to the overall
reduction divided by the average search time. The same is true for adding the values for
∆KLs. The values for the different scenarios all fulfil this property.
Since both simulation with 40 agents, have roughly the same average search time, the
average gain per time step (the sum of social and environmental ∆Hs and ∆KLs) are also
roughly similar. But the decomposition for those two simulations looks very different. In
the case where only one agent uses the social update 3 of the 4 values are positive, while
the remaining one, the ∆KLs, for the social update is negative, but close to zero. So the
Social Update Information is slightly wrong on average.
The simulation where all agents are social has very different distribution of values.
Here the ∆KLs is clearly negative, but this is compensated by a much larger ∆KLs for
the environmental update. But the environmental update has a negative value in ∆Hs, the
average reduction in entropy. This again in compensated by a large reduction of entropy
for the social update.
The measurements for the simulations with 200 are all positive, and show no particular
differences in regard to decomposition between the one social and the all social case. All
average gains for the one social case, the one that performs worse, are lower, as would
be expected given that the agent has a longer average search time. Taking a closer look
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at the underlying data shows that these lower averages, especially in the environmental
update values, results from a large amount of updates with zero information gain.
5.4.3 Interpretation
After looking at the resulting data gathered from the different simulation utilizing the
social update there are several questions that still remain to be answered.
• Why does the environmental update never have a negative ∆KLs, i.e. why is no
single environmental update misleading?
• What causes the average gain in certainty or correctness to become negative?
• Why does an increase in the agent population beyond a certain number worsen the
performance of social agents?
• Why is this worsening effect stronger for the case where only one agent is social?
Deterministic Observations
One major difference between the environmental and the social updates is that the infor-
mation in the environmental updates is never misleading to the agent, i.e. never increases
the KL divergence. This can be explained by the fact that the environmental sensor in-
puts, the states of the world cells, are fully determined by the location of the food source.
Assume that C is a random variable encoding the state of a world cell, with C = 0 meaning
it is empty, and C = 1 meaning it contains the food source. F encodes the food source
location; the information the agent wants to learn about. We see that for a given state
of F we can determine the state for every C. If we know where the food is, we can tell if
a specific cell contains it or not. So, H(C|F ) = 0, or in other words, C is determined by
F . If the agent now observes a cell C, we can calculate how this would affect the agent’s
Bayesian model of P (Fˆ = f), the probability for the actual location, f . If the cell is empty
we know that P (C = 0, F = f) = 1, and therefore Bayes’ theorem calculates as:
P (Fˆ = f |C = 0) = P (C = 0, F = f)
P (C = 0)
· P (Fˆ = f) = 1
P (C = 0)
· P (Fˆ = f). (5.13)
Since P (C = 0) has to be smaller of equal to one, it follows that
P (Fˆ = f |C = 0) ≥ P (Fˆ = f). (5.14)
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The analogous argument can be made for any other state of C, which in this specific
case would be containing the food source. It follows that for any observed state of C the
probability of the actual location f to contain the food source is increased, which leads
to a decrease in KL divergence. This simply follows from C being fully determined by F .
Contrary to this, the state of an agent’s actions are not determined by F , so in general
H(A|F ) ≥ 0. As a results, updating with another agent’s action contain the possibility of
actually increasing the KL divergence, i.e. becoming less correct.
This offers another nice distinction between social and environmental information for
this simulation, but we should be careful to generalize this result. I would argue that is it
pretty safe to assume that an agent’s actions are not fully determined by the information
it is looking for, simply because the agent is lacking this information in the first place.
Furthermore, in a more complex scenario the agent might have several concerns it needs
to address, resulting in a form of hybrid action selection that depends on different aspect
of the environment.
Nevertheless, I doubt that it is generally safe for other models to assume that envi-
ronmental observations are fully determined by the information an agent seeks. Any form
of noise, be it in the sensor input, or in the environment itself, would already violate this
constraint. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to assume, that it is quite possible for
environmental information to mislead the agent as well.
Negative Average Information Gain
In the simulation with 40 Agents, where each of them has the social update ability, the
average reduction in entropy becomes negative for the environmental update. This is
counter-intuitive at first. It is well understood that a single update can result negative
entropy reduction, but the average reduction in entropy should be positive. Especially
since the mutual information can be defined as the average reduction in entropy, and we
established in chapter 4 that there is a non-zero amount of mutual information between
the cells in the environment, and the position of the food source location. But taking a
closer look at one formalization of mutual information, as in
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ), (5.15)
it becomes clear that this average reduction is quantified in regard to a prior of H(X). In
our specific example, this prior is Fˆ , the internal model of F , which can assume a state
of high certainty and low external correctness. A subsequent update from this state with
environmental information, which is always correct in our case, will then result in lowered
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certainty (an increase in entropy), and a increase in correctness. This wrong, but certain
prior in the internal model is created by the social update. Specifically for the case with
40 social agents we see that the average ∆KLs for the social update is negative, meaning
that, on average, the social update is wrong. What is happening here is that the agents
encounters another agent and then uses that agent’s action to update it own internal state.
This creates the assumption that the food source location is likely just outside its reach,
in the direction the other agent was just going. This assumption is likely wrong, as the
measurement indicates. The agent then explores the location of high probability, likely
finds it empty and subsequently updates it internal model. The model is now much more
correct, but less certain, since the location which was likely to contain the food does not
actually contain it. This also explains how the inclusion of the social update changes the
nature of the information gained from the environmental update as seen in the scatter
plot in Fig. 5.2 to the one seen in Fig. 5.5. The information gain changes because of the
systematic change in the priors, not due to any change in the information itself.
Furthermore, even though the social update is systematically wrong (as in average
decrease in correctness), the overall performance of the agent is still improved by it.
Just disregarding the social update would return the agent to its non-social performance,
which was worse than the performance of the agent that incorporates the incorrect social
information. So taking up this “misleading” information is beneficial. In this specific
case it improves the correctness gained from the environmental information substantially,
compared to the correctness gain from environmental information in the non-social agent.
Furthermore, the social update still contributes a huge amount of reduction in uncertainty,
which in this case also helps to rule out a lot of locations where the food is not.
Systematic Dependency for Naive Social Update
Understanding how specific information leads to an average gain in uncertainty, at least
for selected parts of the sensor input, still leaves the question why the social update is
on average incorrect. Similar to the argument regarding the average reduction in entropy
the average reduction in KL divergence should not be negative. While single symbols can
be misleading, they should not be misleading on average. If they are wrong on average
than this means that the model (namely, the conditional probabilities) used to perform
the update are wrong, i.e., not reflecting the actual probabilities as they are. This means,
we should take a closer look at the models used for the update.
Our model of the agent’s behaviour was created by observing non-social agents, so
it is possible that it fails when this model is used to incorporate the behaviour of other
social agents. One the other hand, we know that that the statistics used in the update are
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Figure 5.7: Illustrations of the four principle Causal Bayesian Networks that explain non-zero
conditional mutual inforamtion, I(X; y|Z) > 0. (a) causal path from X to Y , (b) causal path from
Y to X, (c) common cause C or (d) being conditioned on a common descendant of X and Y .
correct for the case where only one agent is using the social update, as the other agents
are in fact non-social agents, just like the ones used for gathering the statistics. Their
behaviour is identical to those in the multi-agent simulation, as the non-social agents in
the multi agent simulation are not aware of other agents, or interfere with them in any
way. The negative average gain in correctness is still present in this case, so we need to
look for a different explanation. In this specific case, a likely candidate is the violation of
the independence assumption for the Naive Bayesian Update, formalized as
I(Ai, Aj |F ) = 0 : 0 < i ≤ n, j : 0 < j ≤ n, i 6= j, (5.16)
where A are the observed actions of other agents, and F is the actual location of the food
source.
In general, there are four different causal structures, illustrated in Fig. 5.7, which
can create mutual information between two variables X and Y , conditioned on another
variable Z (Pearl 2000). For two variables X and Y to have positive, non-zero mutual
information there has to be either:
• a causal path from X to Y , not containing Z
• a causal path from Y to X, not containing Z
• a common cause C, leading to both X and Y , neither path containing Z.
• a causal path leading from both X and Y to Z, the variable the mutual information
is conditioned on.
In our specific case, F , the location of the food source is determined at random, so
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it cannot be in any causal path from one action A to another. Similarly, since F has
no parent nodes, it can only be the common cause variable itself, instead of a variable
lying on the path from the common cause to the variables in question. For our specific
example this means that to show that the independence assumption is violated, one has to
demonstrate either a direct path from one variable to another, or show a common ancestor
in the causal graph that is not F itself.
There is one further possibility, the fourth case, where dependency is induced by con-
ditioning on a variable which is the descendant of both variables the conditional mutual
information is calculated for. To illustrate, it is possible to select a subset of the events
of the two variables in question, so that they have mutual information. Since the mutual
information for the remaining subset cannot be negative, the overall mutual information
will then also be positive. A classic, fictional example is the dependency relation between
smart and athletic people in elite universities. The events, or samples in this example are
people. Each of them can be smart, with a probability of 10%, which is formalized with
the variable S, and each of them can be athletic, with an independent probability of 10%,
which is formalized in the variable A. For the overall population, there is not dependence
between being smart, or being athletic, so I(A;S) = 0. But if we now select a subset of
the population, this changes. Assume that an elite college would accept anyone who is
either smart or athletic, or both. Acceptance will be formalized as C = t, the random
variable for college acceptance assumes the state true. A simple calculation would then
show that I(A;S|C = t) > 0, since it is more likely for someone who is smart and in
college to not be athletic. This also means that I(A;S|C) > 0 is larger than zero, as the
general conditional mutual information is just the weighted sum for all states of C.
This leaves in total three different ways on how the different agents’ action variable
can become correlated:
1. direct causal path from one action to another action,
2. common cause for different actions that is not the food source location,
3. conditioning of the overall system on a variable that is a descendant of different
actions.
In the following part I will demonstrate how the fishworld simulation in particular could
realize these violations of the independence assumption. I will also speculate how those
fishworld specific violations generalize to generic social Bayesian Learning Scenarios.
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Common Cause
As the agent’s actions are partially determined by its own internal state, it is conceivable
that the agent’s actions in several different time steps are a result of the same internal
state. This would then introduce a dependence of the agent’s actions in different time
steps. And indeed, taking a close look at multi-step action sequences, one can observe
that the agent nearly never goes back the way it just came. Since the agent knows that all
cells in that direction are empty, it would only move there if its actions were determined
at random, because all cells in reach were already explored. In general, the existence of
memory makes this dependence possible, since the very point of having memory is to use
a particular piece of information later, and possibly repeatedly to inform ones actions. On
the other hand, this effect should not worsen depending on the number of agents present.
Direct Cause, from Action to Action
Taking into account that the average gain of KL divergence is significantly worse in the
case where all agents are social, compared to the case where only one agent is social, it
stands to reason that this difference should somehow account for the lack of correctness.
Allowing all agents to observe each other makes the system susceptible to information
cascades. One agent might go into a certain direction, another might follow, base on the
assumed private information of the first agent, etc. And indeed, if we take a closer look at
the agent behaviour, we can see that the agents in the simulation seem to synchronize their
behaviour by aligning the directions of their movement. This will be studied in greater
detail in the next section, but here it should help to illuminate the differences between
the “all social” and “single social” model. The model where all other agents are social
allows those agents to each observe each other, and thereby to synchronize their resulting
actions. This then leads to statistical dependency, and furthermore, to errors when using
the Naive Bayesian Update.
Furthermore, the behaviour of the social agents is slightly different than the non-social
behaviour, which was used as a basis to construct the statistics for the Social Bayesian
Update. In addition, this could also introduce a source of error that would worsen the
update.
Dependency through Selection
Even with the information cascade and the faulty statistics as explanation we still need
to explain why the KL divergence for the single social case still indicates that the infor-
mation gained from other agents is wrong, on average. One explanation for this was the
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dependency through memory, but there is another possibility. When the agent observes
two or more agents, then those are not randomly chosen from the population of all agents,
but they are chosen by virtue of being in sensor range of the observing agent. This means
the observed agents are likely to have been in close proximity to each other, and therefore
observed similar parts of the environment in the past. This means their actions basically
give information about similar parts of the environment, and updating with said informa-
tion becomes redundant, and thereby wrong. The underlying assumption for the update
is that the observed agents are randomly selected from the population of all agents, but
this is not the case. Not in this simulation, and not in general, as observation is often
limited by location and time, as agent mostly can only observe other agents that are close
to them, both in terms of time and location.
Concluding this excursion into possible systematic dependencies it seems there are
several possible explanations for why the social update can be on average incorrect. Fur-
thermore, the likely explanation for the difference between the all-social and the single-
social case seems to be some kind of information cascade, indicated by the alignment of
agent’s movement, and by the significant change in average KL divergence in the case
where agents can observe all other agents.
In general, this area does warrant further studies. The information theoretic tools I
utilized here gave some insight into what is happening, and indicated certain tendencies,
but it would be nice to further disentangle the different effects. But even this simple
simulation already generates a lot of complexity, which makes it hard to further subdivide
the different measures. To partially address this I will look at a second simulation, where
similar effects can be seen and differentiated with more clarity.
Lack of information gradient
Moving on to the simulation with 200 agents, it still remains unclear why the agents
performance becomes worse when the number of agent increases? Looking at the aver-
age decrease in entropy and KL divergence, which are all positive, it also looks like the
systematic incorrectness of the social update offers no explanation here. If anything, the
information gained from the social update seems to be more correct than for the case with
40 agents. But a closer look at ∆Hs reveals that the updates now contain a larger number
of update events where ∆Hs is either zero, for the environmental update, or very close
to zero for the social update. Similarly, the change in ∆KLs also is very small in these
events.
An increase in sensor events with little or no information- and correctness gain would
explain the lowered average for both the entropy reduction and the reduction of KL di-
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vergence. Furthermore, there is a very clear explanation what happens when the ∆Hs
of an environmental update is zero. Since the agent chooses its actions to maximise the
gain in entropy reduction a zero indicates that any possible action would have resulted in
zero information gain. Therefore, all cells within on time step must have already had an
assumed probability of zero, meaning all cells directly around the agent have already been
ruled out as food source locations by the agent. This is bad for the agent’s performance,
as there is no gradient that infotaxis can use to guide the exploration. The agent has to
resort to random action selection until it finds an area that still has non-zero probabilities.
This has happened even to single agents before, but for larger agent population this effect
seems to be more common.
The specific problem here causes by the large number of agents is the increase in
likelihood of the following scenario. Imagine the agent is surrounded by other agents,
who are all just at the edge of its own sensor range. All of them have just moved, and
now the agent performs a social update. One thing that is clear from the statistics is
that the agent that just moved had not seen the food in the last round. So, there is
an area around the observed agents previous position that becomes completely explored.
This area reaches beyond the sensor range of the observing agent. Now, if the agent is
surrounded in all directions, then those explored areas might overlap in a way so that
the fully remove all information from the world in immediate moving distance. The area
becomes informationally dead, and the agent, in our current model, has to resort to random
search. This surrounding scenario becomes more likely when there are more agents in the
simulation.
Alignment vs. Lack of Gradient
What remains now is the difference between the “single social” and the “all social” sim-
ulation for 200 agents. Or more specifically, why do the agents in the simulation, where
all agents are social, perform better. Looking at the data, it seems that they are less
often subject to the lack of an information gradient. This can be seen by locking at the
actual data plotted in Fig. 5.7, but is not clearly visible in the actual plot. The agent in
the all-social simulation has less environmental updates that are completely zero than the
agent in the simulation where the other agent are non-social. This only occurs when all
four directions offer no new environmental information, and the agent then chooses one
at random. This indicates, that the agent in the non-social simulation is more often in a
situation where all local informational gradients are gone.
One difference between the all-social and the single-social case is the possibility for the
agent who all use social update to align their movement directions (I will study this in
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a quantitative fashion in the next chapter). The lack of a good gradient, as explained in
the last section, is caused when agents move into the observing agent’s sensor range from
all directions. If we now assume that the agents align, or partially align their movement
directions, then this becomes less likely. So, the presence of an information cascade could
protect the agents here from landing in a fully explored zone without a gradient.
5.5 Conclusion for Fishworld Model
The most direct conclusion drawn from the analysis of the fish world simulation, extended
with the social Bayesian update, is that the information gained from other agents is indeed
helpful in some cases. Using the social update ability has allowed agents, under specific
circumstances, to perform far better than any non-social agent could. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to conclude that such an adaptation would be reasonable for an agent to have.
But a closer look has also revealed that there are several problems that can arise in
which the social Bayesian update ability can be harmful. One such limitation is very
specific to the modified infotaxis search, which is in essence a gradient ascent along an
informational gradient. If this gradient vanishes around the agent, then the search becomes
undirected and inefficient. As demonstrated in the model, this can occur when there are
to many agent around to gather information from.
Furthermore, there were also examples of how the Bayesian Update, specifically the
Naive Bayesian Update, can fail in a more general way. The simulation where all 40 agent
were using the naive Bayesian Update demonstrated clearly, that the gathered information
is not just misleading in a specific event, but can be misleading on average. There are
several different mechanism that can lead to a systematic dependency, which then can
cause the Naive Bayesian Update to be wrong. Several of these dependencies, such as
a dependency through memory, or the dependency introduced by observing only those
agent in close proximity, are likely present in a wide range of scenarios, and the resulting
problems should therefore also be expected across a range of social learning scenarios.
Additionally, there seems to be some form of alignment between the agents, just based
on gathering information from the environment and other agents. This phenomenon,
which look similar to some form of coordination, will receive some further attention in the
next chapter. First however, I will take a closer look at how the treasure hunter model is
affected by social Bayesian update.
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5.6 Multiple Agents Treasure Hunter Scenario
In this section I will integrate the Bayesian Social Update into the Treasure Hunter Sim-
ulation and demonstrate how using the information gained from others can change an
agent’s digested information.
To recap the model: Consider a world with n locations, one of them containing treasure.
The location of the treasure is encoded in the random variable T , with |T | = n. The agents
try to locate in which of the n locations in the world the treasure is located. Once per
turn an agent action consists of visiting one of those n locations and observing whether it
contains the treasure. Should an agent find the treasure, it is immediately replaced by a
new, ignorant agent.
The last chapter demonstrated that there is some information about the treasure lo-
cation T = t in the distribution of the agent’s actions A, as observed when they embark
to a location. So, by observing where other agents are looking for treasure one can gain
information about the treasure location.
In the multi-agent simulation in this chapter it is now possible for the agents to observe
each other. Observing an agent will tell one where the observed agent is looking for the
treasure. It will not reveal whether the treasure was found, or whether the location
contains treasure. This information is encoded in the variable A.
If an agent observes another agent’s action, it will integrate the obtained information
into its own internal model. The observing agent will perform a Naive Bayesian Update,
based on the statistics gathered from the non-social treasure hunter simulations (Fig. 4.9),
to update its own internal probability distribution Tˆ which encodes the agents assumed
probability for the state of T . This uses the same formalism introduced in more detail in
section on Social Bayesian Update for the fishworld model.
Since the order of actions is important for the results, here is the exact order of what
an agent does in its lifetime:
1. initialize internal distribution Tˆ to the uniform distribution
2. if observing other agents, update Tˆ with Bayes’ Theorem
3. decide to search one of the locations
4. if treasure not found → update Tˆ
5. if treasure found → reset Tˆ to uniform distribution
6. repeat from 2. onwards
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All data discussed here is the average value for 1,000 simulations, each running for 1,000
turns.
5.6.1 Single Social Agent
In the first experiment we are looking at 10 agents in a world with 10 locations. Only
one of the agents has the ability to observe the others. The location of the treasure is
fixed, and determined at random at the beginning of the simulation. Every time any of
the agents finds the treasure, its internal memory is reset.
Unsurprisingly, the remaining non-social agents perform exactly as in the single agents
simulation. Their distribution of actions matches the one recorded in Fig. 4.9, and their
performance ratio is 0.180. Performance is measured as the ratio of discovered treasure
vs. turns. So, if an agent finds treasure on average once every five turns, it then has
a performance ratio of 0.2. This measurement is also identical to the fraction of agent
actions that are looking at the right location.
The one social agent in the simulation is performing better; it reaches a performance
of 0.30. This agent benefits from the information the other agents gather. As discussed in
the “Digested Information” argument, the other agents act as information preprocessors
for the social agent. Also, note that the distribution of actions of the social agents is even
more concentrated on the actual treasure location, hence the mutual information between
its actions and the treasure location, I(A, T ) = 0.220, is higher than the same mutual
information for the non-social agents, which was 0.042. The social agent performs better
and its actions encode more relevant information
As an additional side-note I should point out that this is another simulation where the
improvement in an agent’s performance coincidences with an improvement in the relevant
information in that agent’s actions. If the agents could be distinguished, then a Bayesian
Update with the social agent’s distribution could yield even more relevant information
than observing a non-social agent.
5.6.2 All Social Agents
Based on the success of this strategy, I assume that in the second demonstration all agents
have adopted the social update approach. This turns out to be extremely beneficial. The
performance of the overall population, which is also the performance of every separate
agent is ≈ 0.99. Once the food is located by one agent, everyone always finds the food. The
mutual information between actions and treasure location is nearly maximal, I(A;T ) ≈
log(10).
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Basically, the relevant information that the treasure is in location t propagates through
the agents. It is displayed in agent’s actions, then used to update another agent’s internal
model, and then that agent uses the information to determine which action to take, which
is going to be A = t. The agent will then find the treasure and reset its internal model. But
it will perceive others before it has to act again, biasing its internal model again towards
taking action A = t. This will continue unless environmental information conflicts with
this information, meaning the agent will not find the treasure in the location it was looking.
In that case, the observed location’s probability to contain treasure it set to zero, and the
agent will look at other locations. This will initially get the agents to explore all locations
until they find the treasure, and then they will all copy each other, finding the treasure
every turn from that point onwards. Note, that the treasure does not move when it is
found, just the agent who found the treasure is reset.
As we see, the important information is preserved by continuously flowing through the
agents population. Even when agents die and are replaced, the information is not lost.
This looks like a very desirable feature for an agent population, and therefore the Social
Bayesian Update seems like a reasonable adaptation for the whole population. But the
next simulation will show that the very same adaptation can have negative consequences
for the agent’s performance, if the simulation is just slightly altered.
5.6.3 Changing World State
In the next simulation the locations of the treasure will change during the simulation to
a different random location. This will happen ever turn with probability of 0.01. On
average this should change the location every 100 turns. The behaviour of the agents is
left unchanged.
First, let’s again take a look at the simulation for a single agent. The performance of
the agent drops from 0.182 for the static world state simulation, to 0.148 for the simulation
where the world state changes. A closer analysis shows that the agent’s original behaviour
has problems dealing with the changed scenario. Consider that the agent visits a location
x, and finds it empty. Then the probability for T = x will be set to zero in Tˆ . If the
location now changes to T = x after the agent visited x, then the agent will first explore all
other locations, finding all of them empty. This, in itself, is not problematic. But once the
agent looked at every locations once, all probabilities are assumed to be zero, given that
the agent still assumes there is one, non-moving treasure location. This is inconsistent
with the basic properties of probabilities, which is a result of the incorrect assumption
about the immovability of the treasure location. In this specific implementation, this
means that the agent now resorts to random search. This behaviour has, as we have seen,
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a lower performance rate, and therefore lowers the agent’s overall performance.
Modelling Uncertainty
To address the problem in the changing world scenario, I will introduce uncertainty into
the Bayesian model. This will also make the model more correct in general, as it produces
a more exact model of the actual probabilities from the agent’s perspective.
Assume the treasure changes its location with a probability of P (change) = 0.01 and
assumes another of the random n locations. This can be modelled by assuming that the
world is in one of two cases. Either, with P (change) = 0.01, it is in a case where the
location has just changed, so T should be uniformly distributed with every t ∈ T having
the probability P (T = t) = 1/n. The other case, with a probability of 1 − P (change), is
the one where the locations remains unchanged, so the agent should continue to assume
the distribution represented by its internal model Tˆ . These two cases can be combined
in a weighted sum to determine a new internal distribution Tˆ ′. The probability for every
state t in this new distribution can be computed as
P (Tˆ ′ = t) = P (change)
1
n
+ (1− P (change)) · P (Tˆ = t). (5.17)
To model the uncertainty, the formula should be applied to the agent’s internal model
each turn. Note that this leaves the ordering of probabilities from the most likely to the
least likely event intact, unless the probability of change would be 1. Therefore, the single
agent behaviour with modelled uncertainty performs still just as well as the agent without,
assuming the location is not changing. But, applying the above uncertainty model to a
single agent in a world where the treasure location does change increases its performance
from 0.148 (for the agent without uncertainty) to 0.180.
The performance increases here because the agent modelling uncertainty retains some
information about the order in which it explored the previous locations in its internal
model. The location that has been visited first and found empty had uncertainty applied
to it for nine times, once the agent cleared the last, tenth location. It therefore has the
largest probability to contain the treasure, and will be the first location to be visited again.
This actually reflects the fact that this location is most likely to contain the treasure, since
it is unclear when the treasure changed location. If it changed location after round 1, then
it would have to go to the first location. If it changed in round 2, it could either go to
the first, or the second location, etc. After the 10th round, when every location has been
visited once it is clear that the location has changed at one of the nine times in between
searches. The resulting probability p(1st),that the treasure is in the first visited location
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can then be computes as:
p(1st) =
1
9
(
1
1
+
1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
9
)
, (5.18)
whereas the second locations has a probability of
p(2nd) =
1
9
(
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1
9
)
. (5.19)
The later the location was visited the lower the probability becomes. The first location is
the one location the treasure has most likely changed to.
This also shows why modelling the uncertainty works better than simply resetting the
probabilities after all locations were visited and found empty. This would reset the internal
model and prevent the agent from having to use random search, but it would not preserve
the ordering of the previous search, which could be used to the agent’s advantage.
5.6.4 Uncertainty and Social Bayesian Update
One Social Agent:
The next simulations now has multiple agents with the ability to model uncertainty and
a changing treasure location. First, lets take a look at a simulation were only one agent
observes the other agents. The one social agent will observe every single action taken by
the other agents and update its model accordingly. It will also apply uncertainty to its
own model after taking its own action.
The non-social agents again perform just as in the single agent simulation (with un-
certainty), as their behaviour remains unchanged. Their performance is 0.18. The agent
that does use the social update is doing worse than that, having a performance of 0.174.
This is the result of internal uncertainty combined with repeated social Bayesian up-
dates. A closer look at the agent’s behaviour reveals that there are certain situations in
which the agent revisits a previously explored location rather than exploring those it had
not yet visited. Lets say the agent has explored location 3 already, and has then later
applied a degree of uncertainty to it assumed probability distribution. It then assumes,
internally, that there is a small chance that the treasure is in location 3. If several other
agents now all take action 3 in the next round, then observing each of those agents will re-
peatedly update this small probability to a larger probability. This might cause the agent
to explore location 3 again, even though it had just been explored. This could not happen
in the previous simulation, since without uncertainty the prior for the update would be a
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probability of 0, which would remain a probability of 0 after the update. But the small
amount of internal uncertainty made the agent susceptible to the influence of other agents.
All Agents Social:
Extending the Social Bayesian Update ability to all agents has even worse results. If all
agents update their internal probability distribution with the other agents’ actions, and
also apply uncertainty, then the performance of all agents falls to 0.1. A closer look at
the distribution of overall actions reveals that all agents are always exploring the same
location. This behaviour is somewhat similar to what happened in the case where all agents
had the social update ability, but without uncertainty or changing treasure location. The
difference here though is that the agents will all go to the same specific location regardless
of where the treasure actually is.
What happens is this: Initially, one agent chooses a location x at random, and all
others update their internal distributions accordingly, making this location more likely.
The first agent then updates its own model, assigning a probability of 0 to that location.
Then it will apply a degree of uncertainty to account for the possibility that the treasure
changed location. The other agents then all visit the same location x as the first agent, as
it is more likely to contain the treasure than any other location. This is according to their
own internal model, based only on the actions of those agents that acted before them.
The first agent now observes all other agent going to location x, updating it own internal
model. When it is the first agent’s turn to act again, all the repeated updates from the
other agents will have “convinced” the first agent that x is the most likely location for the
treasure to be in, and the whole process will be repeated from the beginning. Basically
all agents reinforce each others behaviour, getting stuck in a feedback loop that is not
dependent on the actual input from the environment. This is a classic example of the
previously mentioned information cascade.
The roughly 10% of found treasure simply result from the fact that the treasure changes
location and coincidentally actually appears where the agents are looking anyways in 10%
of the cases. If the treasure location would remain unchanged and the agents would
initially pick the wrong location, then the performance rate would go down to 0.
So, while the Social Bayesian Update is very beneficial for the agents in some cases, it
turns out that it can even be harmful, specifically when combined with a more accurate
model of uncertainty. The next simulation takes a closer look at the problem that a
repeated update from other agents’ actions seems to dominate the information from other,
non-agent sensor inputs. I will show that this can be alleviated by neglecting some of the
agent’s input.
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5.6.5 Partial Observability
For the next Treasure Hunter simulation I assume that all agents apply uncertainty to their
model (P (change) = 0.01) and also use the Social Bayesian Update with a distribution
based on the non-social agent’s behaviour whenever they observe the actions of another
agent. The treasure location does change, also with a probability of 0.01. Different to the
other models, only a fraction of the other agent’s actions can be observed. Every time an
agent takes an action ever other agent has a probability of po to observe this action and
update its internal model. Whether an agent can observe a specific action is determined
for each observing agent separately.
This basically creates several simulations interpolating between two previously studied
simulations. If po = 0, then the model would be identical to the non-social agent simula-
tion, and if po = 0, then it would be identical to the one where all agents could observe
each other, which led to a feedback loop and very bad performance ratios.
Changing Observation Probability for all Agents
Varying the parameter po for all agents results in performance ratios as depicted in Fig. 5.8.
As expected the extremal points have similar performance to the non-social and all-social
models. In the case where no agents observe each other the agents find the treasure on
average 0.18 times per round. The performance ratio increases as the chance to observe
other agents increases, up to ca. 30 % observation probability, where all agents have
a performance ratio of ca. 0.32. Increasing the observation chance further lowers the
performance again down to about 0.1 at an observation chance of more than 50 %. The
performance stays this low for larger observation chances for the population.
The second line in Fig. 5.8 is the mutual information between the agent’s actions A,
and the treasure location T . We see that I(A;T ) has the same value as for a non-social
agent when the observation probability is zero, then it rises to a peak of ca. 0.45 bits
for an observation probability of 30 %. The mutual information then decreases for larger
observation chances, down to zero mutual information for values above 60 %.
5.6.6 Interpretation as Information Cascade
Following from earlier arguments it is unsurprising that increasing the observation prob-
ability from zero upwards leads to an increase in performance. Agents do encode relevant
information about the environment, and when other agents occasionally observe others,
and use this information, their performance increases, since they have more relevant infor-
mation about the environment. The interesting effect here is the decrease of performance,
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Figure 5.8: A graph depicting both the average performance of an agent population, and the
mutual information between its actions and the treasure location, depending on the probability to
observe the actions of other agents. The values are calculated for 100,000 recorded actions of the
agents for each percentage of observation probability.
once all agents have a observation probability higher than 30 %. Why is a further in-
crease in obtained social information suddenly detrimental to the agent’s performance?
The problem here can be understood as an information cascade.
Both simulations, the one where agents model uncertainty and the one where agents
do not, exhibit clear signs of an information cascade in the case where all agents observe
each other. This is not unusual, as both simulations fulfil all the previously identified
criteria:
• The simulations contain agents that perform actions sequentially.
• There is private information for the separate agents
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• The agents employ social Bayesian learning
• Everyone can observe the action of everyone else
In the context of information cascades, the fact that one simulation models uncertainty
can basically be understood as creating a different set of priors for the updates.
A detailed account of the process that leads to the information cascade is as follows.
Initially, the first agent makes a random choice where to look for the treasure. The next
agent updates its internal model, and the position the first agent looked at becomes more
likely to contain the treasure, so the subsequently acting agent also looks there. All other
agents will likely follow. If there is no uncertainty, then this “cascade” will end after all
agents looked at the location once. If there is uncertainty, and if it is applied directly after
the agent visited a location, then we are dealing with a very similar situation to the one
discussed earlier, where an agent was convinced by others that a previously visited location
could, with high probability, actually contain the treasure. But in the current case, where
all agents are using the social update, this is not just a random co-occurrence of the other
agents action, but a population-wide synchronization, resulting from the Bayesian Update.
The data from the simulations indicate that basically all agents always move to the same
location. So, after applying uncertainty, every other observed agent would indicate that
the food is in a specific location. This then causes all observing agent to also go to that
location.
In the first simulation, the one that does not model uncertainty, this leads to an
information cascade that makes all agents move to the right location. Every other cascade
is aborted after one round, as all agents realize that the treasure is not actually there,
and their zero probability prior makes them insusceptible to social information from other
agents. This leads to a whole population of agents finding the treasure nearly every turn,
which results in nearly perfect agent performance.
In the simulation where the agent’s internal model has added uncertainty it is possible
for the agents to synchronize on a specific location in a similar fashion, but cascades for
incorrect locations will not be aborted. Therefore, the location the population synchronizes
on might be the wrong one. Since none of the agents are sure that this is not the right
location (because the location could have switched), this wrong synchronization becomes
persistent. Finding the treasure then comes down to random chance, the chance being
that the treasure location switches to the position the population already believes the
treasure to be in. Alternatively, the agents could get lucky, and the agent who moves first
might choose the actual location of the treasure at random.
So, while it is clear what happens when all agents can observe all other agents, the
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more interesting cases here are those with a limited chance to observe the other agents.
With very low observation probability the agents act very similarly to non-social agents,
and have a similar performance. As the observation chance increases, so does the agent
performance. The information from the other agents is used to improve performance and
agents are able to find the treasure ca. 32 % of the time. This also is accompanied by
a significant increase in the mutual information between the treasure location and the
agent’s actions. The agent population as a whole has good information about the location
of the treasure and retains this information to a degree. On the other hand, once the
treasure location changes the population is able to switch their internal models, and then
prefers going to the new location. Those ca. 68 % of the actions that do not locate the
treasure can be understood as an investment in exploration.
Once the observation chance gets higher than 30 %, the performance starts to drop.
The agents still synchronize, but this synchronization is not subject to environmental
information. This can be clearly seen in the development of the mutual information,
which drops to zero. Above 70 % observation chance the actions of the agent population
have no correlation with the actual location at all. The increase in observation probability
makes the population more susceptible to information cascades.
The observed phenomenon can also be understood in regard to the underlying network
topology. As Gale and Kariv (2003) prove, social Bayesian learning in a network leads to
uniformity if the network has a certain connectivity. As the chance of random observation
increases the network describing which agents observe each other transforms from one of
separated clusters to a fully connected network. Complementing this work, Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar (2011) prove which network topologies will lead to asymp-
totic learning, meaning that eventually all agents will converge on the right solution or
behaviour. Both their work applies to learning with persistent agents in a network with
random but persistent structure, while our model here removes and add agents, and has
probabilistic observation probabilities. Therefore, their work does not directly apply to
my model, but still suggests that the network structure and specifically the connectedness
would play an important role in learning process.
Particularly interesting here is that there seem to be two different transitions when the
network of observation becomes more complete. First there is a increase in uniformity that
also leads to a high degree of correct behaviour. Then, the uniformity rises even more, but
tends to converge on a random location, with no correlation to the actual information in
the environment. So there seems to be a trade-off here between getting a lot of information
from other agents, but at the same time still being able to incorporate the information
from the environment.
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Changing Observation Probability for one Agent
If the observation probability is understood as the result of an agent’s effort invested in
observing others, then it could be treated as a behavioural parameter that the agent,
or at the least the process that adapts agents, could control. This could be realized
by deliberately degrading the agent’s sensors to save resources in case of an adaptation
process on the agent’s population, or by simply discarding some of the sensor input at
random if this is realized as an agent strategy. In this context it would make sense to ask
if an individual agent could perform better than the rest of the population, by unilaterally
changing the probability to observe others.
Given that the actions of the remaining population provide a high degree of mutual
information it might be useful to obtain more of this information than others do. On the
other hand, there were also indications that taking in too much information from others
might override the information from the environment, and thereby degrade the agent’s
performance. So deliberately lowering the social information intake might also improve
the agent’s performance compared to the rest of the population.
In the next simulation we will look at one agent that can change its observation prob-
ability independent from the rest of the population. The observation probability for an
agent determines how well it can see others, not how well it can be seen. That means that
whenever this agent would observe another agent’s action, its own observation probability
would be used to determine whether this agent could actually sense what action the other
agent took.
All other agents in the simulation have a fixed observation probability of 30 %, since
this was the value that lead to the best performance for the overall population, and also
encoded the most relevant information.
In Fig. 5.9 we see the resulting performance ratio and mutual information I(A;T ) for
varying po for the one agent that can change its observation probability. Overall, the graph
looks very similar to the previous graph where all agents could change their observation
probability. The performance for that one agent is still optimal at ≈ 30%. Scaling down
the observation probability to zero, obviously has the same performance as the non-social
agent. Increasing observation probability still also still lowers the performance to ca. 0.1.
This is particularly interesting, because for this specific simulation it creates something
akin to a game theoretic equilibrium at the 30 % point. Even if all agents could change
their own observation probability at will, none of them could change it away from 30 %
without also decreasing its performance, all other factors being equal. Additionally, the
mutual information I(A;T ) for the specific agent is also largest at 30%, which is at the
same time the relevant information the agent’s actions provide to other agents. While not
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Figure 5.9: A graph depicting the performance of a single agent, and the mutual information
between this agent’s actions and the treasure location, depending on the probability to observe the
other agents in the population. All other agents observe each other with a probability of 30%. The
values are calculated for 100,000 recorded actions of the agents for each percentage of observation
probability.
doing so deliberately, agents still provide valuable information to each other. In this case,
they provide the most at the same point where they have the best performance, as seen in
Fig. 5.9. Thereby, an agent that is interested in improving its own performance, is also
motivated to process and provide as much relevant information as possible.
5.6.7 Comparison to Relevant Information Function
The idea that more performance leads to more encoded relevant information relies on
the assumptions that the relevant information function RI(u), which tells us how much
information is needed for a given performance level, is monotonically increasing, and on
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the assumption that the agents strategies actually lie on, and not above the trade-off
function. Since it is possible to compute the actual RI function for the treasure hunter
model, we can compare the achieved values to the function, and thereby how efficient the
agents use their information.
RI(u) for the Treasure Hunter Model
The relevant information for the treasure hunter model is determined by the distribution of
the treasure, encoded in T , and a specific agent’s action distribution, encoded in A. Both
random variables are defined over the same alphabet, which corresponds to all possible
locations in the world.
As relevant information is a property of the environment, and not of a specific agent, it
considers all possible strategies P (A|T ), regardless of how any specific agent would acquire
the information needed to actually implement this strategy. To determine the value for
RI(u) we have to answer the question, which joint distribution of A and T that has at
least a performance level of u has the lowest mutual information.
Since the treasure relocates randomly we know that the marginal probabilities for any
specific state t of T are p(t) = 1/|T |. Now, for any specific state t, to achieve an average
performance of u, with 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.0, the agent has to employ a strategy that chooses the
right action with the probability of u, hence P (A = t|T = t) = u. It follows that all
other states of A together share the remaining probability. Since the distribution of the
other states does not matter in terms of performance, the remaining probabilities should
be distributed uniformly in A to minimize the mutual information:
P (A 6= t|T = t) = 1− u|A| − 1 . (5.20)
This allows us to compute the conditional probability P(A—T=t) for a strategy that both
achieves performance level u, and has minimal mutual information. With this we can
compute the conditional entropy as
H(A|T ) = −
∑
t
P (T = t)
∑
a
P (A = a|T = t) log(P (A = a|T = t) (5.21)
= −|T | 1|T |
(
u log(u) + (|A| − 1) 1− u|A| − 1 log
(
1− u
|A| − 1
))
(5.22)
= −
(
u log(u) + (1− u) log
(
1− u
|A| − 1
))
(5.23)
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The relevant information then is the mutual information,
I(A;T ) = H(A)−H(A|T ). (5.24)
For our specific example of a world with ten locations we can therefore compute the
relevant information function as
RI(u) = log(10) +
(
u log(u) + (1− u) log
(
1− u
9
))
. (5.25)
Note that this is the function that computes the minimal mutual information for
being on a specific performance level u, not for having a strategy that at least has the
performance level u. But looking at the actual function, which can be seen in Fig. 5.10, it
becomes clear that the function is, for values of u over 0.1, strictly increasing. Therefore,
the minimal mutual information for a specific performance level above 0.1 is also the
actual relevant information needed to perform at least that well. There is no strategy that
performs better with less mutual information, and as a result, the graph computed with
Eq.(5.25) is the actual relevant information function for all values above 0.1.
The previous distinction is necessary, though, because in this case it is necessary to
process information to have a performance level lower than 0.1. A performance of 0.1 can
be achieved with a random strategy, and therefore has no relevant information. Eq.(5.25)
does reflect this, as it is zero for u = 0.1. For values of u lower than 0.1 the function
in Eq.(5.25) computes values higher than zero, which would be the information necessary
to actually perform at this level. One would have to actively avoid the treasure. But by
previous definition relevant information should return the information needed to at least
attain a specific level, and since random performs better, and has no relevant information
all performance levels below u = 0.1 have zero relevant information. This is reflected in
the graph in Fig. 5.10, which therefore differs from Eq.(5.25) in values below 0.1.
The data points plotted in Fig. 5.10 are taken from the two previous simulations, those
where all agents changed their observation probability, and those where only one agent
changed its observation probability and all other agents had an observation probability of
30 %. Each point is the combination of the mutual information I(A;T ) and the achieved
performance ratio for a specific percentage of observation probability. Different observation
probabilities result in different strategies, i.e. different conditional probabilities P (A|T ).
The data points gathered here are, as expected, all above or on the RI trade-off curve.
The values developed very similarly for both simulations. For an observation probability
of 0.0 the data point is located at a performance of 0.18, and actually on the trade-off
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curve. As the observation probability increases so does the performance. The strategies
still stay on the trade-off curve for the lower percentages of observation probability, and
since the trade-off curve is strictly increasing, so does the encoded relevant information.
As the observation probability gets larger we see that the resulting data points leave
the trade-off curve, which means the resulting strategies encode more mutual information
about the environment than necessary. The strategies for further increases in observation
probability are located in the upper loop where they gravitate towards a point of no
mutual information and a performance of 0.1. This indicates that they also encode more
information about the environment than necessary.
This comparison of the mutual information in the actual strategies to the actual rel-
evant information illustrates how observing more and more agents leads to processed
information, which might not necessarily be relevant. The strategies with low observa-
tion probability are located on the actual relevant information trade-off curve, meaning
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they are efficient in the regard that they do not process non-relevant information. The
strategies which are subject to the information cascade on the other hand do display a
lot of information about the environment in their actions which is non-relevant. At the
same time, as seen here, their performance diminishes as well. Fortunately for the agent
population, the point where agents display the most relevant information about the envi-
ronment is also roughly the point where the agent performs best, so it would be possible
for an agent population, which could adjust their observation probability, to stabilize in
the point which benefits all agents the most.
5.6.8 Conclusion for Treasure Hunter
The treasure hunter model offered a chance to perform a clearer analysis of the information
provided by the agent’s actions, and how it does affect other agents in turn. Also, it allowed
us to better study how information changes when it is processed through several agents.
Similarly to the fishworld model the naive conclusion here is that the information
in other agent’s action can increase an agent’s performance. Especially the lone social
agent benefited from observing others. Furthermore, the simulation provided additional
evidence that an increase in performance leads to an increase in digested information, i.e.
an increase in the mutual information between agent’s actions and the treasure location.
As we saw, the mutual information between the food source locations and the agent’s
actions was maximal at roughly the same observation level.
Also, similar to the fishworld simulation it became clear that the usefulness of the
acquired information depends on several factors, such as the application of uncertainty to
the internal model. Without uncertainty the system proved to be relatively stable; more
information was always more helpful. All agents observing each other led to an information
cascade, but one that preserved the location of the treasure in the agents population, even
though none of the agents in the population had actually seen the treasure. This was
particularly helpful for the agent population when new agents entered the population.
The interesting case was the simulation with uncertainty in the internal model of the
agent, where more processed information would lead to problems, as several sources for
information now had to be balanced against each other. An increase in the chance to
observe each other first leads to an increase in overall performance, but if too much social
information was coming in it eventually overrode the actual environmental information,
and the agents would synchronize on an arbitrary choice.
While this might look bad for the digested information hypothesis, it is in fact address-
ing the first research question of this thesis. In the area of artificial life the main interest
is to reproduce the behaviour of living systems. Systematic errors of living systems are
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particularly interesting, as they offer insight into how a systems operates. Making an
evolutionary argument for a system that always operates perfectly is simple, the benefit
of such a system are clear. But producing a reasonable systems that produces systematic
errors similar to those observed in natures is far more interesting, as it indicates that
nature might operate with the same, or functional similar mechanisms.
For this specific case there are rough similarities to phenomena such as mass hysteria,
cargo cult believes and run-away fashion fads. As discussed in the introduction, these are
often subsumed under the general concept of information cascades. While they can be very
harmful, they also seem to be an existing phenomena in biological systems. The fact that
our model produces similar phenomena is therefore interesting, rather than problematic.
Relating the last model to information cascades in general also leads to the question
what additional insight the fisherman model can provide here. Of particular interest
here would be the existence of a Nash equilibrium of social information intake, where no
agent by itself could change the chance of how often it would observe others without a
decrease in its own performance. As an agent would (roughly) provide the most relevant
information by operating at the observation level where it would also perform best, the
agent is motivated to remain at that observation level, for its own benefit. Thereby it
would also provide the largest amount of relevant information. No single agent could thus
switch its strategy unilaterally without losing performance.
At the same time this also showed that the process of providing information to others
and using such information is dynamically linked. Using information from other agents
changes the information an agent provides itself. In general this leads to a game theoretic
scenario, where the question of how much information from others an agent should process
is not just a static optimization process. By collectively processing more information
from others a situation might arise in which the very information agents provide to others
vanishes. So, if everyone tries to process as much social information as possible, this might
lead to no social information for anyone. In this specific scenario there existed a specific
equilibrium point where an individual agent was both performing optimally and providing
the most information to others with the same strategy. But this begs the question if such
equilibria for information processing always exist?
Similarly, there are also a lot of open questions regarding the network structure and its
influence on social Bayesian learning. Recent work, as discussed earlier (Gale and Kariv
2003, Acemoglu et al. 2011), shows that both the network structure and the internal
priors influence if the population will converge, and if it will converge on the optimal
solution. If an agent can influence how much “resources” are spent on specific sensors, or
at least determine where to steer its attention, then this agent might actually be able to
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change the very network structure it is located in. From the perspective of information
maximisation it might in fact be reasonable to actually discard certain inputs, in order
to increase the overall “quality” of the information that is provided via the network of
possible observations.
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Flocking Behaviour
6.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter demonstrates how the previously introduced infotaxis behaviour, combined
with the social Bayesian update, can lead to flocking behaviour. I aim to demonstrate that
the maximisation of relevant information alone is sufficient to generate behaviour similar
to flocking.
I will first give a short introduction to flocking behaviour in nature, in general, and
to Reynolds boids rules (Reynolds 1987), in particular. It will serve as a baseline to
compare our results against. I will then present a slightly modified version of the earlier
gridworld search task, incorporating both infotaxis and Social Bayesian Update. I will also
introduce some measurements for alignment, local density and collision, to investigate the
prime properties boids-like flocking should display. Finally, I will present the results, and
discuss in a less technical frame how information maximisation leads to those properties.
6.2 Introduction
6.2.1 Motivation
Observation of the agent’s movement in the social infotaxis simulations in the last chapter
indicated that the agents might move around in groups, forming something akin to swarms
or flocks. The purpose of this chapter is to verify the existence of this behaviour in a more
quantitative fashion.
The main hypothesis is that agents controlled by infotaxis and Social Bayesian Update,
as described in Chapter 4 and 5, will form flocks of agents, similar to the behaviour
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generated by the boids rules (Reynolds 1987).
This is particularly interesting in regard to research question 1, which asked if opti-
mization of information processing leads to agent-agent interaction. Flocking or swarming
is clearly an interactive behaviour that requires some form of coordination. Embracing the
bottom-up, artificial life perspective, it would be good to demonstrate that optimization
of information processing could lead to such behaviour.
For the following model we will therefore assume that agents indeed optimize their
intake of relevant information. We will also assume that these agents somehow adapted
to display behaviour functional equivalent to infotaxis and the Social Bayesian Update
described in the last chapters. We can then ask if it is possible that these behaviours
generate behaviour similar to flocking?
6.3 Related Work
6.3.1 Animal Aggregation in Nature
Flocking behaviour is a natural phenomenon found in a diverse selection of life forms.
Spatial aggregation of animals have been observed in bird flocks, fish schools, mammalian
herds, and bee swarms (Allee 1931, Lissaman and Shollenberger 1970), just to name a
few examples. Dyer, Ioannou, Morrell, Croft, Couzin, Waters and Krause (2008) even
demonstrate that humans, under specific circumstances, exhibit similar flocking behaviour
in large crowds.
In general, the flocking phenomenon is a widespread and well documented example of
local, agent-centric self-organization. There is no central entity that controls or creates
the flocking, but it emerges nonetheless, as a result of the individual agents’ behaviour,
which in turn is based on the local information available to those agents.
The possible explanations for flocking behaviour, or animal aggregation, are numerous.
Depending on what kind of animal we are talking about, flocking offers several benefits.
It protects the individuals from predators, offers an increased choice of mates, and adds
the possibility that other flock members might be aware of food sources, predators or
migratory routes that the individual is not (Camazine 2003). Several of those reasons can
be conceptualized as forms of information transfer. This might be the information about
mates, food sources, predators, or other factors in the environment that are important
for the agent. In essence, these cases are examples of relevant information being shared
between the flocking agents.
Incidentally, if we look at several of the earlier biological examples for Danchin’s “Inad-
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alignment cohesion separation
Figure 6.1: Three figures illustrating the three basic boids rules: alignment, cohesion and separa-
tion. The agent in the middle of each figure determines its movement direction by observing the
locally visible agents (those in the dashed circle). The resulting direction for each rule is the thick
arrow. The actual resulting movement is a weighted linear combination of the three indicated
direction.
vertent Social Information” (Danchin et al. 2004) we see that the animals who exhibited
the ability to use the digested information of other agents, such as bees (Baude et al.
2008) and birds (Parejo et al. 2008) are also animals that exhibit flocking or swarming
behaviour.
Further supporting evidence for the relation between swarm behaviour and information
transfer are several recent studies into the informational properties of artificial swarms.
Couzin, Krause, Franks and Levin (2005) demonstrate that information known to only
a subset of the swarming agents is still sufficient to guide the overall movement of the
swarm. Also, Wang, Miller, Lizier, Prokopenko and Rossi (2011) demonstrate that agent
aggregations exhibit certain information theoretic properties if their behaviour is created
with the boids flocking rules. Specifically, information storage (Lizier, Prokopenko and
Zomaya 2007) and transfer entropy (Schreiber 2000) between agents becomes larger when
the swarm organizes from a more to a less fragmented configuration.
So it seems plausible that flocking behaviour enhances the ability to use the information
of other agents and in theory it could even be caused by maximising one’s own information
intake.
6.3.2 Boids
One of the first models to recreate this behaviour in a computer simulation is the boids
steering model, introduced by Reynolds (1987). Originally developed to animate the
movement of fish and birds for graphical presentation, the boids model has developed into
a de facto standard for flocking algorithms.
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The three basic rules, alignment, separation and cohesion, are agent based and local,
so they allow every agent to determine its own actions by itself, using only local data:
Alignment: Steer towards the average heading of local flock mates. The agent adds all
the movement vectors of the locally visible agents. The resulting vector is the agent’s
desired movement direction, based on the alignment rule.
Cohesion: Steer towards the average position of local flock mates. The agent averages
the position of all visible agents. The vector pointing from its own location to that
center of mass is the cohesion component of the agent’s movement.
Separation: Steer to avoid crowding local flock mates. The agent determines the dif-
ference vectors between itself and each other locally visible agent. Based on those
vectors the agent creates and repulsion vector for each visible agent. This vector
points in the exact opposite direction, and is longer the closer the other agent is.
The sum of those repulsion vectors is the separation component of the agent’s move-
ment.
The agent’s actual direction of movement is a weighted linear combination of the three
vectors for alignment, cohesion and separation. Each of them weighted with a coefficient
that determines how strong that specific component, or rule, influences the agent’s overall
behaviour.
This model, or variations thereof, are not only the basis for many current flocking and
swarm simulations, but are also a powerful example for how simple, local rules can lead
to the emergence of complex, life-like properties.
Furthermore, artificial flocks based on boids rules have also been used to perform ge-
ographic location tasks (Macgill and Openshaw 1998), demonstrating how flocking makes
agents better at processing data related to locations. This is related to my model, as the
agents in the fishworld model also try to find a specific location. In contrast, Macgill and
Openshaw (1998) introduced flocking explicitly to increase the performance, while in our
model flocking is a by-product of the optimization of information processing.
6.4 Information based Flocking
What I want to investigate in this chapter is if the phenomenon of self-organised flocking
can be produced by the optimization of information processing. But instead of motivating
the individual atomic rules for separation, cohesion and alignment, I will investigate if
infotaxis and Social Bayesian Update will generate a group behaviour similar to flocking.
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In my model the individual agent‘s actions, and the resulting global flocking behaviour,
is created and motivated by obtaining as much relevant information about the environ-
ment as possible. This is an additional result of the previous efforts to extend information
theoretic-behaviour generation in general, and in particular the biologically inspired info-
taxis model by Vergassola et al. (2007), to a multi agent system.
In the original infotaxis model the sensor inputs from the environment are used, via
a Bayesian Update, to update an internal probabilistic model about a specific location.
Actions are chosen based on how much expected information gain they provide for the
internal model. In the multi-agent model, the actions of other, observable agents are
treated with the same Bayesian update.
The focus of this chapter is to evaluate this claim by looking at some quantitative
data regarding the agents’ flocking behaviour. I will use a slightly modified version of the
earlier infotaxis driven grid world search, and introduce some measurement to verify the
existence of flocking behaviour.
6.4.1 Experimental Model
As before, we are looking at a grid world model with periodic boundaries. There is one
single location of interest, which I will call the location of the food source, but one can
interpret it as any other relevant location information, such as position of shelter or mates.
The goal of the agents is to determine (not reach) this location in the shortest possible
time.
The agents’ initial location, and the location of the food are randomly initialized at
the start of the simulation. The agents all use the infotaxis behaviour to locate the food
source, and all of the agents are using the Social Bayesian Update when they encounter
another agent incidentally. Both behaviours have been described in detail in the chapters
on “Digested Information” and “Social Bayesian Update”, respectively.
Different from the other models, this simulation includes collision detection. If an
agent tries to move into a cell already occupied by another agent it will remain in its
originating cell.
Once an agent finds the food, the agent still disappears. An agent that has disappeared
does not block other agents, cannot be observed, and its behaviour is not taken into account
for the statistical measurements. Note also that the food source itself is unaffected from
agents finding it.
The above scenario determines the basic properties of our setting. Now, as I am
interested in flocking behaviour, for an effective evaluation, the simulation will be run
continuously, so the agents have time to form a swarm. Thus, instead of reinitializing the
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simulation every time one or all agents find the food source, at each time step there is a
3 % chance that the food will be randomly relocated. In this case, the internal models
of all agents are reset, so they start a new search. Those agents which have disappeared
because they found the food will also be put back into the world in the location they
previously disappeared from. The purpose of this is to allow swarms that have already
formed to continue their coordinated movement.
If several agents are on the same cell when they re-enter the world they will be put
into the same cell. They can still not move into a cell were there is another agent, but
they can leave from a cell that contains several agents.
6.5 Measurements
While flocking behaviour is visible at this point in our model, defining an objective overall
measure which quantitatively captures the emergent flocking behaviour seems difficult. A
direct action-to-action comparison between boids rules and infotaxis is problematic. First,
because flocking in its original form is not well defined for a discrete grid world. Second,
the question here is not if the underlying micro-behaviour is identical, but if infotaxis can
lead to similar macro-behaviour of the overall swarm.
Instead, I aimed to measure the immediate effects that behaving according to the boids
rules should have. For that, I defined the following measurements.
6.5.1 Alignment
To quantify the alignment of the different agents, I added up all the agents’ movements
and took the length of the resulting vector and normalised it. I.e., every agent x ∈ X has
an associated vector
~vx ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)(−1, 0)(0,−1)} (6.1)
corresponding to the last direction it moved in. The global alignment is then calculated
as the length of the sum of all agents’ vectors, divided by the number of agents:
alignment =
|∑x∈X ~vx|
|X | (6.2)
This results in a value between 1.0 and 0.0. The maximum value is reached when all agents
move in the same direction, and the lowest value of 0.0 is attained when the movement of
all agents is distributed evenly among those moving north and south, and those moving
west and east, respectively. Note again, that agents which have found the food are not
158
CHAPTER 6. FLOCKING BEHAVIOUR
taken into consideration for this measurement, since it would be irrelevant to measure how
well aligned they are, once they are not moving anywhere.
This measurement is taken for every simulation step, and an average over all simulation
steps is then calculated for the whole simulation.
6.5.2 Cohesion
To measure cohesion, I simply count, for every agent, how many other agents are within
the agent‘s sensor range for any given time step. This value is then averaged over all
agents, and over all time steps, and the result is the local agent density, or simply density.
This value, different from the global alignment, is only taken locally, and reflects how well
agents keep other agents within their own sensor range.
6.5.3 Separation
The hardest value to measure is separation, since it basically quantifies an objective of
what should not happen. To approximate this, we measure how often one agent tries
to enter the cell of another agent, and thus is colliding with it. In this case, the agent
trying to move will simply fail doing so. The resulting number of overall collisions is then
divided by the number of time steps, providing an average amount of collisions per round,
or simply collisions. This number is of course also dependent on the number of agents
in the simulation, but this dependence is not linear. Therefore I did not normalise with
respect to agent number. Thus, one needs to take care to only compare values where
similar amounts of agents have been involved. Again, agents that have found the food are
not considered for collision detection.
6.5.4 Results
All measurements were taken in a open ended simulation where the food had a 3 % chance
of being moved every time step. When this happens, all agents’ internal models are reset,
and those agents who have already found the food earlier are put back into the simulation.
The simulations were run for 100,000 time steps, with 20 agents, in a 20×20 torus-shaped
grid world, with a sensor range of two. As a baseline for comparison, we also measured
those values for a group of agents that chose their actions at random, only stopping if
they chanced upon the food source. The other two behaviour modes considered here are
non-social infotaxis, and infotaxis where all agents have the ability to use a Social Bayesian
Update. The last is called Social Bayesian for comparison.
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Alignment Density Collisions
Random 0.23 1.03 0.72
Non-Social Infotaxis 0.29 1.33 1.31
Social B. Update 0.39 1.68 0.49
Table 6.1: Flocking indication measurements taken for three behaviour models. (Random, Info-
taxis, Social Bayesian
Comparing the random behaviour to the non-social infotaxis search, we notice that
both the local agent density and the number of collisions are larger for the infotaxis
model. The agents are not reacting to each other in the non-social infotaxis model, so
this is a result of the improved search algorithm alone. If we measure how long it takes,
on average, for a random agent to find the food (ca. 450 time steps), and compare it
to the time it takes an infotaxis agent to find the food (ca. 70 time steps), we see that
the infotaxis search has a much better performance, resulting in agents actually finding
the food before it changes position. This causes a local concentration of agents, as more
agents get to the area around the food location faster. This, in turn, is likely to result in
increased density and collisions.
Also note regarding the alignment indicator, that even for a group of agents which
move at random the average alignment is not 0.0, but 0.23. This is a statistical effect
and not surprising, since it would actually take coordination to ensure that all agents’
movements are always balanced between the different directions.
The interesting comparison is now between the two simpler models and the Social
Bayesian Update. In the latter, we see a further increase in alignment, indicating that a
high number of agents now move in similar directions during most of the simulation. Keep
in mind that to achieve an average of 1.0, all agents would have to move in that same
direction, in every turn. We also get a further increase in local agent density, while at the
same time the number of collisions is reduced. So while there are even more agents within
the sensor range of each other, the agents manage to collide much less.
Furthermore, if we take a look at a graphical representation of the agent’s behaviour
(two sample images can be seen in Fig. 6.2) we can see that small groups of agents are
forming when agent’s happen to encounter each other, and those groups then start to
move together. The “tails” in Fig. 6.2) indicate the last few movements of an agent, and
we can see even in the still image, that those agents that are closely group together also
have well aligned movement vectors for the last few moves.
While relying solely on visual results is problematic when identifying swarm behaviour
(as discussed in (Sayama 2011)), together with the quantitative measurements this gives
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Figure 6.2: Two visualizations from a social infotaxis simulation with 15 agents, sensor range 5 in
a 50 x 50 world. The crossed out box is the food source, the black boxes are agents. The “tails”
attached to the agents visualized the movement of the agent for the last 9 time steps. Each tail
consists of 3 line segment, each representing the vector of past agent movement for 3 time steps.
further evidence that the agents behaviour now exhibits some form of coordination resem-
bling swarm behaviour.
6.6 Interpretation
I presented a model in which the agents’ behaviour is motivated by one single principle or
goal, namely to gain as much information about a relevant variable in the environment. To
achieve this, the agents take any kind of sensor variable, be it an environmental variable,
such as the state of a grid world cell, or the action variables of another agent, and perform a
naive Bayesian update on its internal probabilistic model regarding said relevancy variable.
The agent’s own actions are chosen in regard to which of them provides the greatest
expected reduction of entropy, based on the agents’ own internal model.
In this section, I would now like to discuss possible explanations on how this informa-
tion maximisation model may lead to the three different rules which create the boids-like
flocking behaviour.
6.6.1 Alignment
The alignment behaviour seems to result mainly from the agent’s estimation of where the
food source is. Looking for an actual location, be it food or some other relevant place,
would be necessary to generate this part of the behaviour. At the very minimum, the
agents would have to believe that there is a relevant location out there and look for it.
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What happens in more detail is this: When an agent is controlled by non-social info-
taxis behaviour moves, then its action contains information about the relative position of
the food source. If we take a look at an agent moving north (due to rotational symmetry,
the actual direction is exchangeable), then the food is more likely to be in a position north
of the agent, and less likely to be in a position south of it. This effect, even though the
agent does not know where the food is, results from the fact that the agent knows where
the food is not. As seen in Fig. 4.2, the probability distribution has its highest peak di-
rectly north of the agent, and the minimum of the distribution is in the area south of the
agent. Both peaks flatten out the further the cells are away from the agent.
Another agent who observed the first agent move north would perform a Bayesian
update on its own assumed probability distribution of the food source. Everything else
being equal, this would lead him to “believe” that the food is more likely to be north.
The resulting move action would also be to rather move north than in any other direction.
A flock of agents, each observing each other, could thereby create a “travelling wave” of
high probability immediately outside of their sensor range, driving them all in a similar
direction.
The generalised principle here is that an agent 1 observing actions by an agent 2
assumed to have similar goals would lead the original agent 1 to conclude that agent 2 has
information that would make such an action reasonable, and in turn, this would make the
same action more reasonable for agent 1.
6.6.2 Separation
Whenever agent 1 observes an agent 2 moving in the grid world model, it performs a
Bayesian update for the position of the food source. The largest impact of this update
is on the probabilities of the area immediately around agent 2. The cells of the world
agent 2 observed in its previous turn are definitely empty; the Social Bayesian Update
would therefore assign a probability of zero to every cell that the agent could have seen in
its last turn. As the agent has only moved the distance of one cell its current location and
all cells around its current location that are one less than its sensor range away still have
a probability of zero. Once a probability is zero, there is no event that would cause the
Bayesian Update to assign a non-zero probability to that cell. Therefore, observing any
cell with zero probability will not yield any change in the internal probability distribution,
and will therefore result in zero information gain.
Since agent 2 is in an area surrounded by cells which agent 1 assumes to have a
zero probability, it would be bad for agent 1’s information gain to observe the cells around
agent 2. The area around agent 2 has become informationally “dead” because of observing
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agent 2.
While observing another agent is an efficient way to gain information, the immediate
environment around that agent becomes informationally unrewarding afterwards. Every-
thing else being equal, an information-driven search would therefore try to steer away from
the immediate area around an observed agent.
In general, if an agent 2 in a specific position reveals information it gets from being in
that position to agent 1, then the more information agent 1 gets from that agent, the less
informationally interesting does being in the same position as agent 2 become.
6.6.3 Cohesion
In the current model, most of the cohesion seen in our agent groups seems to be a direct
result of the high amount of agent alignment. If agents that meet each other move into a
similar direction, with similar speed, then they also happen to stay together.
While it was possible to generate a higher level of cohesion than random in the studied
model, it is unclear if such an effect would also hold in a more general model. If more
movement direction where to be included, or if the agents could use variable speed, this
part the flocking behaviour might not be generated.
One way to counter this, would be to further modify the infotaxis formalism. In general,
it would be reasonable to include a further term into the infotaxis formalism which would
account for the amount of information gained from other agents. Following from the
“digested information” principle, it is informationally advantageous to keep other agents
in sensor range, to be able to use them for a Social Bayesian Update. Seeing another agent,
and being able to use the information in its actions increases each agent’s expected entropy
reduction. This information reduction could either be estimated from past experience, or
combined with an expected action formulation even explicitly computed.
The agent would then need to maintain an additional probability distribution, which
would model the expected number of agents in each cell of the environment. This model
would be updated when another agent is actually encountered. Upon leaving the sensor
range the other agent would then be modelled with some diffusion kernel, assuming that it
would move at random. Similarly, it would be possible to use a more advanced behavioural
model. Based on this the agent could calculate how many agents it could expect to see if
it moved in a certain direction, and adjust its action selection accordingly.
I would speculate that this additional behavioural term would lead the agent to be
attracted to each other. Furthermore, I would also speculate that this effect would be
more robust in regard to different models of the world.
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Based on the previous argument, I would argue that, from a perspective of maximising
the relevant information intake, the best position to be in relation to another agent would
be as far apart, but just in sensor range. This way each agent could gain the digested
information from the other agent, but at the same time observe the most area that is not
informationally “dead”. Maintaining a specific distance, just within sensor range, would
then be the resulting macro-behaviour.
6.7 Future Work
Since all agents observe each other I would suspect there is the distinct possibility that a
positive feedback loop can emerge, which detaches itself completely from the environmental
information. As an example, an agent might take, for lack of better information, a random
action; for example to move up north. Another agent might observe the first, and if it did
not know anything apart from the fact that another agent moved north, he also would
move north. The first agent in turn might now see the second, observe that the other agent
moved north, and take this as good reason to also move north. This vicious feedback circle
then continues, reaffirming both agents internal beliefs that “they are doing the reasonable
thing”. This phenomenon warrants further study, since it could illuminate how in social
settings seemingly reasonable assumptions lead to strong “convictions” that are utterly
wrong and detached from reality.
Furthermore, it might also be interesting to move the present model from a grid world
scenario into a continuous world. This would not only create more realistic animations,
but would also be necessary to establish that the observed effects are not just artefacts of
the grid world model. The challenge here would be the extension of previously described
information theoretic tools to the continuous domain.
6.8 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter offered a quantitative analysis of the flocking behaviour resulting from the
maximisation of relevant information intake, as described in chapter 4 and 5. The mea-
sured qualities indicate that a group of infotaxis agent with Social Bayesian Update has
increased alignment and cohesion and collision avoidance, when compared to random or
non-social agents. Since these factors by itself are able to generate flocking behaviour (as
demonstrated by the boids rules), it seems reasonable to call this behaviour flocking.
Furthermore, I also outline in argument, how maximization of relevant information can
conceptually be used to generate all three basic boids behaviours. Further work would have
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to be done to evaluate if this can be realized across a variety of models, or in the continuous
domain. But in theory, there is a basis for flocking based on information maximisation,
and this chapter can serve as a proof of concept, that flocking can be generated in this
way.
As outlined in the introduction, this result is particularly interesting in regard to the
first research question, which puts this into an artificial life context. For the specific
example of this model I demonstrated that flocking-like behaviour can indeed arise from
information theoretic principles. If we were to fully accept the assumption that organism
are indeed actively trying to maximise their information intake, and also have adapted
in a way to realized the previously outlined abilities, then this indicates that it would
be conceivable that these organisms also develop some kind of flocking behaviour under
certain circumstances, or at least be inclined towards flocking.
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Conclusion
This chapter gives an overview of the larger argument running through the chapters, and
reiterates the important conclusion related to it. It also uses the insights gained from the
previous chapters to answer the main questions motivating this thesis.
7.1 Thesis Summary
Chapter 2 outlined the information theoretic agent-world model used in this thesis, and
discussed its main properties. Information was introduced as a non-semantic quantity,
independent of a specific agent’s perspective. Then causal Bayesian Networks were used
to define an agent model that does neither require semantic grounding for its symbols, nor
presupposes basic social abilities, such as the identification of other agents. The model
reflects the idea of situated and embodied cognition, where the agent has to figure out
the world from the agent’s perspective through interaction with the world defined by the
agent’s embodiment.
Chapter 3 revisited Polani’s concept of relevant information. Information is relevant
when it is necessary for an agent to perform better. This makes it possible to quantify
how much relevant information an agent needs to process in order to perform on a specific
performance level. In this context I then returned to the central assumptions of relevant
information maximisation and information parsimony. In a world where relevant informa-
tion increases for higher performance levels the maximisation of relevant information can
be easily motivated. An agent that wants to perform better needs to acquire more relevant
information. Keep in mind, though, that due to the definition of relevant information as
the minimal mutual information over all strategies with a certain performance level, there
is a clear upper limit of how much relevant information an agent can obtain. An agent
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can, of course, always obtain more information, but it is not necessary to do so. At this
point we return to the idea of information parsimony, which was itself not studied in this
thesis. The general argument here is that information processing has a cost, so processing
more information than necessary is a waste, which should be avoided. As a result, we
would assume that adapting agents would try minimize the amount of mutual information
between their inputs and outputs, ideally down to the level of the relevant information. In
summary, this motivated how the maximisation of relevant information and information
parsimony would likely cause the agents strategy to end up on the trade-off curve between
performance and necessary mutual information.
Furthermore, I argued that if the agent is actively processing information, it is likely
that the agent is situated in a world where the trade of between performance and mutual
information is “non-trivial”, i.e. the agent actually has to process more information to
perform better. Those two insights already suggested that an agent would be intrinsically
motivated to increase the mutual information between its own actions and the environ-
ment.
I also introduced the concept of unique sensor information in chapter 3, to demonstrate
how an agent could, within the same adaptation process used previously, determine how
much relevant information is located in a specific part of the sensor input. This would
allow the agent to determine that some sensor inputs are more valuable than others.
Chapter 4 introduced the Digested Information argument, where I argue that an agent
is likely to encode not just any piece of information about the environment, but specifically
those bits of information that are relevant to its own behaviour, the same information
that is also relevant to the behaviour of other agents with similar agendas. I discussed
two simulation models to demonstrate the existence of relevant information in an agent’s
action, and also discussed some related properties of digested information. Namely, that
an agent is likely to
1. encode more relevant information when its performance increases,
2. encode more information than the environment,
3. and transport relevant information from other locations and points in time to the
here and now.
Following from the arguments and simulations in chapters 3 and 4 I then concluded,
that
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from Chap. 4 An agent is encoding information relevant for its own behaviour in its
actions. In the specific simulations I looked at this information was also relevant for
other agent’s with similar goals.
from Chapt. 3 Assuming that the agent manages to realize a strategy on the relevant
information trade-off curve (either through adaptation of learning) it can determine
which part of its sensor input contains how much relevant information.
Combining these two insights it seem plausible for an agent, especially one motivated by
maximising its relevant information, to realize that there is a certain amount of relevant
information located in the part of the environment that is the other agent’s action. This
should motivate the agent to specifically pay attention to the actions of other agents similar
to itself. Furthermore, the simulations in chapter 4 also indicate that relevant information
is likely to be present in higher density in the actions of others. Combining this with the
principle of information parsimony would make the information in other agent’s actions
even more attractive, as less overall information would have to be processed to gain a
given amount of relevant information.
Chapter 5 then demonstrates several possible effects when an agent actually incorpo-
rates the information of others via Bayesian Update. The three main conclusion from that
chapter are:
1. Using other agents’ digested information can actually increase an agent’s perfor-
mance; this can exceed the performance level theoretically attainable for a single
agent.
2. Not all information gained from other agents is necessarily useful for the observer;
processing other agent’s information can be detrimental to agent performance be-
cause:
(a) In populations where only one agent is social too much information can destroy
the information gradient used in infotaxis search.
(b) Location based selection of observations can lead to a conditional dependency
between other agent’s actions, which violates the central assumption of the
Naive Bayesian Update.
(c) In an all social population information cascades can propagate misleading in-
formation through the population, which then overrides the correct information
gained from the environment.
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3. Processing another agent’s action information becomes another factor that changes
the digested information that an agent provides to others.
The concrete examples in this thesis, specifically the treasure hunter model, demon-
strated that using the information of other agents changes the information an agent pro-
vides. An interesting phenomenon here is the possible existence of game theoretic equilib-
ria. An agent has to balance its own performance against the information it provides. The
agent itself is just interested in optimizing its own performance. But if this means that
the agent would not provide any information to others, then the same reasoning could be
applied to other agents, and as a result there would be no information available to anyone,
and no one would profit from a Social Bayesian Update. But in the specific case of the
treasure hunter model with partial observability there was a specific behaviour (the one
with ca. 30% observability) that was both optimal in terms of performance and providing
information. Moving away from it unilaterally would not be possible for any agent without
incurring a loss of performance. Assuming that the chance of observation is a parameter
controlled by an adaptive process this would allow the overall population to stabilize in
this equilibrium state, where all agents would use a specific level of observation to perform
Social Bayesian Updates.
Chapter 6 demonstrated, using the same basic formalism of previous simulations, that
information maximisation can lead to flocking behaviour. This indicates the possibility
that the classical boids rules for flocking need not necessarily be assumed primitive, and
that more fundamental information theoretic principles could be used generate similar
flocking behaviour. This further demonstrates how a information theoretic approach can
lead to some form of agent-agent interaction; all that is needed is some localized relevant
information, and the ability to integrate the digested information of other agents.
7.2 Research Questions Revisited
With an overview of the whole thesis in mind we can now return to my initial research
questions. The first one was:
Does the optimization of information processing lead to agent-agent inter-
action?
This question has been refined throughout the thesis, both in scope and meaning. First,
I needed to clarify what exactly I meant by optimization of information processing? I
decided to use the principles of relevant information maximisation and information par-
simony as assumptions on how an organism might optimize its information processing to
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see where this would lead. Other options, such as the maximisation of channel capac-
ity between an agent’s actions and sensors (empowerment) or adaptation towards better
prediction of an agent’s future state where left unstudied.
I also limited the scope of interaction that I looked at, focussing on the most basic
agent-agent interactions, cutting out more complex social interactions. This lead me
to another question, namely, is there something special, in information theoretic terms,
about the information in another agent’s actions? I believe that this is a necessary first
step towards an information-theory guided sensor evolution that can account for attention
towards other agents. The early chapters then were focussed on demonstrating, with a
formal mathematical basis, that the information in another agent’s actions does indeed
have some special properties.
Assume that agents with similar goals need to acquire the same information. The
relevant information formalism together with the digested information argument show
that this necessary information inadvertently needs to be displayed in their actions. While
there are a lot of model and strategy-dependent differences the bottom line is that if an
agent wants to react appropriately to the information in the environment, then it has to
display at least the relevant information in its actions. Whether another agent is able
to use this relevant information form its own perspective is another matter, but both
the argument, and the supporting simulations show that the information is there. This
results from the agent’s drive to improve its own performance, and does not necessitate a
desire of the agent to communicate, or a joint pay-off matrix that rewards cooperation or
coordination.
For a specific agent that tries to make sense of an unstructured environment this
means that other agents are processes in the environment that are intrinsically motivated
a.) to extract the information they need and b.) to provide this information in their
actions. Arguably, they are the only part of the agent’s sensor input or environment with
that motivation. This already provides a reason for an agent to adapt in a way that
pays special attention to other agent’s actions, as they are likely to provide the relevant
information an agent with similar goals would need.
With this as a basis, we can then return to the larger question, and ask how this could
lead to actual interaction between the agents. Relying on information theoretic measures,
the special properties of digested information can be quantified from the agent’s perspec-
tive, using methods such as the unique relevant information formalism. Therefore, an
agent that is using information maximisation as a guiding principle for sensor adaptation
would indeed favour a sensor adaptation that pays special attention to other agents.
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This, together with the actual processing of information via Bayesian Update, demon-
strates that information theoretic principles alone can already lead to a rudimentary form
of social interaction, meaning that now ones agent’s actions would causally depend on
another agent’s actions. Keep in mind that this did not require any joint pay-off matrices,
or the ability for agents to directly influence each other.
In the later chapters the simulations exhibited several collective behaviours which are
also present in real, biological systems, such as flocking and information cascades. So,
in conclusion, it seems that within the scope and assumptions chosen in this thesis the
answer to the first question is positive.
Tying this back into the original, larger motivation for the question from the perspec-
tive of artificial life connects this back to our understanding of nature. Initially, I presented
the hypothesis that adaptation in nature can be understood in terms of optimizing certain
information theoretic principles. Especially in the area of sensor adaptation and basic cog-
nition this has lead to interesting and life-like behaviour (Klyubin et al. 2005b, Klyubin
et al. 2007, Der et al. 1999, Ay et al. 2008, Sporns and Lungarella 2006, Prokopenko et
al. 2006) . This work is part of an effort to further extend this information theory based
behaviour generation to also include the interaction with other agents. By reproducing
phenomena observed in nature, such as flocking or information cascades, I am aiming to
bridge the gap from basic cognition to higher social abilities. Importantly, the fact that
those different phenomena are generated with similar informational principles leads further
support to the original hypothesis, namely that natural agent are guided by informational
principles in their adaptation process. Specifically in this dissertation, one of the main
insights was the observation that agents are inclined to provide relevant information to
other agents with similar goals. This leads to the possibility to differentiate agents with
information theoretic measurements from the environment, and further creates a gradient
for the development of attention, and the ability to integrate the information provided by
others. In regard to our understanding of nature, these insight might also create a change
of perspective. Understanding life in terms of information processing is not only about
organisms that process information to improve themselves, but the environment is also
filled with other organisms providing information they already processed to others.
The second question looks at this thesis from a different perspective:
What insights can the analytical framework of information theory provide
into agent-agent interaction?
As a scientist studying nature it might be interesting to use the tools discussed in this
thesis to study the phenomena I tried to generate. As I did not actually apply any of
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the tools discussed within here to empirical data, the answer to this question remains, for
now, also theoretical.
One advantage of the information theoretic approach is that measures, such as entropy,
mutual information, etc., are extremely versatile as they can, in principle, be applied to
virtually anything that can be expressed as random variables. In this thesis I focussed
mainly on how to apply these measure to the simulated interactions of agent-agent inter-
action.
The measure of unique relevant information, specifically within an agent’s sensor input,
can give insights into where relevant information is located in the environment. While this
is not directly linked to agent-agent interaction it allows us to quantify how information is
contained in the actions of a specific agent. This might, as demonstrated, help to differen-
tiate this information from other, less interesting, environmental variables. Furthermore,
it might also allow us to differentiate different agent’s by how much information they pro-
vide. Both insight might lead to an agent paying attention to other agents in general, and
well performing agents in particular.
Furthermore, information theory allowed us to decompose the digested information in
an agent’s actions into stigmergy and action information. This allows us to quantify how
much information is in the actual action selection of an agent, and how much information is
“around” the agent, because the agent’s actions have injected it back into the environment.
This allows us to better understand where the information is located, and what is needed
to facilitate good information transfer from one agent to another. By understanding what
the current medium for information transfer is, we can better understand how sensor have
to adapt to capture this information.
One illustrative example here is the information contained in the actions and positions
of the random agent. Counter to my intuition the random agent still displayed some
information in its actions. Even though its decision where to move was random, and
therefore independent of its sensor input, the decision to move at all was not. The agent
would stop if it found the food. This led to a considerable amount of information encoded
in the agent’s position, which was measurable with the methods discussed in this thesis.
The decomposition of the partial information into the different forms of sensor input
(social and environmental) in the fishworld model also helped to explain why more agents
in the environment where bad for the social Bayesian update. The different possible causes,
such as systematic dependencies of lack of informational gradient, could be differentiated
by their different profiles for the partial information properties. While not done in this
thesis, I also believe that this analysis could be further extended, and be performed in
more detail by relying on specific measures for information flow, which where not used in
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this thesis.
In the simpler treasure hunter model, the comparison of the different strategies to the
actual relevant information graph illustrated easily which strategies were informationally
efficient and which were not. This is helpful to understand how exactly other agents
provide information, especially once the information they provide changes due to their
own information intake.
In summary, there where several examples detailed throughout the thesis on how spe-
cific insight about a system with several agents can be reached with the help of information
theoretic tools. So if the question was just aimed at the analysis in models, then the an-
swer is also positive, and well demonstrated through this thesis. In a more general context,
namely the real of nature, it remains to be seen if the tools developed in this thesis will
be of use.
7.3 Discussion and Future Work
In this section I like to discuss some general issues arising from this thesis, and outline
questions that could be addressed with further work. I will also speculate in regard to
what might be likely phenomena to arise from continuing research in this direction.
7.3.1 Deceit
The question that was raised most often in relation to this work is about deceit. I make
the claim that agents have to encode a certain amount of information into their actions.
But what if there is, different from the presented model, a shortage in resources? What if
the other agent’s actions do matter for an agent, and suddenly an agent is motivated to
hide its information? I have argued that, in our model, the minimal mutual information
(the relevant information) has to be displayed in the agent’s actions. Using any less
mutual information between the environment and the agent’s action would results in a
lower performance level. So, in our model, reducing the information is only possible if the
agent is willing to reduce its own performance.
Before we look at more general models I like to point out a possible confusion regarding
what we are talking about. The information I mean is the perspective invariant mutual
information which is calculated from an omniscient perspective; the information that is
there regardless of any specific observer. This should not be confused with the information
that another agent can obtain from one agent’s actions. The common ideas of deceit rely
on using the difference between what is actually happening, and what another agent can
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either perceive or infer from its observation.
A classic example is the kind of deceit where an agent would first determine if it is
observed by another agent it is competing with. If not, it would then perform whatever
strategy is best, regardless of the information displayed. If it is observed, the agent would
act in a misleading way or not at all.
Furthermore, an agent could also utilize the other agent’s inability to model its perception-
action mapping correctly, in order to systematically mislead it. So, the agent could act
as if a specific thing was the case (while it is not), and thereby lead the other agent to
perform suboptimal.
In both cases the agent’s actions would contain more information than the other agent
would perceive. As there seems to be a different between the actual information in an
agent’s action and the obtainable information it would be nice to clarify this further, possi-
bly finding a way to measure how much relevant information can be obtained from another
agent’s actions given a specific model of the other agent perception-action mapping.
I believe that two things would be most helpful here to address this question in further
detail. First, I would be good to better understand how an agent would adapt to obtain
and utilize this information. Secondly, making agents compete for resources, or more
general, the inclusion of joint pay-off matrices leads to a dynamic environment, in which
other agent’s action could now directly affect an agent’s performance. To deal with this
analytically we would need to extend the basic notions of game theory by incorporating
information theory.
7.3.2 Adaptation of the Bayesian Update
The thesis relies heavily on the idea that an agent would adapt to obtain and utilize
the information displayed by other agents. I modelled this by equipping agents with the
ability to perform Bayesian Updates for variables in their environment. Even if I was
just to talk about an ability that is functional equivalent with a Bayesian Update, it is
still questionable how and if such an ability would develop. Showing such an adaptation
in a simulation model would be a good step to further support the idea that something
functionally equivalent to a Bayesian Update could arise. Ideal would be to demonstrate
how this could lead to a generic Bayesian Update ability; so an agent is not just able to
perform something “like” a Bayesian Update for a specific context, but could demonstrate
and apply this ability to new contexts.
Approaching this problem from a different direction would be to study actual biological
agents to determine what methods they are using to incorporate information from other
agents. Bayesian Update was chosen for my model because it is optimal in the sense that
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it gives the best estimate of the world given the available information. But it would be
possible to consider other models of information integration, social learning and decision
making and apply similar information-theoretic analysis to them.
Even when sticking with the Bayesian Update, another aspect should be addressed
in the future. A proper Bayesian Update does not only require the ability to utilize the
Bayesian Theorem, but also requires the agent to somehow obtain a conditional probability
distribution to perform the update with. This could be part of the evolutionary adaptation
(for a functional equivalent of a Bayesian Update), but greater flexibility would be gained
form being able to “learn” this conditional probability distribution during an agent’s
lifetime. In our model we considered this distribution fixed, but if an agent could update
its distribution then information gain should also incorporate possible changes to the
model. This area has not been touched upon in this thesis, but it would be relevant in
order to understand the development towards social information integration.
7.3.3 Game Theory and Information Theory
In this thesis I deliberately assumed a model where an agent’s action has no direct influence
on the performance of other agents. This was done so I would not have to deal with the
recursive complexity that arises from adapting your behaviour in regard to a likewise
adapting environment.
The Nash equilibrium I did describe in chapter 5 demonstrated that even in this case,
there is still a possibility to influence other agents in a way that changes one’s own envi-
ronment. By passing on “bad” information, the same information could be passed back
to an agent and influence it towards “bad” behaviour. In our specific case there was an
evolutionary stable strategy for processing a specific amount only, so that no single agent
could unilaterally change its processing without losing performance. An interesting ques-
tion would be to ask under what circumstances such equilibria do arise? One speculation I
would offer here is that the model we observed was basically cooperative in nature. Agents
did not gain anything by other agent’s performing better or worse, but they could gain
more information from agents that would perform better. So it was in the general interest
of all agents that all agents performed well.
A more general approach would be take a look at what happens if agents act in a
competitive or zero-sum scenario. We could cut out dedicated communication and assume
that the only way agents pass on information is through their actions. So every time
an agent acts it has to consider both the effect of the action on the world, and what
information it transmits with this action. Arguably, one could even say that these two
aspects are now the same, as transmitting information into the world is just another way
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of affecting it.
In classical game theory, where all information is know to everyone, an agent has to
determine how to act optimally by taking into account that other agents will also act
optimally while again including how other agents will act into their decision making.
In specific cases, for example the complete-information, sequential, zero-sum game, this
results in the convergence on a specific set of strategies which are optimal in the sense
that it is not possible to act better, given that the other agents are competent.
In this extended model we could now assume that agents have a.) limited information
about the world b.) a non-perfect model of how other agents map sensor inputs to actions.
This then requires a decision making agent to not only calculate how its actions would
affect the world and the other agent’s decisions, but an agent would then also have to
take into account how its action would change another agent’s world information and the
other agent’s model about itself. A complete solution in the game theoretic sense then
would require the agent A to not only have a (probabilistic) model of agent B, but also be
able to model how agent B would model agent A, etc. This would have to be a recursive
probabilistic model of models up to the point where the interaction ends.
A nice example for a scenario of this kind would be the game of poker, or even better,
online poker. Betting is the only action a player can take, and in the online version also the
only way how to communicate with other players. Each player only knows its own cards,
and relies on an imperfect model of the other players behaviour to determine what cards
the other player has based on the other player’s actions. Both the player’s assumption
about the world and how others act change over time.
This proves to be quite complicated, and as far as I am aware there is no general
solution for how to act in this model. So, while it would be interesting to extend the
model in this thesis towards a more competitive model, it is unclear how an agent would
determine how to actively deceive others if information about the world is limited. On
the other hand, one could approach this scenario from a brute force perspective, and just
create a scenario where deception could be useful, and enable the agents to adapt their
strategy. It would then be interesting to see what kind of deceptions arise, and how they
would be reflected in the information theoretic properties.
7.3.4 Detachment of Social Information Update
Another phenomenon that would warrant further study is the detachment of “believe”
regarding some state of the environment from actual environmental evidence. An infor-
mation cascade in the treasure hunter scenario demonstrated that repeated social updates
can transfer a “common” shared believe that the treasure is in a specific location, even
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though it is not. This, by itself, is a known phenomenon, and has been conceptually linked
to the spread of religion, fashion fads and mass hysteria.
I would speculate that a similar phenomenon arose in the fish world scenario, once noise
was introduced into the agents internal models. Then agents could perpetually move into
one direction, reinforcing each others believes that whatever they are looking for would
be just out of their sensor range. This would be interesting, as it not a convergence on a
specific false assumption, such as the food is at coordinate x and y, but a convergence on
an ever changing assumption, i.e. the food is 5 spaces to the east.
This also raises the general question if the information transfer realised by Bayesian
Modelling of the world and Social Bayesian Updates could give rise to a systems that
allows for replication, modification and adaptation of information patters, common to
what is sometimes described as “memes”. The general idea of memes is that ideas or
cultural units are subject to a similar evolutionary process as biological organisms.
The idea of memes is mostly associated with Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 1990), who
introduced an early concept of them and possibly coined the term “meme”. He presented
them as a non biological analogy to the biological replicators, the genes. Both replicators
are, given the right environment, able to create copies of themselves, despite there being
no “intention” present on their part. He also introduced the idea that the fitness of those
replicators is mainly determined by three properties:
• copying fidelity: how similar, or errorless the new copies are
• fecundity: how often the replications create new copies
• longevity: for how long a particular replicator is able to make copies
These properties work well, for both memes and genes, but while the replicators of the
genetic evolution are well identified, it remains unclear what the replicators in question
for the memetic evolution are, how their self-replication process is realized and how the
properties of a specific meme are determined by the underlying dynamics.
Another major contributor is Aaron Lynch (Lynch 1999) who introduced similar con-
cepts under the name of “Thought contagion”. He modelled the spread of memes with a
model borrowed from epidemiology and defined the meme’s contagiousness as:
F (m) = A(m) ·R(m) · E(m) · T (m)
• A(m): proportion of individuals assimilated on encounter
• R(m): proportion of individuals that retain m in their memory
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• E(m): number of expressions of m by a host for a given interval
• T (m): number of potential new hosts
This model still has problems identifying the replicators, but is able to use actual
numerical values once it is possible to determine whether a host is infected with a meme
or not. His work also describes a wide array of social phenomena, from the spread of
religion, to sexual moral, to political views, in terms of thought contagion and therefore
offers a good repository of phenomena worth explaining.
While the meme analogy might be attractive regarding our intuition, there is the
question what the model of memes adds as a scientific theory (Edmonds 2002). Specifically,
Edmonds outlined three challenges that memetics needs to address. I speculate that
information optimization might be a possible route to address the third challenge, to
produce “a simulation model showing the true emergence of a memetic process”, but
there are still a lot of problems that would need addressing. First, to make the model
credible, the previously discussed assumption that organisms use an ability similar to a
Bayesian Update would have to be connected to nature. If this was possible, then it
might be possible to use the physical expression of behaviour or action selection as a
testable medium to track the transfer of memes. Here information theory could be used
to construct a metric that does not rely on a semantic interpretation of the actions to
ascertain the closeness of different action or information patterns. In a model it would
also be possible to compare the internal models and track similar similarities, but this
would be hard to verify in connection to biological phenomena later.
The advantage of an information optimization model that incorporates some form of
Bayesian update would be that it does not include an explicit replication mechanism.
The purpose of the original Bayesian Update could be just to understand states of the
environment and act accordingly. Information would in this case only flow from the
environment to an agent once. Only the addition of other similar agent would then create
the “information flow” from agent to agent, creating a new environment for information,
in which it would become detached from the original source and subject to slow changes
due to noise. Agents which perform badly might be less likely able to pass on the pattern,
which would then introduce a mechanism for selection.
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